Phil, I suggest your starting point in evaluating my claims should be the constitution and not the state. For that appears your actual starting place.
Any encroachment against the rights of the people — if there have to be any — has to be through enactment of statutes properly written and their enforcement properly limited.
By David Tulis / NoogaRadio 91.7 FM
[This post continues my dialogue with Phil the lawyer, who says a more natural reading of the law is that given by the courts: That the transportation law applies to everyone, not just people in the transportation industry. Lawyer Phil’s comments are in bold.]
The only way under the constitution that the state can encroach upon the people’s free communications and movement on the roads that belong to them is if they do something on those roads that affect the public interest.
The above three paragraphs provide another good example of why I say that you often sound like you are making a constitutional challenge to the statute. After my previous indications that it sounded like you were challenging the constitutionality of the statute, you stressed that you were not. Now you are saying “any encroachment against the rights of the people . . . has to be through enactment of statutes PROPERLY WRITTEN AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT PROPERLY LIMITED.” You also say “THE ONLY WAY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION THAT THE STATE CAN ENCROACH . . .”
This is classic constitutional challenge language. Are you challenging the constitutionality of the statute or not? You can’t (or shouldn’t) use classic constitutional challenge language and then get frustrated when attorneys and judges are interpreting your approach as making a constitutional challenge to the statute.
If you aren’t challenging the constitutionality of the statute, why are you suggesting that my starting point in evaluating your claims should be the constitution? If someone is being charged with violating a statute, the ordinary starting place is to see if they really are violating the statute based on the wording of the statute. If they aren’t, you don’t have to look any further. If they are, then you might look further and challenge the constitutionality of the statute (either on its face or as applied).
‘Not buying your argument’ on ‘natural reading’
The state has, in Title 55, imposed rules on part of the activity of the traveling public. And that is the commercial part.
I’m still just not buying your argument that the natural reading of the statute leads one to the conclusion that it only applies to commercial drivers.
I believe you are confusing your want for regulation of the “noncommercial drivers” on the road as you call them vs. the actual limits of state authority under a constitution.
I think you’re wrong, but I’ll try to be open to the possibility that bias is affecting my analysis. In general, however, I really am pretty good at divorcing my objective analysis from what I want the results to be.
You want there to be regulation and offer hilarious examples of blind 9 -year-olds behind the steering wheel as to why we have to have it.
I acknowledge the examples are extreme, but they make a point. I note that you have not responded to the issue of whether you really believe there shouldn’t be ANY regulation of noncommercial drivers on public roads. Do you really believe that? If so, you wouldn’t be in favor of regulating the extreme examples I presented. But whether you and I think there should or should not be regulation is not really the key issue at present. The key issue at the moment is “what does the law say?” After we determine that, we can determine — as a matter of policy — whether that law is good or bad and whether it should be changed.
Tenn. Code Ann. Title 55 is constitutional, I submit, because it governs one type of use of the road and it does not offend any of our rights under the state or federal constitutions. It doesn’t affect the right of travel at all (Booher case).
Accurate summary of Tulis position
I am trying to understand your position. Is the following a correct statement of your position?
1. The State is constitutionally prohibited from restricting or regulating individuals’ rights of travel on public roads so long as the travel is noncommercial.
2. Title 55 only purports to regulate or restrict commercial travel.
3. Therefore Title 55 is constitutional.
I realize the above is not a perfect syllogism because theoretically there could be other reasons for Title 55 to be unconstitutional. I’m just trying to get a good handle on exactly what your position is.
Tile 55 does not offend the rights the people because it is designed to protect their rights and protect them on the road.
From whom?
From those people who make a living on the roads by transporting people or goods for hire.
And so, again, your position is that Title 55 does not purport to protect people from noncommercial drivers, correct?
Title 55 regulates in the public interest — through the department of safety — the commercial use of the road by people who are not exercising a right. They are exercising a privilege.
And my interpretation of the statute is that it — as evidenced by the plain and natural reading of the statute — regulates more than commercial use. As I’ve noted before, you and I may never come to agreement on this issue because we apparently have differing interpretations of what the statute is purporting to say.
The nexus of control is the privilege system.
What exactly do you mean by “the privilege system.” This is generally not a term regularly used “in the law.”
Are you perhaps arguing that the State is only permitted to regulate privileges and that if something is not a privilege, the State has no constitutional authority to regulate it whatsoever?
I’m not trying to argue here. I’m still trying to fully understand your position (although if this is your position, it again sounds like you are making a constitutional challenge to the statute).
I sent you Philips v. Lewis to help you establish the essential elements a privilege to be proven in a criminal case. The essential element in every criminal prosecution of a Tennessee and/or other person on the road for a “traffic offense” is occupation or calling or trade.
Essential element in traffic stop: Privilege
And this gets back to our different reading of the statute. I don’t think a natural reading of the statute leads one to the conclusion that the statute is only purporting to regulate commercial activities or privileges. In my opinion, your reading of the statute is very activist oriented and is not seeking first the intent of the drafters.
