Admissions/denials for department of revenue official to answer under oath, by affidavit as to truthfulness, completeness
In interest of discovering the department’s facts and the facts surrounding its legal position, petitioner demands answers to these admissions or denials by a party representing the commissioner, David Gerregano, under oath.
If the party denies an admission statement, petitioner demands reasoning, explanation, causation, citation to law or other answer illuminating the facts surrounding department practice generally and in this case.
Petitioner proposes that if there is a misfire in a question, that commissioner counsel discuss by phone how to arrive at legal facts and dispositive material facts put into view toward agreement to give a broad platform on which the hearing officer may make his order.
The department has ascribed the suspension of Petitioner’s vehicle registration to its “administration of the Electronic Insurance Verification Program (“EIVS” or “EIVS Program”) for [Petitioner’s] failure to comply with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-12-101, et seq. (the “Tennessee Financial Responsibility Law” or “TFRL”) and Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-12-201, et seq. (the “James Lee Atwood, Jr. Law” or the “Atwood Law”) (collectively referred to as the “Financial Responsibility Laws”).” Do you admit the department revokes petitioner on authority of Part 1?
Do you admit that the department’s activity pursuant to 55-12-210 upon registrant goes beyond the authorization and described purpose of the law as stated in 202, “to verify whether the financial responsibility requirements of this chapter have been met with a motor vehicle liability insurance policy” and also 55-12-204(a), “an insurance verification program to electronically verify whether the financial responsibility requirements of this chapter have been met with a motor vehicle liability insurance policy” (emphasis added)?
Do you admit that Atwood (Part 2) runs alone or independent from Part 1 of the TFRL even though Part 1 is included in 55-12-202 & 204 as being part of the chapter (see question 2) that requires the verification of financial responsibility?
Do you admit Atwood does not define financial responsibility?
Do you admit Part 1 is only place in Title 55 chapter 12 that defines financial responsibility?
Do you admit the verification of insurance under 210, as proof of financial responsibility per 202 & 204, is required only for financial responsibility.
Do you admit financial responsibility can be completely shown or satisfied under Part 1 after an accident or judgment?
Do you admit Part 2 does not define “security” or “exemptions”?
Do you admit the only place to find definition of security or exemption is in Part 1 of chapter 12 of Title 55?
Do you admit department’s actions apart from Part 1 of TFRL deny petitioner a right to a hearing before being harmed in his rights by revocation?
Do you admit the law as written grants rights to petitioner to a hearing prior to state action against him, in that the commissioner of safety “shall provide for hearings upon request of persons aggrieved by orders or acts of the commissioner under this chapter; provided, that the requests are made within twenty (20) days following the order or act.” ? Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-12-103
Do you admit that petitioner’s right to a hearing before revocation exists because he filed notice of appeal after the commissioner of revenue’s “act” (determination of violation, sending of notices) but before his “order” (revoking registration), such petition being timely filed for hearing prior to injury to his rights by department?
Do you admit that in agency practice the Atwood law is enforced promiscuously or without discrimination, or universally upon all motor vehicles, regardless whether such automobiles have an accident as described under T.C.A. § 55-12-104?
If you deny, do you admit that the agency directs TFRL to be enforced upon all users of the road, whether drivers or operators, or whether private people traveling by right in private conveyances for private purposes (nonpublic)?
Do you admit that even if proof of responsibility were required per IICMVA (financial responsibility programs and procedures guide and the filing of an SR-22 certificate), the statute only applies to persons that fall within those provisions, and that petitioner is found to not fall within these provisions?
Do you admit or deny that the agency knowingly and intentionally denies petitioner the exception even though the department staff know he qualifies for an exception to any alleged requirement because there “is no physical contact with another vehicle or object or person” and there has not been “a judgment *** obtained?”
Do you admit or deny the department in practice rejects § 55-12-106 and has no duty under it?
Do you admit or deny that the notice process followed in this case is premised on protocol outlined in § 55-12-210 that states, “(a)(1) If there is evidence based on either the IICMVA model or the full book of business download process described in § 55-12-207 that a motor vehicle is not insured, the department of revenue shall, or shall direct its designated agent to, provide notice to the owner of the motor vehicle that the owner has thirty (30) days from the date of the notice to provide to the department of revenue”? Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-12-210
Do you admit department custom that no hearing is required by revenue prior to registration revocation because petitioner is presumed subject to the commissioner of safety because petitioner had an accident and failed to meet duties required at 55-12-104, accident reports?
Do you admit that DOR practice vis a vis members of the public is based on presumption of qualifying accident, and any person without insurance coverage is deemed a scofflaw and violator of law subject to administrative suspension/revocation?
Do you admit petitioner challenges this presumption of the department?
