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‘Pre-plea remedy & avoidance’ slaps traffic charge; ‘must be heard in Nashville under uniform administrative procedures act’

“I object to these proceedings,” I tell a sheriff’s deputy to handcuffs me though telling me I am not under arrest. (Photo David Tulis)

Affidavit, pre-plea remedy and avoidance

Comes now accused, living in Hamilton County, Tenn., and does attest to the following matters pertaining to his arrest Nov. 22, 2023, by Hamilton County sheriff’s department to be true, accurate, and complete, to the best of his knowledge.

Accused challenges the state’s claim that its case gives the court subject matter jurisdiction because the accuser State of Tennessee has made appearance without having exhausted its administrative remedies before bringing the matter for enforcement in criminal jurisdiction, a case based on presumption the accused herein rebuts. 

The matter at issue is under the uniform administrative procedures act (UAPA) at Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-101 et seq. Controversies over licenses are administrative in nature (“[T]he grant or refusal of a license to use public highways in commerce is purely an administrative question.” McMinnville Freight Line, Inc. v. Atkins, 514 S.W.2d 725, 726–27 (Tenn. 1974)). (1) Accused demands his right to have the dispute over a license be heard first by State of Tennessee under auspices of its department of safety and homeland security, responsible for issuing the license upon which claim is made, the court not yet qualified by ripeness of the allegations to determine if State of Tennessee has authority make a claim for which relief may be granted as a criminal matter.

Factual Background

On Nov. 22, 2023, at 6:26 a.m., deputy Brandon Bennett of Hamilton County sheriff’s office chases accused southbound on state Highway 153, running his blue lights. He arrests accused in a retail parking lot opposite the Hixson Wal-Mart store for “a broken passenger taillight in which white light could be seen.”

Deputy Bennett in “incident narrative” and affidavit of complaint describes the seizure as a “traffic stop” for a “passenger taillight” of a “vehicle” being “[operated]” by a “driver and violator.” (2)

“I explained [to] Tulis he must be in compliance with Tennessee Law while operating a vehicle on public roadways. I then asked for Mr. Tulis’ driver’s license which he refused to produce. Mr. Tulis stated he did have a license, but did not want to give it to me. I advised *** I needed his license to identify him as the driver and violator. Mr. Tulis again refused so *** I asked him to step out of the vehicle, which he did,” according to the affidavit of complaint.

“What makes you believe right now that I’m traveling right now in commerce?” accused asks Mr. Bennett.

BENNETT “Well, I observed you on the motor way and *** I do believe you to be the person operating this vehicle as of right now.”

TULIS “I rebut the presumption, sir, I’m operating a vehicle. Right now, I would rebut the claim that I am driving and operating a motor vehicle. Is it not possibly prudent for you to determine whether or not I’m involved in the activity under the privilege right now? That would be under [Title] 55, chapter 50, and also under [Title] chapter 65 under the Tennessee code annotated, which is carriers.”

 BENNETT “You’re not. I’d say you’re not. You’re not. If I take this before a judge he’ll also state that, ‘Yes, you are in violation of a traffic law under section 55 of — ”

TULIS “The light law?”

BENNETT “— Yes.”

TULIS“— Yes, well. I rebut the presumption, officer ***. ”

Audio/video record shows Mr. Bennett stating three times that accused is not acting in commerce.

Mr. Bennett, under color of office, orders accused from his car and binds his wrists, arresting and imprisoning him. Mr. Bennett takes accused to Hamilton County detention center, aka Silverdale, whereupon in name of State of Tennessee accused is criminally charged and booked without warrant as required under T.C.A. § 40-7-103, the alleged breach not meeting the legal standard for public offense.

Magistrate Blake Murchison states at a hearing he finds probable cause for the arrest, and releases accused on his own recognizance.

The allegations arise from Hamilton County sheriff’s office colorable administration of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ Titles 65, carriers, and 55, motor and other vehicles. Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 55 regulates the privileged field of activity called transportation. The privilege is the trade, business, calling or taxable vocation styled “operating” or “driving” a “motor vehicle,” for which authority is state of Tennessee through the exercise of a state  privilege in the Uniform Classified and Commercial Driver License Act of 1988, regulating transportation on Tennessee roads, Title 55, motor and other vehicles.

