1. Standing to sue, failure to acknowledge existing material facts
The orders of the court held by Hamilton County chancery court judge assert relator has no standing to sue and such claim is reviewable by the court of appeals without a presumption of correctness. It is well recognized that a party must show three “indispensable elements” to establish constitutional standing: (1) a distinct and palpable injury, as opposed to a conjectural or hypothetical injury; (2) a causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) the alleged injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable decision of the courts, the focus being upon the relator and the nature of the source of the claims — in part, concerted frauds under color of authority. The petition evidences relator’s standing to bring the suit.
Real harms caused by violation of duty
To secure standing, relator shows he has been personally, particularly and specifically harmed, with injuries that are actual, not theoretical or prospective. The relator testifies to harms in the petition that he is “being irreparably injured” (p. 11, ¶ 21, 22) and an “oppressive interference with relator’s liberty or other lawful interest” (p. 15, ¶ 50). Relator, under direction of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-25-101, files petition “supported by affidavit” (p. 42 ff), to establish justiciability by evidence of personal harm from respondents’ wrongs. The affidavit evidences five harms — two threats of arrest, religious injury, economic injury and denial of right to honest government services, each sufficient to establish standing, each admitted by respondents, none denied or particularly challenged as to veracity, extent, historicity or level of detail.
The petition and the affidavit of irreparable harm are taken true and as evidence. “In a judicial proceeding, nothing is believed unless proved upon oath,” Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, 1955 ed. § 71 Maxims Applicable to the Practice of the Court; “[W]hen a fact, or state of facts, is duly verified by the affidavit of a competent person, the Court accepts such affidavit as absolutely true” § Id. 833, Weight and Effect of an Affidavit. There is (1) a distinct and palpable injury (p. 43 ¶ 1, p. 44, ¶¶ 22, 23), caused by concerted frauds committed by the respondents under color of authority, harms that would not have happened but for these “fairly traceable” acts or omissions (Barnes directive No. 1, pp. 8, 39, p. 43 ¶ 9) (Lee executive order No. 14, p. 13 ¶ 33, p. 73 ff).
And (2), the causal connection of concerted frauds committed by the respondents under color of authority, acts of omission and commission, are “fairly traceable” from the petition. The harms personally suffered by relator in the “stay at home” edicts lawlessly promulgated result from violations of law by respondent William Byron Lee, acting in the office of governor.
To secure relator’s rights and the rights of the people in the state of Tennessee, Lee took an oath to obey the state’s laws and administer them, including T.C.A. § 68-5-104 (p. 9 ¶ 10; p. 10 ¶ 12). Barnes is employed by Hamilton County as health department administrator subject to T.C.A. § 68-5-104 (p. 10, ¶¶ 11, 12). Respondents, prior to suit, are demanded to show obedience to law. They supply no evidence of compliance with the law, and so admit violating it (p. 12, ¶ 30; p. 13).
Their unwarranted actions directly irreparably harm relator in his fundamentals rights (p. 42), redressable through the Tennessee constitution that grants “every man, for an injury done him” a “remedy by due course of law,” constitution, article 1, sect. 17. Such violation has allowed respondents, by “such tactics as subterfuge, confusion, and deceit,” (p. 15, ¶ 49), to violate state law. And (3), the “injury is capable of being redressed,” in chancery, with its “exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases of an equitable nature” where the debt or demand exceeds $50, T.C.A. § 16-11-103, with power to abate nuisances, T.C.A. § 16-10-110 (shared with circuit courts), and correct respondents subject to equity of their oaths of office for wrongs done in violation of law under color of their offices. The indispensable elements for standing being met, the court’s assertion that there is lack of subject matter jurisdiction “because Relator lacks standing” (pp. 217, 232), is incorrect, prejudicial and causes injustice.