Do you admit in routine practice in this case you follow department practice that no hearing is required prior to revocation because petitioner is presumed subject to duties required at 55-12-105, that he failed to show proof of financial security and responsibility, and was convicted of this failure in court?
Do you admit that the department regulates the shipping public through the motor vehicle registration law?
Do you admit that the description of privilege is that it is a pursuit or occupation taxed, not as property, but as an occupation; another element in this occupation is, that its object and pursuit is directed to a profit to be made off the general public, the merchant having a relation, by reason of his occupation, to the whole community in which he may do business, by reason of which he reaps, or is assumed to reap, the larger profit by drawing upon or getting the benefit of the resources of those surrounding him?
Do you admit that petitioner is required to get his car registered as a motor vehicle even though petitioner does not use the car as a motor vehicle (for purpose of private profit and gain, under privilege of driving and operating, for commercial purposes in which the road is the place of business, as described in the question above)?
Do you admit he has the right to exercise commerce under the state privilege even if he does not currently involve himself in the occupation, calling or trade of driver or operator of a motor vehicle?
Do you admit that revocation of the registration of the motor vehicle in this case removes the legal nature of the minivan as a motor vehicle under law and leaves the remainder or balance a mere car, automobile, private chattel, private conveyance or suchlike?
Do you admit that, following revocation of registration, that petitioner has right to use the minivan as a car and automobile, apart from the jurisdiction of the department, which department recognizes as a limit to its authority?
Do you admit that, insofar as the department is concerned, petitioner is a nontaxpayer and not liable for any obligation to the department if he avoids any commercial use of the former motor vehicle, now a mere automobile and private chattel property?
Do you admit petitioner claims a right to use the disputed car privately, as a matter of right, on the people’s right of way, freeways and other roads in state of Tennessee, apart from the activity of driving or operating a motor vehicle?
Do you admit that absent a registration plate exhibited on his conveyance petitioner cannot use his car privately, outside of any commercial act, movement by car outside of the driver/operator vocation, calling, business or trade implied in the privilege scheme outlined in T.C.A. § Title 55 or Title 65 without facing criminal charges?
Do you admit that police departments, sheriff’s departments and state troopers legally and lawfully administer Title 55 and 65 upon the shipping public?
Do you admit they have agency from the department to enforce TFLR on behalf of the department upon a person who has not had a qualifying crash, as in the case of petitioner?
Do you admit that these persons are widely, commonly and generally known in Tennessee, by citizenry and public officials alike, to perform “traffic stops” and criminally charge with “driving on revoked registration” any person in car or on motorbike if that person doesn’t bear a current (non-expired, non-revoked, non-suspended) license plate?
Do you admit that these persons are widely, commonly and generally known in Tennessee, by citizenry and public officials, to perform “traffic stops” and criminally charge with “driving on revoked registration” any person in car, or on motorbike if that person doesn’t produce for the officer a current valid driver license?
Do you admit that these persons are widely, commonly and generally known in Tennessee, by citizenry and public officials, to perform “traffic stops” on any person in an automobile if that person doesn’t show “proof of insurance” regarding use of the car?
Do you admit that these law enforcers, in common knowledge, perform “traffic stops” without any regard to whether a person is (1) subject to Titles 55 and 65, chapter 15, or (2) a private user of the road (defined as a traveler without current tag, without a current or valid license, or without any license, or without insurance, not being involved in for-hire, contract or commerce activity under privilege)?
Do you admit that it is common knowledge among parties enforcing department TFRL policy in Tennessee’s 95 counties that “everyone knows you cannot use the roads without a driver license, registration and proof of insurance”?
Do you admit that the revocation of registration (permission) to use the car for hire, under contract for transporting goods or people or commercially in interstate and intrastate commerce, also brings a potential criminal charge upon petitioner for using the car privately?
Do you admit that revocation of the registration of the petitioner’s motor vehicle does not allow, under department practice and staff common understanding, petitioner to use it for purposes of free exercise of rights of religion, “a natural and indefeasible right” under Tenn. const. Art. 1, sect. 3, and “that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience”?
Do you admit that the revocation of registration, under department practice and common understanding, to use the car under contract, or for hire or commercially in interstate and intrastate commerce brings a potential criminal charge upon petitioner, a NoogaRadio reporter, for using the car privately for purposes of free exercise of press rights under Tenn. const. Art. 1, sect. 19?
Do you admit that, under department practice and staff common understanding, the revocation of registration brings a potential criminal charge among Gerregano’s LEA partners for petitioner’s exercise of the “right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common good” and to travel in his car to the county seat or Nashville “to instruct their representatives, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government” in Tenn. const. Art. 1, sect. 23?
Do you admit that, in department practice and usage, petitioner performs a criminal act if he uses the subject minivan for any purpose, with its four tires on the public right of way or the public freeway, said automobile moving down the public road, without a valid nonrevoked registration as proven by a valid tag?