Deputy Bennett’s vocabulary is thoroughly commercial, down to describing the right-rear taillight as the “passenger side” of the car. A guest or rider sits in the right-hand seat, in “absence of any contractual relation between the parties”; in contrast, a “passenger” pays for transport under §§ 65 and 55. Talbot v. Taylor, 184 Tenn. 428, 429–30, 201 S.W.2d 1, 1–2 (1935) (abrogated by a 1992 case on other grounds).

A sheriff’s deputy says “driving is privilege” and his job is to protect constitutional liberties. Our court proceedings will hold him to account on these claims. (Photo David Tulis)

Petition for pre-plea avoidance

The state’s case fails to give the court subject matter jurisdiction because (1) the party bringing the claim is acting outside of statutory authority, (2) the court into which he files his allegation receives it prematurely, and (3) because the accused is in no way known, on Nov. 22, 2023, at 6:26 a.m., to be involved in privileged activity subject to the commercial and administrative authority of Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 55.

Privilege enforcement in Tennessee arises from the general assembly’s constitutional authority to regulate trades, granted Tenn. const. art. 2, sect. 28, “The Legislature shall have power to tax merchants, peddlers, and privileges, in such manner as they may from time to time direct, and the Legislature may levy a gross receipts tax on merchants and businesses in lieu of ad valorem taxes on the inventories of merchandise held by such merchants and businesses for sale or exchange.” Privilege management is described in Phillips v. Lewis, 3 Shannon’s cases 230 (1877) (emphasis added) (3)

Criminal enforcement and administrative regulation are distinct areas of law. The case before the court originates in administrative regulation, which is civil. The criminal authority invoked only on articulable, reasonable or warranted suspicion of a crime under Tenn code ann. § Title 39 having been committed. State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335, 343–44 (Tenn. 2003). (4)

Only a member of the highway patrol can stop a motor vehicle traveling on the road without probable cause. “(c) Unless a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed, no officer, except members of the Tennessee highway patrol acting pursuant to § 4-7-104, shall have the authority to stop a motor vehicle for the sole purpose of examining or checking the license of the driver of the vehicle” (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-103).

The trooper’s authority to stop motor vehicle operators apart from probable cause inheres in the pre-agreement to be stopped on part of the driver or operator of a motor vehicle, that being through his application for a classified and commercial driver’s license under § 55-50-101 et seq. (5) A licensee “on the privilege” – or exercising the activity under state privilege – is subject to state trooper administration of the regulatory laws upon transportation or traffic. Transportation is under privilege because no one has a right to use the public right of way for private profit and gain; only licensees under taxable privilege may use the people’s public roads for gain. (6)

Driver licenses are purely an administrative matter enforceable by the Tennessee department of safety and homeland security (DOSHS). “The members of the Tennessee highway patrol have jurisdiction and authority to make such investigation of operators of motor vehicles for hire as they may see fit to ascertain whether or not they are operating in compliance with § 65-15-109, and whether or not they are otherwise complying with the law relating to such operators, and they have authority to make arrests for any violation of title 65, chapter 15, or of any other traffic law of the state.” (Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-7-105)

The DOSHS commissioner signs a semiannual covenant with the U.S. department of transportation for fiscal years 2022-2024 to receive federal funding to improve commercial motor vehicle safety. The document is “TENNESSEE Commercial Vehicle Safety Plan Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program Fiscal Years 2022 – 2024” (hereinafter, “TCVSP”) EXHIBIT No. 1. (7)

In the TCVSP, the commissioner states on p. 4 – “The Tennessee Highway Patrol of the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security (TDOSHS) is the sole agency in the State of Tennessee responsible for enforcing laws related to size, weight, and safety regulations for commercial motor vehicles. The Tennessee Highway Patrol is the State’s lead agency for the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program and does not fund any sub-grantees” (emphasis added).

TCVSP, on p. 5, states that the highway patrol’s overseer, DOSHS, enforces the operating and driving privilege upon commercial motor vehicles to protect “the general public.”  (8)

According to Tennessee Code Annotated (TCA) Title 65 Chapter 15, the Tennessee Highway Patrol (THP) is the lead agency in the State of Tennessee responsible for enforcing laws related to size, weight, and safety regulations for commercial motor vehicles and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program. No sub-grantees are funded. The THP uses various regulatory, enforcement, and educational strategies to achieve its mission. Tennessee troopers are certified to conduct all levels of the North American Standard inspections, including passenger carriers, cargo tanks, and hazardous materials. The THP, in partnership with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, conducts commercial motor vehicle targeted enforcement and public education and awareness programs geared toward both industry and the general public to increase awareness of commercial motor vehicle safety issues and the operation of passenger vehicles around commercial motor vehicles.”

