CHATTANOOGA, Tenn., Jan. 11, 2021 — The following is evidence of the fighting spirit of David Tulis of NoogaRadio Network and 96.9 FM in Chattanooga in his case to require Gov. Bill Lee and a local official to obey state law regarding epidemic outbreaks. The case is 747 days in Tennessee courts, in which nine judges rule against every motion and petition, and the relator’s petition in equity and for writ of mandamus filed in Hamilton County chancery court in October 2020.
The Tennessee supreme court refuses to hear the case that challenges its fraudulent participation in Gov. Lee’s violent overthrow of democratically elected constitutional government starting March 12, 2020, which emergency enriched the state with billions of federal “rescue” dollars.
The case is on appeal seeking a hearing with the U.S. supreme court, the petition for writ of certiorari docketed Jan. 20, 2023.
This is part of a hearing in January 2021 among chancery judge Pamela Fleenor, Janet Kleinfelter from the
MR. TULIS: Your Honor, I object.
THE COURT: Mr. Tulis, I’m going to listen to this objection and then I’m going to tell you, you cannot continue to interrupt people. We have a certain order. You will be heard in full, but —
MR. TULIS: Well, I’m —
THE COURT: — each person gets to go at their turn.
Court accepts fraud in its venue
MR. TULIS: Your Honor, let me ask a question, please. I’m — I have two motions to strike. Why is not the strike heard first, please?
THE COURT: Because it’s a response to the motion to dismiss. It was — it’s a response. It was filed subsequent. You will be heard on that.
MR. TULIS: All right. I have a second objection, Your Honor. And I object, I object that we’re hearing from Mrs. Kleinfelter and Mrs. Milling at all, because equity principles, whether fraud or notice or good faith or clean hands or other appropriate things such as due process require, Your Honor, that the respondent hasn’t earned the right to object or make any further statement in the action for mandamus relief that relator filed in answer — in absence of an answer to the admitted frauds in this case. We’ve had fraud in the record 101 days. They can’t speak unless they address it, Your Honor. That’s why I object to hearing either of these two parties.
THE COURT: All right. The objection is overruled. Ms. Kleinfelter, you may argue the motion to dismiss.
MR. TULIS: On what grounds?
THE COURT: That I’ve already ruled on — you’re relitigating the same issues. We’re getting to the merits of your case now.
MR. TULIS: Well, we’re getting to procedure. Their, their motions —
THE COURT: Mr. Tulis —
MR. TULIS: — are —
THE COURT: Mr. Tulis —
MR. TULIS: — (unreportable crosstalk) Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Tulis, do not interrupt again. Ms. Kleinfelter, you may argue the motion.MS. KLEINFELTER: Thank you, Your Honor. So, we’ve raised a number of different grounds in our motion, Your Honor, as to why the petition for writ of mandamus should be dismissed. Some go to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and some go to the failure to state a claim. ***
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Now, Mr. Tulis, this is your time to respond, argue your motion to strike, object, whatever you want to do. Now is your — you have the floor, sir.
MR. TULIS: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. For the record for any appeal, consistent with the factual evidence in the petition, notwithstanding the boilerplate offered by both respondents, or inadequate, order denying the motion to strike respondent’s motion to dismiss for continuing fraud, which, among other things, the challenged order, consequent with granting, if justice is to be done, needed to provide notice to show how the petition was insufficient; and that this court, contrary to its actions to date, provide the state on relation with an opportunity to amend any particularized inadequacy, particularized inadequacy; then that relator refused or failed or could not amend, and to provide foundation for how this court can continue to allow fraud to infiltrate, subsist and be subsidized in chancery and tolerated by equity principles.
That despite the vast discretionary authority, Your Honor, granted an honorable court, these same requirements apply equally to the purported motions to dismiss, and this court is required to provide its valid foundation and notice for due process consideration that ultimately justice be done. Dismissal upon the otherwise inadequate, if not frivolous, motions of the respondent, in admitted fraud and breach of duty causing, with evidence of record, particularized irreparable harm to relator and — or the state of Tennessee on relation, is unwarranted and constitutionally invalid against the relators’ rights to remedy for the particularized harm — again, particularized harm — done to him by respondent in any capacity. The motion to dismiss is improper, being the fraud now admitted by respondents in choosing this route, the procedural route, has not been answered pursuant to equity principles, and the court is duty bound to summarily and immediately issue the writ of mandamus; that the respondent is compelled to obey the law and stop committing, or by omission, the irreparable harm, Your Honor, evidenced in the adequate petition, no lawful record existing to the contrary.