State v. Booher, 978 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) states, “Thus, not only has the appellant’s right to freedom of travel not been infringed, but also, we cannot conclude that this right is even implicated in this case. Rather, based upon the context of his argument, the appellant asserts an infringement upon his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state. This notion is wholly separate from the right to travel.” Do you admit that DOR authority as exercised offends underlying rights of travel and communication?
Do you admit that petitioner’s right to exercise rights of ingress and egress privately by car are not implicated and not offended in the action by the department against petitioner in this case?
If you admit the above question, do you admit that he has a right to travel freely and unimpeded, apart any claim from the department, and that no law officer has authority as a matter of law to demand of him a valid registration of any kind or any other state claim upon his private communication in movement?
Do you admit that the commissioner in this action implicates only and solely petitioner’s rights to for-hire or commercial use of the road, under privilege, which commerce rights are laid out in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824)?
Do you admit that the commissioner in this action implicates both sets of petitioner’s rights, his right to travel and his right to use the roads under privilege to obtain a living?
Do you admit that the DOR enforcement policy Tennessee is a “pre-crash financial responsibility proof required state” is universally or generally known by police, deputies and troopers and that it is routine and part of their duties to administer what is referred to in the public as the reportedly mandatory insurance policy?
Do you admit that the Gerregano enforcement policy will operate upon commissioner’s and department’s agents, employees, allies, business partners, assigns, privies or other parties to get them to criminally charge petitioner and people in like station for being on the road with a tag suspended by the commissioner?
Do you admit the department employees in instant case recognize that “The ‘Financial Responsibility Law’ *** was enacted by the Legislature in 1951 and is carried into the Code at 2715.49 et seq” ( Now 55-12-101 et seq) and that “These Code Sections reflect the public policy of the State and are enforceable in the exercise of the State’s police power. The statute is in derogation of the common law”? Turner v. Harris, 198 Tenn. 654, 658, 281 S.W.2d 661, 663 (1955)
Do you admit that in 1951 the state and the department began regulation of motorists and accident responsibility as an after-accident financial responsibility state?
Do you admit that Gerregano directs the department in practice to reject these origins of Tennessee being an after-crash financial responsibility state, as cited in many court cases prior to 2017, given new presumed authority to make Tennessee a mandatory insurance state with proof of financial security as a precondition for a car to be registered as a motor vehicle?
Do you admit the department bases its actions upon petitioner on the phrase, “(a) This part shall apply to every vehicle subject to the registration and certificate of title provisions,” in section 139?
Do you admit claiming that the change in the law in 2014 gave new powers to the department – the change being “this part” as new language, replacing “this chapter” in section 139 in question above?
Do you admit that in agency policy and practice the § 55-12-139 phrase, “a. This part shall apply to every vehicle subject to the registration and certificate of title provisions” refers to just this section, not the entire Part 1 of chapter 12?
Do you admit some other provision or provisions giving the department authority to enforce TFRL as if it were a pre-crash financial responsibility proof required law upon all motor vehicle owners and drivers?
If so, to which do you admit?
Do you admit that, in DOR practice and custom, if a person has come under safety commissioner’s authority after a qualifying accident, and has purchased a bond to cover the past accident, that the bond is deemed by department practice sufficient for the person to use the roadways without forward-looking insurance coverage?
Do you admit that, in department practice upon the public, § 55-12-139 (b)(2)(B) says that “financial responsibility” means: (i)A certificate, valid for one (1) year, issued by the commissioner of safety, stating that: “i. A cash deposit or bond in the amount required by this part has been paid or filed with the commissioner of revenue; *** ”
Do you admit proof of financial responsibility is required only of those who have had a qualifying accident or judgment?
Do you admit that at 55-12-112 cash and check deposits to the commissioner of safety – in lieu of insurance – are described solely in terms of applicability toward payment as result of an accident?
Do you admit there is no law or regulation pertaining to deposits made, held by either safety or revenue on reserve, as a guarantee in an accident?
Do you admit the $65,000 amount is the law’s maximum amount required to show financial responsibility, and that the law doesn’t envision payments of pre-cash payments of $65,000, but post-accident posting up to that amount, fixed at the amount of the actual crash?
Do you admit 214, stating “Nothing in this part shall alter the existing financial responsibility requirements in this chapter,” is abrogated by department practice?
Do you admit that the department intends for the public to believe that any and all members of the public, including petitioner, must buy corporate partner-issued insurance policies prior to crash, as in the screengrab below?
Do you admit that, in the screengrab above, Gerregano says failure to obtain auto insurance “can result in *** losing the right to drive your vehicle?”
Do you admit that in the screengrab Gerregano doesn’t say “will result” in losing privilege to use the motor vehicle, because that is not a certitude because it is not in the law?