TCVSP p. 7: “The State of Tennessee, Highway Patrol executes the following activities to meet the requirements of 49 CFR part 350.213(b): *** Enforcing federal registration (operating authority) requirements under 49 U.S.C. 13902, 49 CFR Part 365, 49 CFR Part 368, and 49 CFR 392.9a by prohibiting the operation of (i.e., placing out of service) any vehicle discovered to be operating without the required operating authority or beyond the scope of the motor carrier’s operating authority” (emphasis added).

Regulation of transportation is under federal auspices.


Use of the public road is in either of two categories, either for private purposes as member of the general public or in regulable commerce. The subject matter in instant case is commercial, under Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 55, motor and other vehicles, and § Title 65, carriers.

The court receives the allegation of commercial use – and wrongdoing under any license – prematurely from State of Tennessee.

Title 65 grants DOSHS authority to regulate commercial activity, affirms the commercial nature of the privileged activity of operating a motor vehicle upon the public highways. “(a) It is unlawful for any motor carrier, contract hauler, or exempt for-hire motor carrier to use any of the public highways of this state for the transportation of person or property, or both, in interstate or intrastate commerce, without first having received a permit from the department or from any state designated as the base jurisdiction state for that carrier pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 11506 [omitted] as amended by § 4005 of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. Violators are subject to penalty pursuant to § 65-15-113” (Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-15-107) (emphasis added).

The law creating THP affirms the same in § 4-7-105. “The members of the Tennessee highway patrol have jurisdiction and authority to make such investigation of operators of motor vehicles for hire as they may see fit to ascertain whether or not they are operating in compliance with § 65-15-109, and whether or not they are otherwise complying with the law relating to such operators, and they have authority to make arrests for any violation of title 65, chapter 15, or of any other traffic law of the state” (emphasis added).

DOSHS is designated for enforcement of privileged commercial motor vehicle activity and its licensing. DOSHS is the specialized agency for ascertaining subject matter jurisdiction for any alleged violations of §§ Titles 55 and/or 65.

Driver licenses are an exclusive state privilege. “The licensing as a privilege of the driving of any motor driven vehicle upon the roads, streets or other highways of the state is declared an exclusive state privilege and no tax for such privilege under any guise or shape shall hereafter be assessed, levied or collected by any municipality of the state” Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-55-501 (emphasis added).

The department of safety and homeland security has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to driver licenses and privilege enforcement upon those people using motor vehicles, (9) according to the two titles above mentioned (§ Title 55 and § Title 65), and under agreement with the U.S. department of transportation that holds that the highway patrol is the “sole agency” for enforcement of the state’s interest in equity and public health, safety and welfare.

Given that a dispute over a license, arising from a rules of the road violation claim, is a privilege and tax matter,   the accused in an administrative and civil matter has right to be heard in agency at DOSHS, with claims as to subject matter jurisdiction to be established there first. (10)

The courts recognize the necessity for exhausting administrative remedies before suits are brought to adjudication: 

The exhaustion doctrine has been recognized at common law as an exercise of judicial prudence. Justice Brandeis referred to it as ‘the long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.’ Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938). When a claim is first cognizable by an administrative agency, therefore, the courts will not interfere ‘until the administrative process has run its course.’ United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63, 77 S.Ct. 161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956). Both courts and legislatures have recognized that the exhaustion doctrine promotes judicial efficiency and protects administrative authority in at least three ways.

First, sometimes ‘[j]udicial intervention may not be necessary because the agency can correct any initial errors at subsequent stages of the process[, and] the agency’s position on important issues of fact and law may not be fully crystallized or adopted in final form.’ Ticor Title, 814 F.2d at 735 (quoting Gellhorn Boyer).

Secondly, exhaustion allows the agency to develop a more complete administrative record upon which the court can make its review. Efco Tool Co. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 976, 981, 1983 WL 14906 (1983). 

Finally, cases that concern subject matter within the purview of administrative agencies often involve ‘specialized fact-finding, interpretation of disputed technical subject matter, and resolving disputes concerning the meaning of the agency’s regulations.’ West v. Bergland, 611 F.2d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). Requiring that administrative remedies be exhausted often leaves courts better equipped to resolve difficult legal issues by allowing an agency to ‘perform functions within its special competence.’ Id. (quoting Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972)). 

Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 838-39 (Tenn. 2008)

The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies requires that administrative matters are to be heard in agency in a contested case “by an administrative judge or hearing officer sitting alone.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-301. At conclusion of such case, the party may appeal “in the chancery court nearest to the place where the cause of action arose, or in the chancery court of Davidson County” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322.