The petition lays forth necessary factual predicates to filing suit that are material and sufficient. Exhibit 1 is relator’s affidavit of personal harm (p. 42). The affidavit of five harms reports relevant material facts that have probative force and legal relevance to the cause. Respondents do not object to any one fact, or attack any one fact to make it less probable or less credible. Relator’s facts are of consequence to the determination of the action. They come from relator, a witness with first-hand personal knowledge whose credibility is at no point of his testimony impugned by respondents or the court. The facts of the affidavit amount to the essential elements of his claim, and are not particularly or specifically impeached. But chancery, like respondents, ignores them.
In its second round of double dismissal orders, chancery acknowledges three facts.
As to Relator’s claim that his affidavit establishes particularized harm to him, only paragraph 1 and paragraphs 23-24 of the affidavit arguably could state any particularized harm allegedly suffered by Relator. (pp. 495, 496) (emphasis added)
Paragraph 1 describes relator’s being thrown out of the county courthouse under threat of arrest for having a bare face (p. 42). Paragraphs 23, 24 describe police officers’ threatening to arrest him if he gets out of his car at a church during a “parking lot” Christian worship service (p. 44).
Chancery “sees” these three facts, but dismisses them because (1) the police officers making the threats are not the respondents, and (2), “Relator [does not] allege Barnes injured Relator,” who “only alleged certain deputies and certain police officers injured Relator” (p. 496).
These three admitted facts are sufficient to establish standing. Gibson discusses justiciability in the context of petitions for declaratory judgments, when a controversy may be merely theoretical or threatened. The petition in instant case brings judicial cognizance to a conflict created by respondents against relator’s liberty and property interests. These interests are concrete, not theoretical or abstract. The harms testified to create an actual, genuine, live controversy, “the decision of which can definitely affect existing legal relations” Gibson, Id., § 1178, The Character of Adverse Interest. Relator has substantial clear interest in his harms, an interest that “must be present, and not contingent.” The petition establishes a claim of right, and asserts it against respondents’ having an interest in contesting it. “When that happens, it is a justiciable controversy.” Id.
This cause originates in fact, and is based on facts and law. The facts are supplied entirely by the state of Tennessee on relation by petition. Chancery operates in favor of respondents who provide no facts. Chancery accepts silence from respondents-in-fraud, observes them evade the law, accepts open fraud in its venue of equity, utters not a dissenting syllable of its misrepresentations, and in its rulings does obfuscate, confuse and decohere the plainness of this cause and the statute it seeks to have upheld. Existence of a single fact as to relator’s personal harms (three are cited above) show the lower court subject to reversal and relator due a writ of mandamus or other equitable remedy by right in equity.
The court does not acknowledge material and dispositive facts. Not seeing and disclosing facts, the court does not see relator’s standing, and does not register claims upon respondents for which relief should be granted.
Aside from the affidavit of harm, exhibits show respondents admit disobedience to the law. In relator’s facts within the case are affidavits (such as affidavit of clerk & master hearing, exhibit of relator’s birth certificate) and several motions-cum-affidavits. These are affidavit of Oct. 30 hearing p. 102; default motion, p. 122; Lee alter motion, p. 250; Barnes alter motion, p. 297; Affidavit & Motion to Object to Billing by Party in Fraud, p. 471.
Chancery shows favor of respondents who file no affidavits, who offer no testimony, who demand no testimony from relator at any of three hearings. Chancery accepts that they do not put him on the stand to debunk his testimony, yet sides with respondents-in-fraud’s vague claims that relator has no personal harm and no facts.
Chancery makes no written findings of facts. It seems free to apply law apart from facts. It determines relator suffers no harm upon which to make a claim because he has no facts. In seeing no facts, and thus in hearing allegations of harm as mere static, the lower court favors respondents-in-fraud and sees in them no lack or shortage of equity and justice. “If [respondents’] answer fails to deny important facts alleged in the bill, every intendment will be made against it: allegations of the bill not denied, nor confessed and avoided, will be taken as true” Gibson, Id., § 1132. Pleadings in Suits for Mandamus, and Proceedings Thereon. Chancery extends courtesy and partiality to them, since they innocently are brought before chancery under allegations of wrong that are alleged to have no basis and be meritless.