Do you admit that Gerregano says “the easiest way to meet your financial responsibility requirement” is to buy insurance?
Do you admit that “the easiest way” is an expression of suggestion, and not mandatory?
Do you admit the department is deceiving the public about the law, even though its policy is absolutely clear in criminal prosecutions of drivers, operators, travelers and others using the roads with no insurance policy coverage?
Do you admit that Gerregano intends the reader of the webpage above to believe that “these changes come as part of the James Lee Atwood Jr. law,” and that the state has converted Tennessee from an after-accident state to now a mandatory insurance state with passage and taking effect of Atwood?
Do you admit that Gerregano on this screengrab doesn’t actually say the equivalent of “everyone is required to have insurance to be on the road” because that would be fraudulent and untrue?
Do you admit that while public statements are not absolutely false, that enforcement of mandatory insurance on 100 percent of registered users and creation of roughly 25,000 criminal prosecutions and convictions a year are knowingly and intentionally enacted by Gerregano?
Do you admit that Cmsr. Gerregano knows, under terms of his appointment, that he cannot act “In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322?
Do you admit that Gerregano acts pursuant to policy knowing, under terms of his appointment, that he cannot act “In excess of the statutory authority of the agency” per § 4-5-322?
Do you admit that Gerregano knows, under terms of his appointment, that he cannot act on opinion, policy, desires or whims “made upon unlawful procedure” per § 4-5-322?
Do you admit that Gerregano knows, under terms of his appointment, that he cannot act in a way “Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion” per § 4-5-322?A state agency violating the law cannot violate just one law. Violation necessarily begets violation.
Do you admit that Gerregano knows, under terms of his appointment and oath of office, that if he acts under color of law, without authority, and injures petitioner and people in like station, that he is acting as a man, in personal capacity, knowingly and intentionally, without shield and immunity of office?
Do you admit that revenue’s website states plainly, “Starting in 2017, uninsured drivers in Tennessee will pay fines and risk losing their vehicle registration if they are unable to demonstrate proof of financial responsibility”?
Do you admit that the TFRL has always operated this way, that “[certain] uninsured drivers in Tennessee will pay fines and risk losing their vehicle registration if they are unable to demonstrate proof of financial responsibility,” namely those under suspension for having shown financial irresponsibility after a qualifying crash?
Do you admit that Gerregano intends to mislead the public as to each member’s personal liability under DOR policy?
Do you admit that Gerregano intends the reader to understand that this authority to require pre-crash proof of financial responsibility is universal, upon every owner or user of a conveyance in Tennessee registered under privilege with the department, apart from any qualifying crash?
Do you admit that Gerregano and his agents revoke petitioner’s registration under this claim, and under his “Tennessee is a mandatory insurance policy state” claim?
Do you admit that your alleged authority and department practice for administering chapter 12 operates as if Tennessee required proof of financial responsibility denying the trigger operative in Part 1 of a qualifying accident?
Do you admit this duty upon the public began Jan. 1, 2017, pursuant to the Atwood law?
Do you admit your authority making Tennessee a pre-crash financial security state, aka mandatory insurance state, began “in 2017”?
Do you admit the department began enforcing the pre-crash financial responsibility proof required policy 15 years after department of safety began enforcing compulsory proof of financial responsibility, circ. 2002 or 2003?
Do you admit this enforcement upon pre-accident drivers, operators and owners of motor vehicles is upon people made liable to TFRL because of the Atwood law?
Do you admit that the department operates in terms of policy that no driver or operator can lawfully use the road without having entered into a contract with a state-approved insurer or a motor vehicle insurance policy, or send the commissioner $65,000 for permission to use the public road?
Do you admit that on Dec. 31, 2015, a day prior to the Atwood laws taking effect, that your department administered the TFRL as if Tennessee were an after-accident state and that no one had to show proof of financial responsibility prior to a qualifying accident under Part 1?
Do you admit that, if Tennessee were an after-accident state prior to Atwood, that the department did not revoke anyone’s registration if that person did not have with him proof of financial responsibility prior to any qualifying accident or judgment?
Do you admit that prior to Jan. 1, 2017, the department made public statements about the voluntary nature of insurance or other proof of financial responsibility, and that motorists, travelers and drivers could have insurance if they chose?
Do you admit that your department administers chapter 12 as if the Atwood amendment taking effect Jan. 1, 2017, gave vast new enforcement powers upon the traveling public, such as petitioner?
Do you admit that the Tennessee attorney general says the revenue department obtained this power of universal enforcement of financial responsibility as an ongoing requirement for all owners, operators and drivers in 2003?