As I have reported in administrative notice and elsewhere, the elements of privilege include the paperwork associated with commercial transportation. Bills of lading, bills of way lading, receipts, contracts, passenger lists, invoices. These are the evidences that the THP is authorized to collect in any enforcement action under Title 55.
The essential element that must be proven is privilege, and the officer at a criminal hearing or trial must be able to prove these elements with facts. The facts would include such documentation and also statements by the driver or operator as recorded on his camera system.
The two preceding paragraphs assume that the statute only purports to regulate commercial use of the roads. Again, I believe that is where our two positions irreconcilably diverge. If we can’t come to agreement on this particular point, I don’t think there’s anyway we will come to agreement on the broader issue you are trying to address.
In a criminal matter the state must state and prove all the essential elements of a crime. Rarely do cops and prosecutors do well in this duty. The defense bar ignores the proper defense in all cases. The accused must be proven first to be exercising the privilege, either as a common carrier or a private carrier (only two types).
This addresses the same issue again. The preceding paragraph can only be correct if the statute only purports to regulate commercial use of the roads. If you are wrong on that point, your previous paragraph is wrong.
He must have his papers in order. He must have a valid driver license for the category of vehicle he is controlling. He must have his car or truck registered as a motor vehicle, the plate being the proof of tax paid. He must have insurance to protect the traveling public.
These are what Title 55 requires of all licensees exercising the privilege. These are required to operate or drive a motor vehicle. A person operating a motor vehicle is not exercising a right whatsoever. He is enjoying the privilege of using a car in a commercial capacity. That’s in line with state law. That’s in line with federal law at USC 49. It is by application, it is by payment of a fee, it is taxable because it evokes the police power in the details of the transportation business. He is subject to police power under regulation in the public interest, for the public health safety and welfare, because he is using the roads for private gain and profit. He is not exercising a right. See my notice for this discussion, and look at the early cases.
Current practice is oppression and fraud. Police and sheriff’s deputies are exercising an authority given to the THP only.
Would you agree that it is not oppression and fraud if the natural reading of the statute is that it does purport to regulate noncommercial use also? It seems to me that it just keeps coming back to that point. Or are you saying that regulating noncommercial use of the roads is, by its very nature, oppression and fraud even if the natural reading of the statute leads one to the conclusion that noncommercial use of the roads is regulated.
Tenn. Code Ann. 4-7-104. Duties.
It is the duty of the members of the Tennessee highway patrol, under the direction of the commissioner of safety, to:
(1) Patrol the state highways and enforce all laws, and all rules and regulations of the department of transportation regulating traffic on and use of those highways; and
(2) Assist the department of revenue and the county clerks of the state in the collection of all taxes and revenue going to the state, and in the enforcement of all laws relating to same.
Phil, where’s your DOT number on your car? Where’s your DOT paperwork? Are you compliant?
Same point again. That only matters if you are right about the most natural reading of the statute. It doesn’t matter if I am right.
Is it correct to assume that just because a department of transportation regulates taxable activity that we have no rights to use the roads and boulevards, except as licensees under DOT?
Same point. What does the statute say? You and I read the statute differently.
And where are delegation orders for Chattanooga police department and Hamilton County Sheriff’s office to regulate transportation? What is their lawful authority? That means, where are the writings of authority, Phil?
Not sure I’m following you here. I can envision that you may be making one of a couple of different arguments, but I won’t go down that path at this time since I think the other issue (i.e., what does the statute say) seems to be the critical issue.
Phil disputes ‘transportation law’
Every year the commissioner of safety assures Washington that THP alone enforces transportation law.
How are you defining “transportation law” in the preceding sentence? Because, generally, my reaction to that statement is that it is inaccurate unless you very narrowly define transportation law.
https://tnt23.wpengine.com/2019/06/tn-tells-feds-that-only-troopers-enforce-traffic-laws/ The key statement: ““The Tennessee Highway Patrol of the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security is the sole agency in the State of Tennessee responsible for enforcing laws related to size, weight, and safety regulations for commercial motor vehicles.
I note that the preceding sentence is very different from the first sentence in this paragraph. They are not one and the same. You cannot infer the accuracy of the first sentence from the second sentence.
“The Tennessee Highway Patrol is the State’s lead agency for the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program, and does not fund any sub-grantees.” (italics added).
The document is “Tennessee commercial vehicle safety plan for the federal motor carrier carrier safety administration’s motor carrier safety assistance program Fiscal year 2018.” Click the link. https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/fastact/tennessee-fy-2018-mcsap-commercial-vehicle-safety-plan-cvsp
But this document doesn’t tell us that noncommercial use of the roads is not regulated.
Phil, transportation enforcement is upon for-profit use of the road for hire upon CMVs (commercial motor vehicles).
Based on my natural reading of the statutes, it is upon that AND MORE (i.e., also noncommercial use of the roads).