And so just, just briefly in introduction, I demand that justice be done in favor of the State of Tennessee on relation immediately, Your Honor. And now to the specifics of my, my motion to strike Mrs. Kleinfelter’s labors. It’s improper. We are 101 days into an admitted violation of 68-5-104. That is a fraud. Equity disallows fraud, it disallows breach of trust, it disallows oppression and violation of oath to stand unaddressed in this court. Actions by the respondent personally are addressed because his, his health security show in defiance of the law is done, I would think, in his personal capacity under color of law, not in his office.
His office has no authority to ignore the statute and to declare a state of emergency. The motion to dismiss the State of Tennessee’s claims on relation with prejudice is not particularized. It is not particularized, Your Honor. It does not answer to the fraud. And the motion that you have read and you’ve heard discussed now is from one who has no standing to argue anything. With unclean hands, admitting fraud, violating oath, there’s no right, no right of having law and notice not shine the light upon it that this case is doing. We are in a state of breach of public trust. There is no lawful title by respondent Lee before this court for 101 days. There’s no title, either, to the property of the people whom he has injured.
There is no lawful excuse. And it’s not a matter of discretion that we’re dealing with here, as we’ll discuss in a minute, I hope. There’s no lawful excuse, no discretion, in default in reply to his, his oath. He is 100 percent in the red. And if the court lets stand this motion, I would like to have an answer in writing as to what — and if I do — if this motion survives in any way, Judge Fleenor, I would like at least 21 days to answer it. Continuing. The motion that I filed with the court is for, in the alternative, misjoinder.
Dismissal is not proper, especially the bad, the bad faith claim that it be done with prejudice. The proper handling of this case, if Chancellor Fleenor wants to hear this alternative petition, is misjoinder. If the court lacks jurisdiction, as Mrs. Kleinfelter says, then Tennessee Code Annotated 16-1-116 is the misjoinder rule. It’s also Rule 21. The proper handling of the Lee portion of this petition for writ of mandamus would be transfer. And that — and she is arguing a venue privilege that deals with commissioners. But it seems that the courts would — that it’s being argued that the courts hold that these rules on commissioners having — being sued in Davidson County apply to the governor, though they’re not — there are no governor cases that I’m aware of. And if it seems to apply to respondent Lee, then I have a right to pursue this case and justice in Davidson County.
So what I would say, Your Honor, that, that if there is no subject matter jurisdiction for the propriety of my claims against him here in Hamilton County, that it be by transfer. And, Your Honor, if Lee is transferred, I would insist on the right in Davidson County to get the date of the filing there as of October the 2nd, not, not the date of the transfer. And that’s pursuant again to 16-1-116. So, that, that is the — that is my argument for dismissal. The case, in sum, Your Honor, if fraud is not addressed in a court of equity, which is chancery’s great, great jurisdiction, great Godly power, then these procedural claims are improper and this motion by Mrs. Kleinfelter should be stricken, Your Honor.
MR. TULIS: In my argument to strike the Barnes motion for dismissal and the brief attached, I assert again that it’s an improper motion, pretending to have a concern for procedure when the fraud that is in the record and not rebutted, which is disobedience of 68-5-104, is unaddressed, the fraud of disobedience to black letter law that applies to everybody, from the governor on down — everybody involved in health and public health is bound by that law. That law, in sum, is not, is not a matter of discretion. And so what I’d like to do, Your Honor, is, in this discussion about the striking the Barnes motion, is to, is to defend the petition as sufficient. Because we’re hearing here that the petition is improperly using mandamus, that mandamus is not a remedy and that I don’t have standing.