Do you admit that in his July 2, 2003, opinion No. 03-084, he states:
These questions concern the duty of drivers in Tennessee to provide evidence of financial responsibility as set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-12-139, effective January 1, 2002. Before this statute was enacted, the Tennessee Financial Responsibility Law of 1977, Title 55, Chapter 12 (TFRL), mandated filing proof of financial responsibility with the State primarily after a motorist had a qualifying accident (see Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-12-104), and Tennessee was not characterized as a “compulsory insurance” state. Financial responsibility could be demonstrated to the Tennessee Department of Safety by filing information after an accident had occurred, in connection with that Department’s authority over the licensing of drivers and registration of vehicles. This accident related
system in essence allowed a motorist a “first bite at the apple” before requiring that he or she carry insurance or meet any particular insurance coverage requirements. McManus v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 106, 109, 463 S.W.2d 702, 703 (1971).
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-12-139 changes the obligations of drivers in Tennessee by imposing an ongoing requirement that all vehicles operated on the highways of Tennessee comply with the TFRL. Moreover, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-12-139(b) relies for its enforcement on the requirement that drivers of such vehicles show law enforcement officers on-the-spot evidence of current financial responsibility in connection with traffic citations, regardless whether an accident has occurred. [emphasis added]
Do you admit there exists a contradiction between Gerregano and the attorney general about new enforcement powers?
Do you admit DOR enforces the law not only upon those who are subject to § 55-12-104 and 105, accident, but all motor vehicles registered with the state?
As regard’s petitioner’s motor vehicle insurance policy at State Farm, do you admit you got policy notice from State Farm about his dropped coverage?
Do you admit owner, driver or operator has options under agency practice as to meeting TFRL when its authority is invoked by a crash, whether insurance, surety bond certificate, bond of $65,000 or value of the accident, whichever is less (T.C.A. § 55-12-105) with safety commissioner?
Do you admit that your department suspends registrations of car owners who haven’t bought a surety bond?
Do you admit surety bonds in lieu of motor vehicle insurance policies are generally unavailable as a product?
Do you admit that your department suspends registrations of car owners who haven’t sent the commissioner of safety $65,000 nor have they obtained insurance nor bought a surety bond for $65,000?
Do you admit that relations between Gerregano and petitioner, in practice of the department, are at equity under Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S.W.2d 930, 933 (1940), “No question was raised by defendants as to the territorial jurisdiction of the case, or the trial court’s jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the court, considering the suit to be of an equitable nature, took jurisdiction to hear and determine the case upon the principles of equity under the authority of section 10329 of the Code”?
Do you admit that insofar as the privilege of operating a motor vehicle is a matter at equity, Gerregano is in breach of the terms of the agreement with petitioner in revoking a valid and currently paid-up vehicle registration?
Do you admit that the commissioner in his practice does have authority to extend his privilege tax administration beyond the scope of Atwood law’s stated purpose of creating “efficient insurance verification program that utilizes the online verification system and data transfer standards for transmitting a full book of business specifications *** to verify whether the financial responsibility requirements *** have been met” by a motorist after an accident, pursuant to section 1 of § 55-12?
Conversely, do you admit the commissioner in his practice in office does not have authority to extend his administration beyond the Atwood law stated purpose of creating “efficient insurance verification program that utilizes the online verification system and data transfer standards for transmitting a full book of business specifications *** to verify whether the financial responsibility requirements *** have been met” by a motorist after an accident, pursuant to section 1 of § 55-12?
Do you admit DOR does in practice extend the department’s powers beyond the legislative intent, as described in T.C.A. 55-12-101 et seq?
Do you admit that DOR has criteria for identifying which uses of the public road must be under the driving and operating a motor vehicle privilege?
Do you admit that DOR has criteria for identifying which uses of the road are nonprivileged?
Do you admit any criteria in the above two questions?
Do you admit that the distinction between regulable and taxable privileges are laid out, in department practice, by communications with department of safety troopers and local law enforcement agencies, to show LEOs which uses of the road are regulable, and which are by right under state law?
Do you admit that the law refers to the duty of DOSHS at TCA § 65-15-101 to “[p]rotect the welfare and safety of the traveling and shipping public *** in their contact with the agencies of motor transportation and allied occupations”
Do you admit that “shipping public” is distinct as a category from traveling public?
Do you admit that the shipping public insofar as registration of motor vehicles is concerned is comprised of taxpayers — parties requiring privilege, operating for profit and gain on the public right of way, subject to the department for taxes and fees, and subject to the department of safety for using the public rights of way for private profit and gain?
Do you admit that the traveling public is comprised, insofar as registration of motor vehicles is concerned, of nontaxpayers — parties not requiring privilege as they use the road for pleasure, exercise of rights, whimsy, private purposes, private necessities, personal necessities, and right of ingress and egress and suchlike?
Do you admit that Gerregano in official capacity, and his department, administer laws upon taxpayers subject to revenue laws?