Every CMV operator must have his papers in order. He uses the roads under a lowered threshold for probable cause. That is, he can be stopped (arrested) for infractions, which are far less than crimes. Commercial enforcement reduces proper probable requirements and gives pretext for arrest. As State v. Garcia explains, when the blue lights go on, that is arrest. Arrest and criminal charges for expired lights, speed, touching the white line, tinted windows (James Myron Mitchell traffic stop by Deputy Wilkey).
Really? A body cavity search and arrest under Title 55, administrative law?
Title 55 is not “administrative law.” It is statutory law. All statutes are statutory law. Administrative law is law promulgated by administrative agencies.
Half of Wilkey’s abuses are because Hammond has ignored notice 653 days and refuses to make traffic stop protocol reform required under my proper, unrebutted notice.
Phil, courts uphold your position. You should be calm and happy in talking with me about these matters of justice. There is no free use of the road. All must be subject to police power. You espouse the conventional opinion of the bar and the judiciary, which pretend we the people of Tennessee (called the “free people” in the constitution) are banned from the roads.
Once again, it all comes down to the natural reading of the statute. I think the courts are “upholding my position” because that is the most natural reading of the statute. I think your reading is a strained, activist reading.
We are banned UNLESS, UNLESS we enter into an equitable relationship to become freight carriers under state privilege.
I don’t see where the statute says that.
Is it possible that I am seeing anything that is even slightly unconstitutional, Phil?
Like pregnancy (you are either pregnant or you’re not), a law or an act is either unconstitutional or it isn’t. I don’t think the “slightly unconstitutional” phrasing is helpful to this analysis.
Do you get a whiff at any point of oppression, malice, abuse, racism, police-state tactics and the like? Or is it just in my imagination?
It depends on exactly what you mean here. I absolutely agree that the police sometimes engage in acts of oppression, malice, abuse, racism and police-state tactics. But this issue — the issue of how individual officers act in individual situations — is a different question from whether the statute purports to regulate noncommercial use of the roads. And if you are contending that regulation of noncommercial use of the roads is — by its very nature — unconstitutional, then that is yet another separate question. Are you saying that there is a constitutional right to travel on public roads without any regulation or restrictions whatsoever so long as you are not traveling for commercial purposes? If so, language in the constitution are you relying upon? Or what language in case law are you relying upon?
You should read the defense of private travel (“driving”) by U.S. district judge Aleta Trauger in 2017. She comes halfway to my position in these matters and says people effectively have to be able to use the roads to live and fulfill essentials of ordinary life. She overturned the state revocation of DL for unpaid court debt law.
I am looking for an attorney to make big money going after abuses of this law, especially against poor people and African-Americans. I am looking for someone who understands the system as it is, and is willing to sue on grounds of bad faith oppression in the misuse of Title 55.
You would have to convince me that a natural reading of the statute indicates that the statute was only intended to apply to commercial use of the roads, and I’m just not seeing that.
My goal is to stop ultra vires enforcement within 3½ years, by which time I hope to work on other projects.
Read my essay on the doctrine of notice next. https://tnt23.wpengine.com/2018/10/notice-means-officials-must-reform-traffic-stops-or-face-personal-bad-faith-tort-lawsuits/ It’s all there how the doctrine works. And you’re wrong to say it has “no impact whatsoever” unless a judge approves. The job of response to notice is that of the party notified, either as to facts and law. Notice has power apart from adjudication, sir.
‘Strained, activist reading’ of law
I think you may be misunderstanding my point here although it may be that I’m misunderstanding yours. So let me try to approach it a little differently. Would you agree that the whole point of notice (in this context) is to give the reader notice of what the law is/says? If so, isn’t notice then inherently irrelevant if it did not accurately state what the law is/say? So, if you are subsequently relying on your notice during litigation, don’t you inherently have to convince the judge that your notice accurately stated the law?
My close study (and report) on statutory construction suggest you are ignoring basic rules on how law is read.
What rules of statutory construction are you saying I am ignoring? What “basic rules on how law is read” am I ignoring? It all starts with a natural and ordinary reading of the statute. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature. And to determine that intent, we look to the natural and ordinary meaning of the statute itself without forced or subtle constructions that would limit or extend the meaning of the language. Am I violating that? Are you? If I am violating that, show me how. I’m open. I really am. But show me the wording in the statute that expresses an intent to regulate ONLY commercial use of the roads. Does it all rest simply on the use of the word privilege? Or does it rest on something else?
Sue cop as oppressor, defend self in traffic court: Transportation Administrative Notice
TRIBAL LAWYER APACHE INDIAN LUIS EWING PROVES THAT DRIVING WITHOUT A REGULAR AND/OR COMMERCIAL DRIVERS LICENSE IS NOT A CRIME, IT’S MERELY A CIVIL INFRACTION, BUT ONLY IF YOU ARE DRIVING COMMERCIALLY!