The moving party, in its endeavors to enforce motor vehicle and transportation laws via TCVSP pursuant to CFR Title 49, is obligated by statute to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: “These rules do not relieve the requirement that a party exhaust its administrative remedies before going to court. Any action appealable as of right must be timely appealed. If an appeal, discretionary appeal, or petition seeking reopening is filed under § 1115.2 or § 1115.3 of this part, before or after a petition seeking judicial review is filed with the courts, the Board will act upon the appeal or petition after advising the court of its pendency unless action might interfere with the court’s jurisdiction.” (49 CFR § 1115.6 – Exhaustion of remedies and judicial review.)

The commissioner of safety certifies that, “The State will ensure that violation sanctions imposed and collected by the State are consistent, effective, and equitable.” (TCVSP item 11 on page entitled “Certification of MCSAP Conformance (State Certification)- FY 2018”). In the interest of maintaining these principles, the law ensures the duty for State of Tennessee exhaust its remedies in agency.


Accused gives notice that he is unwilling to yield this right to have the matter heard administratively in the department of safety where available administrative remedies have not yet been exhausted.

The protocol for an in-agency hearing as to the facts and subject matter jurisdiction is outlined at Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-301; accused also has right to a pre-hearing conference, Tenn. Code Ann. 4-5-306, a hearing on whether he is subject to the officer’s claims about his activity, and a final order, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-314. Further administrative remedies remain available to the accuser in an administrative hearing pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 (a). Declaratory orders.

“(a) Any affected person may petition an agency for a declaratory order as to the validity or applicability of a statute, rule or order within the primary jurisdiction of the agency. The agency shall:

(1) Convene a contested case hearing pursuant to this chapter and issue a declaratory order, which shall be subject to review in the chancery court of Davidson County, unless otherwise specifically provided by statute, in the manner provided for the review of decisions in contested cases; or
(2) Refuse to issue a declaratory order, in which event the person petitioning the agency for a declaratory order may apply for a declaratory judgment as provided in § 4-5-225.

The state’s accusation in this case is premised on authority of Tenn. Code Ann. Title 55, invoking the jurisdiction of the department of safety and homeland security, before which they must reasonably be first heard.

Case law has consistently recognized the importance of the exhaustion doctrine:

When a statute provides for an administrative remedy, an aggrieved party must ordinarily exhaust the remedy before seeking to utilize the judicial process. Thomas v. State Bd. of Equalization, 940 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tenn. 1997); Bracey v. Woods, 571 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tenn. 1978). In Thomas, this Court observed that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine allows an administrative body to ‘(1) function efficiently and have an opportunity to correct its own errors; (2) afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise without the threat of litigious interruption; and (3) compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.’ Thomas, 940 S.W.2d at 566. Nevertheless, unless the statute providing for an administrative remedy requires exhaustion ‘by its plain words,’ an administrative appeal is not mandatory. Id.; see also Reeves v. Olsen, 691 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tenn. 1985). Absent a statutory mandate, the exhaustion of the administrative remedies doctrine is a matter of judicial discretion. Thomas, 940 S.W.2d at 566 n.5; Reeves, 691 S.W.2d at 530; State ex rel. Moore & Assocs., Inc. v. West, 246 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Ready Mix, USA, LLC v. Jefferson County, Tennessee 380 S.W.3d 52 at 63-64. (emphasis added)

The above mentioned facts and law demonstrate that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, as the matter is administrative and not ripe. The accused demands that the court dismiss the case and grant the state leave to exhaust its remedies against the license at DOSHS.

“The trial court, by reason of plaintiff’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, acquired no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. When it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach the merits. In such a situation the action should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” Melo v. United States, 505 F.2d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 1974)

Courts derive their powers to adjudicate not from the parties, but from the law. A Court acting without jurisdiction of the subject matter, or beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon it, is therefore acting without authority of law and its judgments and decrees in so acting are void and bind no one. Sheffy v. Mitchell, 142 Tenn. 48, 215 S.W. 403.” Gillespie v. State, 619 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)

“The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a nonwaivable defect that may be raised at any time to justify dismissal of a pending action. Id. Ambrose v. Welch, 729 F.2d 1084, 1085 (6th Cir. 1984).