Do you admit that your department administers laws upon taxpayers (holders of the tag privilege) only – but not upon nontaxpayers (parties exercising rights of communication, travel, rights exercise by private automobile)?
To clarify, do you admit that your department does not administer in practice and administration upon the public any law upon parties not subject to the Title 55 motor vehicle registration privilege?
Do you admit that your department lacks any authority whatsoever to impose its regulatory or tax authority on nontaxpayers or parties using the roadways apart from claims of state privilege?
Do you admit that your department lacks authority to impose tax authority on nontaxpayers who use their cars or automobiles to travel on the freeways and public roads of the state, nontaxable and not subject to privilege?
Do you admit that your department under Gerregano is careful, conscious, cautious about not seeking to impose tax and regulatory authority upon parties not subject to revenue laws?
Do you admit you received petitioner letter, U.S. mail no. 7022 0410 0002 2445 0241, dated July 26, 2023, requesting “such a plate or proof I can show law enforcement officers that I am not using the public road for commerce or for hire, one that admits I am behind the wheel for private pleasures, duties, personal purposes and for the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed, God-given unalienable and inherent rights under common law?”
Do you admit that DOR is conscious of those areas of the traveling economy over which the commissioner has no authority, and is willing to oppress, forbid, criminalize, harm and outlaw, by his high authority and influence, such areas, and the people moving and using these areas?
Do you admit that you did not supply, do not supply, nor will not supply petitioner such a plate, sticker or proof to avoid his being criminally charged for using the road privately in exercise of constitutionally protected and protectable state and federal rights?
Do you admit, given the commissioner’s knowledge of law as a commissioner of revenue, that to outlaw and arrest a class of users of the public road without trial or law would be a bill of pains or punishments, or a bill of attainder?
Do you admit that, in agency practice, such legislation or custom is understood and known by Gerregano and his agents to be forbidden under U.S. and state law?
Do you admit that the department readily violates these rights, demarcate from areas of department authority?
Do you admit that the administrative department of revenue does not, in this case or any case of a similarly situated party, abrogate common law rights recognized by and retained by petitioner under the Tennessee constitution?
Does existence of department of revenue, and its action in this case, abrogate the right of petitioner to not be a taxpayer?
Does DOR admit that in the course of one day, a registered motor vehicle can be used alternatively as a private automobile, as the legal category depends on the claims of the privilege statute and that some uses are under privilege, and some are not?
Does existence of department of revenue, and its action in this case, abrogate the right of petitioner and to use the public road freely, as a nontaxpayer, nonprivileged?
Do you admit in this case that administration of a tax law (registration) is exercise of a police power?
Do you admit that agency practices as a tax power regularly are viewed by police, deputies and troopers, exercising the police power, to arrest, seize, imprison, prosecute, and seize property of people who have a suspended tag (like petitioner) but who are using the road for private purposes, apart from the privilege and not in any way affecting the public interest?
Do you admit that Gerregano knows about and is familiar with the provision in law that “This chapter shall not be construed as in derogation of the common law, but as remedial legislation designed to clarify and bring uniformity to the procedure of state administrative agencies” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-103?
Do you admit that Gerregano and his employees are aware they are liable for performance under the U.S. Sherman antitrust act at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7?
Do you admit that department employees are aware of criminal sanctions under 39-16-403. Official oppression, “(a) A public servant acting under color of office or employment commits an offense who: (1) Intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, stop, frisk, halt, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment or lien when the public servant knows the conduct is unlawful; or (2) Intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power or immunity, when the public servant knows the conduct is unlawful” ?
Do you admit that, as an administrative agency, revenue department employees know and are aware they cannot in any way abridge a constitutionally guaranteed right?
Do you admit that, under department practice and staff common understanding,
people of Tennessee have a constitutionally protected right to travel upon the public right of way, apart from any taxable or regulable activity of the department?
Do you admit that, under department practice and staff common understanding, a right to travel exists concurrently with a man or woman exercising a state privilege?
Do you admit that, under department practice and staff common understanding, the right to apply for a privilege and to obtain it, barring any disability, operates upon an underlying right of free movement and communication, outside your department’s purview?
Do you admit that, under department practice and staff common understanding, petitioner has an underlying right to free communication upon the people’s roads?
Do you admit that, under department practice and staff common understanding, the roadways, lanes, boulevards, highways and other infrastructure belong to the state of Tennessee?
Do you stipulate that your department heads and staff operate daily on the understanding the roadways, lanes, boulevards, highways and other infrastructure belong to the people, with your department merely serving as caretaker or trustee of one aspect of the maintenance of these public assets?
Do you stipulate that, under department practice and staff common understanding, petitioner has right of ingress and egress from his abode under common law?