The record makes plain the 2020 “Covid-19” disaster is one not just of a virus, medical science and military-gain-of-function research applied upon the people of Tennessee. It is one of maladministration, malfeasance, dereliction of duty, official misconduct and mass tortmongering, according to the petition and affidavit. Even if relator has no standing, the record of mass wrong cries for intervention by the court, if not to the grand jury of Davidson or Hamilton counties, then to the sheriff or to the attorney general for criminal prosecution of T.C.A. § 39-16-401, official misconduct (pp. 471, 478; transcript of evidence-1, p. 6, pp. 26, 27, pp. 49, 51).
MR. TULIS: *** Will the Court acknowledge this statement of official misconduct by respondents and these two officers of the court as a *** formal complaint, Your Honor?
THE COURT: No, sir. You, you — that —
MR. TULIS: You will — you will not acknowledge that as a notice?
THE COURT: here — No. No, sir. We’re, we’re
MR. TULIS: All right.
THE COURT: — on a motion to alter or amend, sir. You, you — All right. You’re way outside of the scope there. You, you have other avenues for that.
(Transcript of evidence-1, p. 51, lines 8-22)
Chancery’s approach to facts is twofold. It proposes facts that could emerge theoretically if the law at T.C.A. § 68-5-104 were in operation (which law relator shows is being ignored) — facts that chancery says are missing. It also does not read the petition and see the record of unrebutted affidavits.
A rare instance of chancery’s admitting that other facts may, indeed, exist is a discussion in dismissal No. 1 of theoretical facts the court identifies as absent, warranting dismissal of the suit.
Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus under T.C.A. 68-5-104. *** [N]owhere in his petition does Relator claim to be someone who was declared to be subject to isolation or quarantined. Nor does Relator seek a writ ordering Respondent Barnes to confirm his diagnosis that required Relator to be quarantined. The Court determines that Relator failed to allege that he sustained a concrete, injury in fact.
Thus as additional grounds, the Court determines that Relator lacks standing to have a writ issued pursuant to T.C.A. 68-5-104, because Relator failed to allege that he was quarantined or escaped from quarantine, so as to demonstrate a right to relief under the statute. Tusant, supra. Further as he has alleged no right to relief under the statute then it follows there is no clear ministerial duty that Barnes must perform as a remedy. (p. 209) (emphasis added)
The court says relator has no “injury in fact” because he “failed to allege that he was quarantined” and such facts from another case. He cannot show that the law was operational under respondent Barnes, and that he is harmed by that operation and denied his rights. Let the court take judicial notice: The law is not being observed and is not being obeyed. (See pp. 308-312 about the court’s foray into fourth-dimensional suppositional “facts,” its creation of a case different from the one relator files.)
The relator “failed to allege” that he “sustained a concrete injury in fact” and did not “claim to be someone who was declared to be subject to isolation” and he failed to show Barnes “confirmed his diagnoses” requiring quarantine and that he “failed to allege that he was quarantined or escaped from quarantine.” It is error to say “petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus under” T.C.A. § 68-5-104 (p. 209). Rather, he evokes the mandamus law to bring Lee and Barnes under that law to show cause the nonfraudulent exigency for the health emergency they purport exits. He seeks mandamus and other appropriate equity pursuant to the constitutional guarantee to relief for harm done through dereliction to confine themselves to the proper course of communicable disease law. He is not the subject of the law.
In this fictionalizing of the case and seeing missing facts, as it were, chancery fails to understand the petition and inserts irrelevant material — as if anywhere relator says he has been subject to the operation of the statute. It appears frivolous to so mistake the case. Chancery appears to intend to misunderstand relator’s intentions or the suit, and to follow the judicial department policy in exercise of prejudice against state of Tennessee on relation.
Relator grows concerned the court sees no facts. He files the affidavit in support (p. 469) into the case “moving the court for an order that the tendered Exhibit No. 1, numbered by the court in the hearing, filed with the clerk and master April 6, 2021, at 3:52 p.m., be entered into the record.” (See record, Exhibits-1). Relator attempts to read the affidavit into the record, and is shut down (Transcript of evidence-1, March 30, 2021, hearing, p. 8-11).‡
Beyond theoretical missing facts, the court has a second method of seeing no facts. It follows lawyerly gazoozling of respondents’ briefs that make relator’s facts “only [alleged] generalized grievances” (p. 215).