Relief demanded

The state of Tennessee and the officer fail to exhaust such available administrative remedies in the department of safety before seeking adjudication, depriving accused of his right to have the matter heard administratively, whereafter he demands to exercise this right at the agency. Because the court receives the allegation prematurely, it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case, and should dismiss it ministerially.

I attest that the foregoing is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge. Further affiant sayeth naught.


  1. TENNESSEE Commercial Vehicle Safety Plan Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program Fiscal Years 2022 – 2024, Pages 1-5, 89-91
  2. Charging instrument State of Tennessee v. David Jonathan Tulis
  3. Incident narrative, deputy Brandon Bennett


  1. All matters pertaining to driver licenses and licensed activity are purely administrative, however, and a upon a license follows the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
    “[T]he Utilities Commission has never been held by this Court to be restricted by the technical common law rules of evidence in determining purely administrative questions, and we have held that the grant or refusal of a license to use public highways in commerce is purely an administrative question.” Hoover Motor Exp. Co. v. R.R. & Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 195 Tenn. 593, 616, 261 S.W.2d 233, 243 (1953).(emphasis added)
  2. 18 U.S.C § 31. Definitions (6) Motor vehicle.- “The term ‘motor vehicle’ means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.***
    (10) Used for commercial purposes.-The term ‘used for commercial purposes’ means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.” (emphasis added)
  3. Police power and regulatory authority under the UAPA are exercisable upon those “on the privilege” of driving or operating a motor vehicle. Phillips describes a privilege as an occupation, trade or calling such as the raising of bitches or jackasses for private profit and gain.

    This pursuit or occupation is taxed, not as property, but as an occupation. Another element in this occupation is, that its object and pursuit is directed to a profit to be made off the general public, the merchant having a relation, by reason of his occupation, to the whole community in which he may do business, by reason of which he reaps, or is assumed to reap, the larger profit by drawing upon or getting the benefit of the resources of those surrounding him. The same idea is involved in the case of the peddler, who may range over a whole county by virtue of his license. His is an occupation of like character, a peculiar use of his capital varied only in some of its incidents. 

    Phillips v. Lewis, 3 Shannon’s cases 230 (1877) at 240

  4. We have noted that ‘[u]pon turning on the blue lights of a vehicle, a police officer has clearly initiated a stop and has seized the subject of the stop within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.’ Id. (citing State *344 v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn.1993)). Accordingly, in the instant case, when Officer Kohl stopped Garcia’s vehicle by turning on her blue lights, she must have had reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that the defendant had committed, or was about to commit, a criminal offense in order for the stop to be constitutionally valid.”State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335, 343–44 (Tenn. 2003) (emphasis added)
  5. Driver licenses are issued and revoked “upon the principles of equity.” Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S.W.2d 930, 933 (1940).
  6.  “The state legislature may properly enact reasonable regulations requiring licensing and registration of motor vehicles as it furthers the interests of public safety and welfare pursuant to its police power. The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway is not a fundamental right. Instead, it is a revocable privilege that is granted upon compliance with statutory licensing Procedures.” State v. Ferrell, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 629“The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common right which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose of life and business.” Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579, 11 American Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, section 329, page 1135“3079a199. Operator is a common carrier, and the business is a privilege, when.–Any person, firm, or corporation operating for hire any public conveyance propelled by steam, compressed air, gasoline, naphtha, electricity, or other motive power for the purpose of affording a means of street transportation similar to that ordinarily afforded by street railways (but not operated upon fixed tracks) by indiscriminately accepting and discharging such persons as may offer themselves for transportation along the way and course of operation, shall be and the same is hereby declared and defined to be a common carrier, and the business of all such common carriers is hereby declared to be a privilege.” (1915, ch. 60, sec 1.), cited in Shannon’s A Compilation of Tennessee Statutes, Volume 2, 1917. (emphasis added)T.C.A § 65-15-102(7) “‘For-hire motor carrier’ means a person engaged in the transportation of goods or passengers for compensation.” (emphasis added)
  7. Date of Approval: Aug. 10, 2022 
  8. DRIVER. One employed in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car. A person actually doing driving, whether employed by owner to drive or driving his own vehicle.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 4th ed. p.585) (emphasis added)
  9. 18 U.S.C § 31 (a)(6) “Motor vehicle.— The term ‘motor vehicle’ means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.”
  10. PRIVILEGE. A particular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, company, or class, beyond the common advantages of other citizens. An exceptional or extraordinary power or exemption. A right, power, franchise, or immunity held by a person or class, against or beyond the course of the law.” Black’s Law Dictionary 4th edition, p.1359

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