Do you stipulate that, in daily operation of your department, staff employees recognize “This right of ingress and egress attaches to the land. It is a property right, as complete as ownership of the land itself.” City of Memphis v. Hood, 208 Tenn. 319, 324, 345 S.W.2d 887, 889 (1961), and Landowners abutting a public highway have a right of ingress and egress to the highway where the condemning authority does not designate the highway as a limited or controlled access highway at the time of acquisition, Pack v. Belcher, 62 Tenn. App. 23, 34, 458 S.W.2d 18, 23 (1969), pursuant to T. C. A. § 54-16-104?
Do you admit that Gerregano’s policy of enforcement of the financial responsibility act brings business to agency partners in the insurance industry?
Do you admit that Gerregano’s policy affects some of the 6.340 million standard passenger vehicle plates in Tennessee?
Do you admit that the number of insurance policies under TCA 55-12-101 et seq number 5,117,030?
Do you admit that in 2022 Gerregano’s practices contributed to the F$2,677,063,051 in auto policy premiums generated for insurance companies in Tennessee, according to departmental figures?
Do you admit that a part of this cash flow is attributed to Gerregano’s practices of compelling all drivers and operators to buy insurance, even if they have not been involved in a qualified accident under T.C.A. § 55-12-104 and 105?
Do you admit that in 2021 Gerregano practice contributed to the F$2,550,344,437 in auto policy premiums generated for insurance companies in Tennessee, according to departmental figures?
Do you admit that a large part of this cash flow is attributed to Gerregano’s practices of compelling 100 percent drivers and operators and users of registered vehicles to buy insurance?
Do you admit that in 2020 Gerregano’s practices contributed to the F$2,459,366,705 in auto policy premiums generated for insurance companies in Tennessee, according to departmental figures?
Do you admit that a large part of this cash flow is attributed to Gerregano’s practices of compelling all drivers and operators to buy insurance?
Do you admit that in 2019 Gerregano’s practices contributed to the F$2,443,635,510 in auto policy premiums generated for insurance companies in Tennessee, according to departmental figures?
Do you admit that a large part of this cash flow is attributed to Gerregano’s practices of compelling all drivers and operators to buy insurance?
Do you admit that in 2018 Gerregano’s practices contributed to the F$2,380,770,332 in auto policy premiums generated for insurance companies in Tennessee, according to departmental figures?
Do you admit that a large part of this cash flow is attributed to Gerregano’s practices of compelling all drivers and operators to buy insurance?
Do you admit the state gets a 2 ½ percent fee from premiums?
Do you admit that the governor is the head of the executive branch and supervisor of Gerregano?
Do you admit that the department regularly sends notices to taxpayers?
Do you admit that the department never sends notices to nontaxpayers outside of privileged activity who use the roadways, boulevards, streets and roads in Tennessee for private purposes as members of the traveling public?
Do you admit that Gerregano is aware of the power of notices to establish a legal claim upon a taxpayer or counterparty?
Do you admit that the department of revenue party in this case sent administrative notices to the petitioner party in this case?
Do you admit that notices can be generated by either party in a transaction or in a relationship at equity?
Do you admit that Gerregano is aware of the legal principle of notice, that with notice knowledge, if not personally held, can be imputed to either principal or agent if either are put under notice?
Do you admit the Tennessee transportation administrative notice served by petitioner upon the Tennessee governor March 5, 2018, under U.S. post office registered mail RE338842074US, is known by the department revenue?
Do you admit that Gerregano personally knows about the notice?
Do you admit that if Gerregano’s superior is on awares about this administrative notice as a matter of fact or law, that Gerregano is also on aware, under the doctrine of notice (“It is a general rule that whatever puts a person on inquiry amounts in judgment of law to notice, provided the inquiry becomes a duty, and would lead to a knowledge of the facts by the exercise of ordinary intelligence and understanding. A person who has sufficient information to lead him to a fact is deemed conversant with it, and a person who has notice of facts which would cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire as to further facts is chargeable with notice of the further facts discoverable by proper inquiry. 66 C.J.S. Notice § 11 (1950). “It is axiomatic that no man can recover upon the theory of fraud or mistake with respect to any matter of fact about which he has actual knowledge or legally imputed knowledge.” Hill v. John Banks Buick, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)?
Do you admit that Tennessee transportation administrative notice is a public document, of record at the Rhea County register’s office?
Do you admit that the Tennessee transportation administrative notice declares that Tennessee law recognizes a distinction between the traveling and shipping public, between travel and transportation?
Do you admit that the notice shows laws and court cases that establish transportation as a category or type of travel on the public right of way?
Do you admit the revenue department has not rebutted or in any way disputed Tennessee transportation administrative notice regarding the right of travel?
Do you admit that revenue department has not notified petitioner, drafter of the notice, of any errors in its analysis, and has not rebutted said notice in any way, either orally or in writing, either by public document or by private means?