RCW 46.20.015 (2) PROVIDES THAT DRIVING WITHOUT LICENSE IN WASHINGTON STATE IS A CIVIL INFRACTION AND NOT A CRIME AND THE MAXIMUM PENALTY IS $250.00 AND NO JAIL TIME IS AUTHORIZED!
Driving without a drivers license offenses in Washington State are merely . . . “[T]raffic infractions and not a crime,” pursuant to RCW 46.20.005 and it’s lessor but included offense of RCW 46.20.015 and see, People v. Battle, 50 Cal.App. 3d Supp 1, 123 Cal.Rptr. 636, 639 (June 27, 1975); People v. Sava, 190 Cal.App.3d 935, 235 Cal.Rptr. 694 (March 27, 1987).
RCW 46.20.015, reads:
“RCW 46.20.015 Driving without a license—Traffic infraction, when.
(1) Except as expressly exempted by this chapter, it is a traffic infraction and not a misdemeanor under RCW 46.20.005 if a person:
(a) Drives any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without a valid driver’s license issued to Washington residents under this chapter in his or her possession;
(b) Provides the citing officer with an expired driver’s license or other valid identifying documentation under RCW 46.20.035 at the time of the stop; and
(c) Is not driving while suspended or revoked in violation of RCW 46.20.342(1) or * 46.20.420.
(2) A person who violates this section is subject to a penalty of two hundred fifty dollars. If the person appears in person before the court or submits by mail written proof that he or she obtained a valid license after being cited, THE COURT SHALL REDUCE THE PENALTY TO FIFTY DOLLARS. [ 1999 c 6 § 4; 1997 c 66 § 2.].” And;
NOTE: The Aberdeen Municipal Court Judges and Grays Harbor County District Court Judges are Scamming people into believing that they are doing them a favor by pretending they are reducing the illegally requested amount of $550.00 to the maximum penalty of $250.00 if you get your drivers license when the statute itself, RCW 46.20.015 (2) says . . . “THE COURT SHALL REDUCE THE PENALTY TO FIFTY DOLLARS!
The RCW 46.20.015 (1)(b) clearly reads in part:
“(1) Except as expressly exempted by this chapter, it is a traffic infraction and not a misdemeanor under RCW 46.20.005 if a person:
. . . (b) Provides the citing officer with an expired driver’s license or other valid identifying documentation under RCW 46.20.035 at the time of the stop . . .” RCW 46.20.015 (1)(b). And;
RCW 46.20.015 clearly states at subsection (2) that:
“[A] person who violates this section is subject to a penalty of two hundred fifty dollars.” RCW 46.20.015 (2). And;
The criminally corrupt (WSBA) Washington State Bar Attorney Prosecutors and Judges are RCW 9A.82.060 are Leading organized crime by knowingly training the Cops to illegally ask for $550.00 which is more than twice the legal limit of $250.00 as provided by the Washington State Legislature at RCW 46.20.015, in violation of RCW 9A.68.020 Requesting unlawful compensation which reads:
“RCW 9A.68.020 Requesting unlawful compensation.
(1) A public servant is guilty of requesting unlawful compensation if he or she requests a pecuniary benefit for the performance of an official action knowing that he or she is required to perform that action without compensation or at a level of compensation lower than that requested.
(2) Requesting unlawful compensation is a class C felony.
[2011 c 336 § 387; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.68.020.].” See also RCW 9A.68.030. And;
The Ex Post Facto Clauses forbids the Cops from imposing punishment of $550.00 for an act which was not punishable when committed or increase the quantum of punishment above $250.00, add interest or from tacking on collection costs and attorney fees pursuant to article 1, section 10 clause 1 of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 23 of the Washington State Constitution; Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17, 101 S. Ct. 960 (1981); State v. Hennings, 129 Wn.2d 512, 524, 525, 526, 527 (July 1996); State v. Valentine, 132 Wn.2d 1, 53, 935 P.2d 1294 (May 1st, 1997); State v. Hartke, 89 Wn. App. 143, 146, 948 P.2d 402 (December 18, 1997).