Here’s the method. Relator has no “standing to sue as he only alleged nonjusticiable generalized grievances” against respondent Barnes, thanks to the noisome throng respondents say effectively is drowning out testimony of relator’s affidavit; the bustle of general public faces prevents chancery’s seeing relator’s mug (muzzled under threat in violation of relator’s rights) (p. 151). It uses his references to other Tennesseans (p. 216) — expressing the civic and public welfare nature of the petition — to nullify material facts regarding his own personal harms. Chancery makes one part of the case cannibalize the other (p. 321).
Chancery rules (on Lee, p. 228) that if other people have been hurt in respondent’s act, relator cannot have facts particular to him as to give him standing (pp. 227-232). Lee makes remarkable claims of innocence on account of multiplicity of victims. Relator may make claims of being hurt, Lee says; “But that’s an injury, Your Honor, that is common to all the citizens of the state of Tennessee, not just the petitioner,” (p. 410, transcript p. 22, line 19). The more that other people are hurt, the less blame is respondent Lee liable for harm against any one of them. The more the number of people whose lives and finances are ruined, and who are defrauded into the experimental jab peril, the less harm, according to Lee.
Court sees no harms, no facts
The rules of equity would seem to not allow casuistry to control an honorable court.
The court that makes no written finding of fact is greatly influenced by respondents-in-fraud as to their harms, awaits correction as to the facts in the record, and hence relator’s honorable standing on the land as an aggrieved man to sue and be heard. See particularized harm discussions, p. 261 ff (Lee) and p. 306 ff (Barnes).
Chancery finds no claim of harm based on relator’s affidavit. It discerns no acts upon which to apply the law and give relief. Nor does it see the facts within the case of how relator establishes his claims for harm. Chancery says he has nothing justiciable in the petition. State of Tennessee on relation alleges fraud 18 times in the petition. Respondents do fraud under color of law in concert. These are claims the court is empowered by proper and sufficient petition to stop.
If relator sues, provides facts, and fails to make an allegation based upon those facts, then whence chancery authority to not forthwith notify relator that he must amend the complaint, and add allegations? State of Tennessee has the right to amend when faced with a motion to dismiss. “If, by amendment, the irregularity [in a lawsuit] can be remedied, or, if the defect or omission can be supplied, it is the duty of the Court to allow it to be done; for the Courts are instituted to enable complainants to have a hearing on the merits” Gibson, Id., § 273, The Office of a Motion to Dismiss.
If there be any Equity, at all, on the face of the bill, even if it be defectively stated, the motion to dismiss cannot prevail; and, on such a motion, every reasonable presumption is to be made in favor of, rather than against, the bill. Id.
Chancery appears unwilling to disclose facts, to exercise a discretion to find no facts that secure relator’s standing in a statewide respondent-imposed disaster. Is the court doing its duty in finding no facts, or is it exercising discretion and bias to declare the relator not harmed and without standing. Chancery denies a duty to look deeper if it couldn’t find any facts to extract any possibility of facts, which it does in its second round of dismissals (“affidavit arguably could state any particularized harm,” p. 496). A single probative fact proves chancery 100 percent wrong. The State of Tennessee demands on relation that the court correct this maladministration of the equity court.
‡ THE COURT: It’s in the record, sir. There is –MR. TULIS: But, Your Honor, you have ignored this record, and the respondents’ attorneys have, in bad faith, smeared the glass in such a way that it is invisible to you and illegible to you. But I would like to — I insist on entering my affidavit into the record in this hearing, Your Honor. It has to be in the record. *** I’m insisting on reading it into the record, because the document has not been noticed or read, Your Honor.
It’s a due process right to enter my evidence into this record, in this hearing, seeing that it has been ignored for these *** 179 days, Your Honor.