So these are, these are all issues that are appropriate in a discussion about the Barnes brief and motion, which — and so I — and I would suggest, Your Honor, that the points — since these are similar defenses by two parties, that the — that you understand my — while my words are directed upon her motion, they really are directed to both respondents together. But, but since this is an oral presentation, there may be some lack of specificity. But, again, Your Honor, I demand that her motion be stricken as improper because it fails to account for fraud.
And that’s a violation of 68-5-104. That’s not allowed in equity, it’s not allowed to have the party with a duty — a known, clear, legal duty to obey. And here we have the health administrator in Tennessee ignoring and having no proof of compliance of this statute which has about five demands upon her and her office. This, this suit was filed when I determined, as a fact, that she had not one — once looked at this law, not once had any discussions about it, there are no reports under it, not a single item of evidence that she is obedient to this law, the key health law, the quarantine epidemic law in Tennessee, ignored by the respondent Barnes. And so that is fraud, that is deception, that is damage, and we are — we are all damaged. And I’m specifically damaged as well, and that will go to my discussion on standing, Your Honor.
So what we have here with her brief is a demurrer and an evasion. A demurrer — we don’t have demurrers in Tennessee law, but that’s what this is, and it is an evasion for now 101 days. To say that Mrs. Barnes is exercising discretion is simply frivolous. It is a frivolous argument. The motion is under color of a proper motion, and it is using this court — with each day that passes without a ruling for mandamus, it is, it is asking and demanding the court perpetuate the fraud of this whole top-down solution to the year’s virus of the, of the — I object to the court not demanding obedience immediately to 68-5-104 or evidence of coming into compliance.
Court ignores evidence
The evidence is, Your Honor, that I, I insist that you ask for that they are in the process of obeying or they have plans to obey. Maybe starting tomorrow, Your Honor, that this, this official plans to start looking at the law to see what it has in there for her to do. Because as I’m asserting, I have a due process right in her compliance of the statute. My due process right, as evidenced in my affidavit of damages, my — with my five points, those damages came to me because she ignored her duty. That, that statute is, figuratively speaking, a complexity thicket. And she has to go into that thicket and meet all of its obligations before she do anything. That statute is binding upon her. There is no discretion.
As I’ll get to and talk about mandamus. There is no discretion, Your Honor, apart from obedience. Discretion does not operate contravening black letter law, in the health law, the health statute, Title 58, binding a woman whose whole life as a nurse and a local official has been under that statute. She knows that statute very well. And I would say that she’s — in her motion she is not denying fraud and she is not — she’s not saying I’m misperceiving the job or that I’m misreading. There is some suggestion that somehow I’ve just misread it, somehow this law — I’m applying it and it really somehow doesn’t apply to her.
And yet, and yet Mrs. Barnes accepts my affidavit of complaint, the petition, of 212 paragraphs, and she accepts — without rebuttal, without putting me on the stand about my injuries, she accepts the affidavit. And that’s, that’s — in chancery, there need not be — there need not be testimony in this case, because the damages are particular and personal to me. And so the petition, Your Honor, is sufficient. That is my main point here. It is made in good faith. It accurately portrays the law, the duty and the obligation of this, of this official. It is proof of disobedience of legislative enactment. The people, through the General Assembly, passed this law, and she is in stark disobedience of the people’s will through statute which applies to her. And my case, my claims are, I would say, a brilliant light on corruption, fraud, roaches feeding on a stinking cancerous tumor dragging across the calendar, of 334 days as of today, a rolling stock of constitutional violations and arbitrary and capricious acts by the boxcar, by the boxcar.
The Constitution is being violated multiple times. I’m leaving those points aside because I’m looking — I’m firing the people’s tracer bullets, Your Honor, at the locomotive pulling this ruling stock, and that’s this law and this official denying obedience and duty to this law. In her duty to obey this law, petitioner and the state on relation has their due process protections. We have protections in her duty. And I, as a representative of the public, in Tennessee and in Chattanooga and Hamilton County, I have a right and — I have, I have a claim in equity, in equity, upon Mrs. Barnes’ performance.
I have a right, Your Honor, I have title, I have interest and equity to know also from this court any inadequacy so that I can exercise my right to amend my petition.