SHAME ON CITY OF ABERDEEN ATTORNEY FOREST WARGUMP AND ABERDEEN MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE SUSAN SOLEN FOR TAKING ADVANTAGE OF QUINAULT INDIANS AND LOCAL MEXICAN AMERICAN CITIZENS FALSELY TRAINING THE CITY OF ABERDEEN COPS AND THE GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY SHERIFF’S TO FALSELY CHARGE QUINAULT INDIANS AND LOCAL MEXICAN AMERICAN CITIZENS WITH FRAUDULENT CHARGES OF ALLEGEDLY VIOLATING RCW 46.20.342 DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED WHEN THEIR ELECTRONIC MOBILE DATA TERMINAL AND THE (DOL) DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING ELECTRONIC DATA BASE CLEARLY SHOWS THAT NUMEROUS DEFENDANT’S EITHER NEVER HAD A DRIVERS LICENSE OR THAT THEIR FORMER DRIVING LICENSES WERE LEGALLY EXPIRED PURSUANT TO RCW 46.20.181 AND COULD NOT BE LEGALLY BE SUSPENDED FOR A FIXED PERIOD OF NO MORE THAN ONE (1) YEAR PURSUANT TO RCW 46.20.311; RCW 46.04.580 and RCW 9A.04.080(1) WHICH PROHIBITS THE ENFORCEMENT OF ANY MISDEMEANOR BEYOND ONE YEAR AFTER IT’S COMMISSION. SEE ALSO STATE v. KLUMP, 61 Wn. App. 911, 813 P.2d 131 (July 16, 1991), SHAME ON THEM FOR KNOWINGLY AND MALICIOUSLY CHARGING UNLICENSED DRIVERS WITH THE CRIME OF RCW 46.20.342 DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED AND THEN PRETENDING TO DO THESE POOR DEFENDANT’S A FAVOR BY DROPPING THE FRAUDULENT CHARGES OF DWLS AND REDUCING THE PENALTIES TO $550.00 WHICH IS MORE THAN TWICE THE LEGAL LIMITED AUTHORIZED BY RCW 46.20.015 FOR WHICH THE MAXIMUM PENALTY IS $250.00 AND NO JAIL TIME IS OR WAS EVER AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE!
THE CRIMINALLY CORRUPT CITY OF ABERDEEN ATTORNEY AND ALL OF THE CITY OF ABERDEEN MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGES WERE REQUIRED BY SUBSECTION (2) OF RCW 46.20.015 TO REDUCE THE FINE TO FIFTY ($50.00) DOLLARS IF THE DEFENDANT’S OBTAINED A NEW DRIVERS LICENSE, NOT $550.00!!!
RCW 46.20.015 (2) CLEARLY SAYS . . . “THE COURT SHALL REDUCE THE PENALTY TO FIFTY DOLLARS!!!
SHAME ON CITY OF ABERDEEN ATTORNEY FOREST WARGUMP AND ABERDEEN MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE SUSAN SOLEN FOR TAKING ADVANTAGE OF QUINAULT INDIANS AND LOCAL MEXICAN AMERICAN CITIZENS, SHAME ON THEM FOR EXTORTING AND BRIBING POOR PEOPLE BECAUSE OF THEIR “LUCRE” AND DESIRE FOR MORE MONEY THAN THEY WERE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO UNDER THE LAW!
The 1599 Geneva Bible says:
“For the desire of money [$550.00] is the root of all evil, which while some lusted after they erred from the faith, and pierced themselves through with many sorrows. 1 Timothy 6:10.
The King James Bible says:
“For the love of money [$550.00] is the root of all evil: which while some coveted after, they have erred from the faith, and pierced themselves through with many sorrows.” Timothy 6:10.
Contact Luis Ewing at Home Office Phone: 1 – (360) 335-1322 or my Cellular Phone at: 1 – (253) 226-3741 or write to me at: or or
Please send GREEN (FRN) $$$ 18 U.S.C. § 8 $$$ CASH ONLY MONEY $$$ DONATIONS by FEDERAL EXPRESS only to:
Luis Ewing,
c/o 4731 State Route 109,
(City of) Moclips,
The State of Washington [98562].
Note: The regular mail man will NOT deliver mail to the resident addresses here in Moclips, so please use UPS, DHL or preferably FEDERAL EXPRESS!
http://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=46.20.015
FACEBOOK PROFILE:
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APACHE INDIAN TRIBAL LAWYER LUIS EWING PROVES THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS . . . “A REGULAR DRIVERS LICENSE” . . . THAT IS NOT . . . “A COMMERCIAL DRIVERS LICENSE.”
LUIS EWING PROVES THAT ALL SO CALLED . . . “REGULAR DRIVERS LICENSES” . . . ARE IN FACT AND LAW . . . “COMMERCIAL DRIVERS LICENSES.”
To all Washington State Law Enforcement I am NOT required to Have a RCW 46.25.010 (3), RCW 46.20.001 (1), RCW 46.25.080 (1)(i)(ii)(iii), 49 CFR § 383.153 (a) “Commercial Drivers License” to drive a PAS Class Registered Motor Vehicle in the State of Washington for NON-COMMERCIAL PURPOSES!
In anticipation that the police officer, prosecutor or judge will “lie” to you and tell you that RCW 46.20.001 (1) requires you to have a driver’s license, I will now expose their scam!
“RCW 46.20.001 License required–Rights and restriction.
(1) No person may drive a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without first obtaining a valid driver’s license issued to Washington residents under this chapter.”
THERE IS NO REGULAR LICENSE ISSUED UNDER THIS CHAPTER, RCW 46.20!
It is an undisputed fact of law that RCW 46.25.080 is the one (1) and only license classification statute in Title 46 the motor vehicle code for the State of Washington and it is also undisputed that all three classes of licenses issued under this statute, Class A, Class B & Class C are all Title 49 CFR § 383.153 (a) COMMERCIAL DRIVERS LICENSE’S.