Do you admit that Gerregano is aware, on account of his high office and great responsibility, of the legal doctrine regarding notice, specifically of the doctrine of acquiescence by silence?
Do you admit that by policy, directive, custom, usage, memorandum, public statements and such like that Gerregano in his person administers the claim that all private travel by right in Tennessee is criminal activity subject to misdemeanor arrest and charges?
Do you admit that by policy, directive, custom, usage, memorandum, public statements and such like that Gerregano in his office, representing the state, administers the claim that all private travel by right (as is petitioner’s) in Tennessee is criminal activity subject to misdemeanor arrest and charges?
Do you admit that the department has authority to solicit an indictment from the Hamilton County grand jury of petitioner for his admissions to using the roads as a private party, before suspension of registration and after suspension of registration?
Do you admit that the department would be following its policy, custom and usage to initiate such a criminal prosecution in the public interest?
Do you admit, on Gerregano’s personally reading the Tennessee transportation administrative notice, that you do not uncover any errors in its citation to statute, court cases and regulations pertinent to transportation and travel?
Do you admit that your department has not in any way objected to any part of Tennessee transportation administrative notice?
Do you admit that your head, the governor of Tennessee, has in no way apprised you that he has objected to Tennessee transportation administrative notice?
Do you admit that your head, Gov. Bill Lee, has in no way directed you to rebut or refute Tennessee transportation administrative notice, a public document registered in the Tennessee public record, and entered as a notice in this case?
Do you admit that the administrative notice filed in this case, of record, describing the financial responsibility act of 1977 describes the state of the law?
Do you admit petitioner’s administrative notice about the financial responsibility law, of record, puts Gerregano on awares about the law?
Do you admit that the July 21, 2023, Gerregano suspension letter cites Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-5-117(a)(1)-(5), which provisions include (1) fraudulent issuance, (2) wrecking of vehicle, (3) unpaid fee, (4) display on wrong vehicle or (5) nonresident dispute, a chapter pertaining to theft,
Do you admit that in this case none of these points (1-5) apply to the facts in record about petitioner?
Do you admit that you cannot, and have not, informed petitioner of the exact provision in § Title 55 chapter 12 that converts the after-accident protocol of the law into a comprehensive liability, duty and obligation upon him or any other licensee or registration in similar station?
Do you admit that you cannot inform petitioner of the exact provision in chapter 12 that converts the after-accident protocol of the law into a comprehensive liability, duty and obligation upon him and all licensees and all other users of registered motor vehicles?
Do you admit that you have identified and discussed purported flaws in the TFRL administrative notice by petitioner?
Do you admit that you have advised your staff to continue existing enforcement practices, and have knowingly and intentionally not shut down the agency program of enforcing TFRA as if Tennessee were a compulsory insurance state?
Do you admit that the department of safety under Cmsr. Jeff Long tells a different story than do you about chapter 12 of Title 55 and the alleged change in the law in Tennessee from financial responsibility to mandatory insurance?
Do you admit that revenue’s co-equal state agency at safety and homeland security declares on its website that the state shifted to a mandatory insurance state in 2002?
Do you admit there is a conflict in the two agencies’ report to the public about the law imposing “mandatory insurance” on all registered vehicle owners?
Do you admit that the screengrab in this question is accurate as to the safety department’s claims about the law?
Do you admit that state of Tennessee, the department of revenue, and Gerregano do not have a mandatory insurance law to administer in this case?
Do you admit that Gerregano uses section 55-12-139 in the law, the penalty statute, to confer a duty, liability and legal obligation upon every registered motor vehicle owner?
Do you admit that the liability statute in 55-12-101 et seq becomes operative upon any member of the driving public upon a qualified accident?
Do you admit that Gerregano knows and realizes that without a liability statute upon petitioner, he has no authority over petitioner in his official capacity and in his office?
Do you admit that, according to agency practice and staff common knowledge, the Atwood law gives no new powers to any branch of state government, and does not convert Tennessee into a mandatory insurance state?
Do you admit that Mr. Gerregano’s enforcement of a mandatory motor insurance policy upon petitioner and others in like station is apart from the 2015 update of TCA 55-12-101 et seq?
Do you admit that Mr. Gerregano’s actions upon petitioner’s registration is based upon department policy?
Do you admit that Mr. Gerregano’s actions upon petitioner’s registration is based upon under his continuing personal direction?
Do you admit that Mr. Gerregano’s actions upon petitioner’s registration are based upon department actors’ and predecessors’ agreement?
Do you admit that you use the U.S. mails to send revocation letters to motorists in Tennessee upon whom you are revoking registration of their vehicles?
Do you admit that transportation in Tennessee is governed by the U.S. congress and that no law or regulation is allowed to contradict any provision of federal law at 49 U.S.C.?