And now as to the propriety of mandamus, this case is justiciable under mandamus and the actions sought. I have a distinct injury. There’s no rebuttal. There is a causal connection between the actions of the health director in Hamilton County and my injuries, dealing with the economy, the economic damages, and also the false threats of arrest.
Redressability, that is very clearly in my favor as well. Mandamus, which is a one-sentence order directing her to obey the law, is redress. That solves my problem, that satisfies the State of Tennessee. Again, it is discretionary. If you look at Tusant v. Memphis, 2001, a very useful discussion, Your Honor, about mandamus. You can’t use it to force a course of discretionary power. It can’t be applied upon exercises of judgment, as these good attorneys have said. It’s not enforceable for an act, quote, done by an official who has lawful authority to determine whether or not he will perform the act. You can’t use mandamus to control an official judgment or discretion. Mandamus does not lie where the right is, quote, doubtful, in Tusant v. Memphis. And also, you can’t use mandamus in, quote, any discretion concerning the doing of an act. But, but mandamus must lie to enforce an official duty as defined in law. It is a purely ministerial act. It is a summary — summary remedy, Tusant says. It is extraordinary — quote, extraordinary in its nature when the right has been clearly established. And I say I have a clearly established right in her duty. It is a command to act or obey. It is not controlling discretion. Discretion is within obedience. That’s my main position here, is discretion is not apart from and in contravening obedience to the statute, Your Honor. It is within, within the statute, not apart or against it. Just a moment ago, please.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. TULIS: I’m not done. I’m not done.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. TULIS: So, Tusant, quoted by the other side, rightly discusses the power of mandamus and its, and its obvious limits, which I’ve researched prior to coming before this court. Now, as far as — again, as far as the propriety of using mandamus, it is, it is justiciable, as I was saying. I have no other remedy. And in equity, when I’m being damaged I go to the remedy that serves, and that is mandamus. I am not asking, Your Honor, for anything that’s shocking or weird or freaky or bizarre. I’m asking for, a minimum, a minimum, in one sentence no doubt it could be done, that, that — the minimum is that Mrs. Barnes and Governor Lee obey the wholesome and good law and serve the public health. And in the interest of judicial economy, I would say mandamus is a great thing to get in your court.
It may interfere with your routine child custody, probate and contract cases, Your Honor, but because it’s preemptory it throws all your, all your dockets out of way for 15 days or so but then it’s gone, it’s gone. But that hasn’t happened. And I am — I find this a very dolorous circumstance. Mandamus, Chancellor Fleenor, exists exactly for this case. This case is a perfect mandamus case.
And Barnes and Lee don’t say that mandamus won’t solve the problem regarding their duty and my right. They’re not saying it doesn’t work. And they don’t object that my demand won’t stop irreparable harm. My demand will stop irreparable harm. And this, Your Honor, empowers you and chancery court to bring and restore the status quo ante of our rights respective. And I would say that, that regarding — that your, your authority and your — as Gibson’s Suits in Chancery points out — the 1955 edition, I believe I have, that chancery handles in wholes and not in halves. And I, I, I want to make this opportunity to demand that the writ issue. And so, finally, Your Honor, finally, this suit is upon two respondents, Mrs. Barnes being the first one in this, in this part of our hearing. They are acting outside the law, they’re acting under color of law, either in their personal capacity or in somehow miscreant use of their office. I am not saying that the state has done anything unconstitutional.
I’m not saying anything about the state. I am the state in this case. I represent the State of Tennessee. I’m the relator. I’m not saying that any law is unconstitutional. I’m not attacking any law and I’m not attacking the state. I am the state. Rather, Your Honor, rather, the State of Tennessee on relation says that Mrs. Barnes has violated the sovereign state’s legislative enactment. The state does have sovereignty. It cannot be sued. And Mrs. Barnes has violated the sovereign state’s legislative enactments through its people. And that, Your Honor, is fraud.
That, Your Honor, is irreparable harm.