See RCW 46.25.080 to wit:
“RCW 46.25.080 License contents, classifications, endorsements, restrictions, expiration–Exchange of information.
(1) The commercial driver’s license must be marked “commercial driver’s license” or “CDL,”
…(a) Licenses may be classified as follows:
(i) Class A . . .
(ii) Class B . . .
(iii) Class C . . .”
Please note that the older Washington Drivers licenses used to say “COMMERCIAL CLASSES” on the top of the back side of the drivers license and in the left hand column of back side of driver’s license, it used to say “Class A, Class B and Class C. The Department of Licensing has committed fraud against the Citizens of Washington and has removed the COMMERCIAL CLASSES designation from the back of the drivers license? However, the New Drivers License’s still says in very small print: “CDL END” in the upper left hand corner of the front of the New Drivers License’s. CDL END obviously means COMMERCIAL DRIVERS LICENSE ENDORSEMENT! (Emphasis added.)
BUT NOW, THE CRIMINALLY CORRUPT WASHINGTON STATE BAR ATTORNEYS HAVE TAKEN OFF THE . . . “CDL END” . . . MARKINGS OFF OF THE FRONT OF THE NEWER SO CALLED REGULAR DRIVERS LICENSE AND PUT IT INTO THE INVISIBLE MAGNETIC BAR CODE SO THAT YOU CAN’T READ IT ANYMORE IN A FRAUDULENT ATTEMPT TO HIDE THE LEGAL FACT THAT ALL SO CALLED . . . “REGULAR DRIVERS LICENSES” . . . ARE IN FACT AND LAW . . . “COMMERCIAL DRIVERS LICENSES” . . ., HA, HA, HA!
I THINK IT’S FUNNY THAT THE STATE OF WASHINGTON HAS CHANGED THE DRIVERS LICENSE NO LESS THAN FOUR (4) TIMES BECAUSE OF ME, HA, HA, HA!
RCW 46.25.050(1) Drivers of Commercial motor vehicles shall obtain a “commercial driver’s license” as required under this chapter by April 1, 1992. …, . . . HOWEVER, this requirement does not apply to any person: (c) Who is operating a recreational vehicle for non commercial purposes.
RCW 46.25.050 (1) makes it clear that this requirement does NOT apply to any person: (c) WHO IS OPERATING A RECREATIONAL VEHICLE FOR NON COMMERCIAL PURPOSES! (Emphasis added.) For clarification, the Washington Administrative Code at WAC 308-100-210 which reads:
(WAC) 308-100-210 Recreational vehicle–Definition. For the purposes of RCW 46.25.050(1)(c), the term “recreational vehicle” shall include vehicles used exclusively for NONCOMMERCIAL PURPOSES which are: (1) Primarily designed for recreational, camping, OR TRAVEL USE. And;
WAC 308-100-210 specifically defines the term “RECREATIONAL VEHICLE” shall include vehicles used exclusively for NON COMMERCIAL PURPOSES which are: (1) PRIMARILY DESIGNED FOR RECREATIONAL, CAMPING, OR TRAVEL USE. Hey Officer Friendly, I do not “transport” passengers, freight or commodities for “compensation” or “for hire.” I use my vehicle solely for NON-COMMERCIAL PURPOSES such as RECREATIONAL, CAMPING OR TRAVEL USE . . . “AS A MATTER OF RIGHT.” See RCW 47.04.010.
The Washington State Supreme Court has already made it clear in the following case that the “DRIVERS LICENSE” is intended to apply only to . . . “FOR HIRE VEHICLES.”
“Sec. 103 It shall be unlawful for any person to drive an automobile or other motor vehicle carrying passengers for hire, within the city of Seattle, without having a valid and subsisting license so to do, to be known as a ‘drivers license’ …”Driver’s license, ‘first class’ shall entitle the holder thereof to drive any kind or class of motor vehicles for hire within the city of Seattle. “Drivers license, second class’ shall be limited to stages, sight-seeing cars, or other motor vehicles operating over a specified route and having a fixed terminal. “Drivers license, ‘third class’ shall be limited to drivers of taxicabs, for hire cars, or other automobiles not operating on fixed routes, and having a passenger capacity of less than seven (7) persons, not including the driver. …It is intended to apply to “for hire” vehicles as provided in section 6313, Rem. Comp. Stats., are defined to mean all motor vehicles other than auto-mobile stages used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration of any kind is received, either directly or indirectly.” INTERNATIONAL MOTOR TRANSIT CO. et al. V. CITY OF SEATTLE et al. , (No. 19992) 251 PACIFIC REPORTER 120-123 (Dec. 6, 1926.) And;
Contact Tribal Lawyer Luis Ewing at home office phone: 1 – (360) 334-1322 or send me a text message to my cellular phone at: 1 – (253) 226-3741 or send me an e-mail to: or or
Please send all Title 18, Section 8 GREEN (FRN) FEDERAL RESERVE NOTES which are NOT TAXABLE by the corporate STATE pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3124, by FEDERAL EXPRESS to:
Luis Ewing,
c/o 4731 State Route 109,
(City of) Moclips,
The State of Washington [98562]
Note: The Post Office Mailman will NOT deliver to the home addresses here in Moclips, so please use UPS, DHS or FEDERAL EXPRESS!
http://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=46.25.080
FACEBOOK PROFILE:
https://www.facebook.com/luis.ewing.77
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APACHE INDIAN TRIBAL LAWYER LUIS EWING PROVES THAT . . . “ALL MOTOR VEHICLES” . . . ARE . . . “FOR HIRE VEHICLES.”