And they are continuing with the court’s leave. With each day that there’s no mandamus, the one sentence that says “obey the law,” we have irreparable harm. I’m defending the law. Your Honor, I’m defending the law. The good, honest government services, it requires and it invites law and order, duty and honor, and representative constitutional government. I am personally injured. There has been no rebuttal by Mrs. Barnes on my injuries.
She — if she wants to put me on the stand about my injuries, she can do that, but I’ve got it all right there, five, five areas of damage. And the fact that we have many people damaged is a very dangerous position to take, Your Honor, and here’s why — one moment. The case Spokeo, Inc. v Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194, that’s a 2016 case, it says that “The fact that an injury may be suffered by a large number of people does not of itself make that injury a nonjusticiable generalized grievance” under the requirement for Article III standing that the plaintiff suffer a particularized injury.
There is particularized injury. And in this boilerplate law work that these two lawyers have done, they’re pretending that just because I represent the people as a whole and speak about them lovingly and caringly as suffering like me that suddenly I don’t have a damage. No, I have specific damages. And everybody, everybody who’s listening to this hearing and everybody else in this state are suffering individually in different ways. Just because we have infamy at-large doesn’t mean we don’t have infamy. And I am specifically damaged and personally damaged. And they have a duty, Mrs. Barnes has a duty, Your Honor, that implies my right of relief today, my right of relief today, for the writ of mandamus. And I think — thank you, Your Honor. I think that covers my motion to strike.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Tulis, I have one question. Could you give me the cite of that Supreme Court case again, sir?
MR. TULIS: Yes, ma’am. It’s Spokeo, S-p-o-k-e-o, v. Robins, R-o-b-i-n-s.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. TULIS: And it’s 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194.
MR. TULIS: I have more business, Your Honor.
Converting relator into a corporation
THE COURT: All right. Let me talk — I will let you get to it. Let me say this: I’m going to take this matter under advisement and issue a written opinion on this motion to dismiss and motion to strike. All right. Now, Mr. Tulis, what’s your other business?
MR. TULIS: Yes, ma’am — or yes, Your Honor. There are two orders — two draft orders against which I have written a motion of objection, and it is regarding the altering and amending of these orders. And I’m concerned in the way that I’m being treated by the respondents in this case. And their, their drafts, their legal work and these draft motions, Your Honor, that you have already signed are — that was pro confesso motion denial and that was also default motion — ruling on default denying my motions. In those — there is a trespass on this case. This is a case of equity. And the respondents pretends that it is a case at law. They’ve restyled the case. They’ve effectively trespassed on my case, as State of Tennessee on relation. They’ve seized my case and they’ve defamed me. And they’ve defamed me on these — just a moment — as to my, as to my status as a man aggrieved. I’m a man aggrieved in this case, and they are pretending that I am something, something less. And this is holding me in contempt. They are defaming me. They are assassinating my character. They are abusing equity principles by restyling this case as one seeking damages. That’s not — I’m not seeking damages. My reference is — to compensation is under equity.
You, Your Honor, have authority in equity to make things right. That’s what you’re — you’re not about damages, you’re about setting things straight. If there has to be some kind of compensation, well, that’s entirely up to you. And my motion, my petition was framed that way, as I point out. And I want these — I would like you to direct these two attorneys to halt their acts making this a fictitious matter.
They are, they are fictionalizing the case. They’re pretending that I’m seeking damages. They’re pretending that I’m a bankrupt corporation. They’re, they’re styling me — they’re not referring to parties in the body of their type as respondents and me the relator, they’re “petitioner.” And the whole, the whole brief refers to “Governor Lee,” the whole brief refers to “Mrs. Barnes.” That also doesn’t seem proper.
Your Honor, this, this is not a law court, this is a court in equity. And, and I demand also, I demand also — okay. I’m sorry. Let me finish. The problem is that I do not have a corporate capacity. I’m not involved in any legal fiction, Your Honor. I’d like that to be part of the record. I’m — it’s fair to say I’m sui juris and not pro se. And I’m a man aggrieved. I’m a private man, acting in my private capacity. I’m a soul wrapped in a body, as C.S. Lewis said.
And I’m on the land. I’m on the land. And to address this problem, Your Honor, of these lawyers reducing me and reducing my capacity into a bankrupt corporation, I, I enclosed in the exhibits my birth certificate in case there’s any question about how my name is spelled. My name is not spelled, all capital David, all capital Jonathan, and all capital Tulis. It’s capital D, small avid, and capital J and small onathan, and capital T and lowercase ulis. And that, that is the proper way. And they can’t — and I’m demanding that these people be required to not recast this case and recast me to reduce my, my standing. They are acting contemptive — contemptuously of me. And I demand an end of this, this, this trespass, this reimaging — as one of my arguments has in writing, reimaging my case to mislead this court. Could you please issue a directive and corrective, Your Honor?
THE COURT: I don’t understand why — you said your name wasn’t with all caps? I’m just not following your argument, sir.
MR. TULIS: Well, the all capital name is for corporations and people acting in a commercial capacity. I’m not acting in a commercial capacity, Your Honor, I’m acting as a man, an aggrieved man. And it’s not just a matter of the type — the capital letter got stuck on a typewriter. There’s a legal reason that people are capitalized that way. Your, your tax forms, your banking forms, all commercial instruments are usually capital letters, denoting the use that that person is applying to himself. He is — when you’re acting in commerce, under contract or as a debtor, that brings that change in the styling of your name. Styling is not an irrelevant and trivial matter, Your Honor. And that’s why my birth certificate is in the record so that the other parties will recognize me as a man. I’m a man, and I’m not in any capacity corporate and not under any legal fiction, Your Honor. Thank you.
MS. KLEINFELTER: Your Honor, this is Ms. Kleinfelter with the Attorney General’s Office. If I can just briefly respond. As I understand it, I think the petitioner’s complaint is with respect to the style of the pleadings, in which I believe both Ms. Milling and I have styled it State of Tennessee, ex rel. David Jonathan Tulis, in all capitals.
THE COURT: Oh.
MS. KLEINFELTER: And we have done the same with respect to Bill Lee and Rebekah Barnes, we have placed that all in capitals, which is customary in styling the headings on a pleading, a complaint, a motion, whatever is being filed with the court. But, Your Honor, I certainly have no objection. I mean, it’s certainly not intended to reflect that Mr. Tulis was a corporation. If he was a corporation, it would require me to have put “Inc.” after his name, for that to demonstrate that he was a corporation. But I certainly have no objection, that if he wants me to style it State of Tennessee ex rel. David Jonathan Tulis and not put that all in caps, I’m certainly glad to do so.
MR. TULIS: And what about Mrs. Milling? Thank you.
MS. MILLING: Your Honor, it does not matter to me one way or the order — one way or the other. I will accept your directive, whatever it is. As Ms. Kleinfelter pointed out, it is customary. I don’t think I have a case in here that I have not used all caps in a heading on a lawsuit. But whatever your directive is is fine, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, the court styles the case in all caps for everything. And my order entered — I just looked back at my order entered December 8th, 2020, and that’s the way we styled it. It means nothing. It’s just a formal pleading. Now, I’m going to get to the substance of your motion to object to the proposed December 20, 2020 — excuse me, December 2nd, 2020 hearing order. What the court discerns is this is in effect a Rule 59 motion. The legal standard for determining a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend is found in the case of Vaccarella v. Vaccarella, 49 S.W.3d 307 (Tenn. Ct. App 2001), which states that “These motions ‘may be granted when the controlling law changes before a judgment becomes final, when previously unavailable evidence becomes available, or when, for reasons, a judgment should be amended to correct a clear error of law or to prevent injustice.
They should not, however, be granted if they are simply seeking to relitigate matters that have already been adjudicated.'” What the court finds is that Mr. Tulis’ motions to object to the orders are simply relitigating matters that were already adjudicated. There is no new law, there was no new facts, and the motions to — and it’s not to correct a clear error of law or prevent injustice. If that’s something you need to take up on appeal, but the Rule 59 motion to object to the December 2nd, 2020 hearing order is denied. Now, let me see, I will have the — Ms. Kleinfelter, can you prepare that order, as the prevailing party under our local rules?
MS. KLEINFELTER: Yes, ma’am.