LUIS EWING PROVES THAT . . . “ALL MOTOR VEHICLES” . . . ARE . . . “FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS FOR COMPENSATION.”
LUIS EWING IS THE NUMBER 1 PREMIER RIGHT TO TRAVEL LEGAL RESEARCHER AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL EXPERT IN THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES!!!
WASHINGTON LAW AT RRS 6313, Sec. 103 DEFINES ALL MOTOR VEHICLES AS FOR HIRE VEHICLES WHICH MAKES IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON TO CARRY PASSENGERS FOR HIRE WITHOUT A VALID LICENSE SO TO DO TO BE KNOWN AS A DRIVERS LICENSE PURSUANT TO INTERNATIONAL MOTOR TRANSIT CO. et al. v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al. , (No. 19992) 141 Wash. 194, 251 PACIFIC REPORTER 120-123 (Dec. 6, 1926.)
“RCW 46.04.320 Motor vehicle.
“Motor vehicle” means every vehicle that is self-propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails. “Motor vehicle” includes a neighborhood electric vehicle as defined in RCW 46.04.357. “Motor vehicle” includes a medium-speed electric vehicle as defined in RCW 46.04.295. An electric personal assistive mobility device is not considered a motor vehicle. A power wheelchair is not considered a motor vehicle. A golf cart is not considered a motor vehicle, except for the purposes of chapter 46.61 RCW.
[2010 c 217 § 1; 2007 c 510 § 1. Prior: 2003 c 353 § 1; 2003 c 141 § 2; 2002 c 247 § 2; 1961 c 12 § 46.04.320; prior: 1959 c 49 § 33; 1955 c 384 § 10; prior: (i) 1943 c 153 § 1, part; 1937 c 188 § 1, part; Rem. Supp. 1943 § 6312-1, part; 1923 c 181 § 1, part; 1921 c 96 § 2, part; 1919 c 59 § 1, part; 1917 c 155 § 1, part; 1915 c 142 § 2, part; RRS § 6313, part. (ii) 1937 c 189 § 1, part; RRS § 6360-1, part; 1929 c 180 § 1, part; 1927 c 309 § 2, part; RRS § 6362-2, part.].” See also 46.25.010 (6)(14); RCW 46.72.010 (1)(2); RCW 47.04.010 (19). And;
Former WAC 48–30-010 (6) defines “motor vehicle” as follows:
“WAC 480-30-010 Definitions.
. . . (6) The term “motor vehicle” shall include all vehicles or machines propelled by any power other than muscular, used upon the public highways for the transportation of persons for compensation. . . .” See State v. Johnson, 179 Wn.2d 534, at 542, (January 8, 2014). And;
RCW 82.44.010 (2) defines “motor vehicle” as:
“RCW 82.44.010 Definitions.
. . . (2) “Motor vehicle” means all motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers used, or of the type designed primarily to be used, upon the public streets and highways, for the convenience or pleasure of the owner, or for the conveyance, for hire or otherwise, of persons or property, . . .
[2010 c 161 § 1166; 1990 c 42 § 301; 1979 c 107 § 10; 1971 ex.s. c 299 § 54; 1967 c 121 § 4; 1963 c 199 § 1; 1961 c 15 § 82.44.010. Prior: 1957 c 269 § 18; 1955 c 264 § 1; 1945 c 152 § 1; 1943 c 144 § 1; Rem. Supp. 1945 § 6312-115.].” See also 49 U.S.C. Section 30103 (b)(1)(2). And;
WAC 480-30-036 defines “motor vehicle” as follows:
“WAC 480-30-036 Agency filings affecting this section Definitions, general
“Motor vehicle” or “vehicle” means:
a) As related to auto transportation companies: Every self propelled vehicle used on the public highways, for the transportation of persons for compensation.” And;
RCW 82.44.010 (2) defines “motor vehicle” as:
“RCW 82.44.010 Definitions.
. . . (2) “Motor vehicle” means all motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers used, or of the type designed primarily to be used, upon the public streets and highways, for the convenience or pleasure of the owner, or for the conveyance, for hire or otherwise, of persons or property, . . .
[2010 c 161 § 1166; 1990 c 42 § 301; 1979 c 107 § 10; 1971 ex.s. c 299 § 54; 1967 c 121 § 4; 1963 c 199 § 1; 1961 c 15 § 82.44.010. Prior: 1957 c 269 § 18; 1955 c 264 § 1; 1945 c 152 § 1; 1943 c 144 § 1; Rem. Supp. 1945 § 6312-115.].” See also 49 U.S.C. Section 30103 (b)(1)(2). And;
RCW 46.04.190 defines any and/or all “motor vehicles” as follows:
“RCW 46.04.190 For hire vehicle.
“For hire vehicle” means any motor vehicle used for the transportation of persons for compensation, except auto stages and ride-sharing vehicles.
[1979 c 111 § 13; 1961 c 12 § 46.04.190. Prior: 1959 c 49 § 20; prior: (i) 1943 c 153 § 1, part; 1937 c 188 § 1, part; Rem. Supp. 1943 § 6312-1, part; 1923 c 181 § 1, part; 1921 c 96 § 2, part; 1919 c 59 § 1, part; 1917 c 155 § 1, part; 1915 c 142 § 2, part; RRS § 6313, part. (ii) 1937 c 189 § 1, part; RRS § 6360-1, part.].” See also RCW 46.72.010 (1)(2).
RCW 46.04.670 defines “vehicle” as:
“RCW 46.04.070 Vehicle.
“Vehicle” includes every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including bicycles.
. . . [2011 c 171 § 19. Prior: 2010 c 217 § 2; 2010 c 161 § 155; 2003 c 141 § 6; 2002 c 247 § 5; 1994 c 262 § 2; 1991 c 214 § 2; 1979 ex.s. c 213 § 4; 1961 c 12 § 46.04.670; prior: 1959 c 49 § 72; prior: (i) 1943 c 153 § 1, part; 1937 c 188 § 1, part; Rem. Supp. 1943 § 6312-1, part. (ii) 1937 c 189 § 1, part; RRS § 6360-1, part; 1929 c 180 § 1, part; 1927 c 309 § 2, part; RRS § 6362-2, part.].” See also 47.04.010 (42); RCW 81.80.010 (11).
RCW 46.04.140 defines a “commercial vehicle” as follows:
“RCW 46.04.140 Commercial vehicle.
“Commercial vehicle” means any vehicle the principal use of which is the transportation of commodities, merchandise, produce, freight, animals, or passengers for hire.
[1961 c 12 § 46.04.140. Prior: 1959 c 49 § 15; prior: (i) 1943 c 153 § 1, part; 1937 c 188 § 1, part; Rem. Supp. 1943 § 6312-1, part. (ii) 1937 c 189 § 1, part; RRS § 6360-1, part.].” And;
RCW 47.04.010 (8) defines any “vehicle” that transports “passengers for hire” as:
“RCW 47.04.010 Definitions.
. . . (8) “Commercial vehicle.” Any vehicle the principal use of which is the transportation of commodities, merchandise, produce, freight, animals, or passengers for hire; . . .[2003 c 244 § 2; 2003 c 141 § 8; 1975 c 62 § 50; 1967 ex.s. c 145 § 42; 1961 c 13 §47.04.010 . Prior: 1937 c 53 § 1; RRS § 6400-1.].” See also Baker v. Baker, 91 Wn.2d 482, 588 P.2d 1164 (1979); In re Marriage of Little, 96 Wn.2d 183, 634 P.2d 498 (1981).
For help with beating your traffic tickets, contact Tribal Lawyer Luis Ewing at Home Office Phone: 1 – (360) 335-1322 or send me a text message to my Cellular Phone at: 1 – (253) 226-3741 or write to me at: or or
PLEASE SEND ALL $$$ 18 U.S.C. § 8 GREEN (FRN) FEDERAL RESERVE NOTE CASH DOLLARS $$$ MONEY ONLY DONATIONS WHICH ARE NOT TAXABLE BY THE STATE PURSUANT TO 31 U.S.C. § 3124, BY FEDERAL EXPRESS ONLY TO:
Luis Ewing
c/o 4731 State Route 109,
(City of) Moclips,
The State of Washington [98562]
Note: The Postman does NOT deliver mail to the houses in Moclips.
YOU CAN CALL ME ANYTIME FROM 1:00 PM THROUGH 12:00 AM MIDNIGHT MONDAY THROUGH SATURDAY!
Luis Ewing home office phone: 1 – (360) 335-1322
Luis Ewing cellular phone: 1 – (253) 226-3741
Luis Ewing SKYPE ID:
http://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=82.44.010
FACEBOOK PROFILE:
https://www.facebook.com/luis.ewing.77
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APACHE INDIAN TRIBAL LAWYER LUIS EWING THE NUMBER ONE (1) RIGHT TO TRAVEL EXPERT IN THE UNITED STATES HAS TOTALLY BLOWN THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL ISSUE OUT OF THE WATER!!!
IT’S ALL OVER FOR YOU PIGS, THE TRAFFIC SCAM IS OVER!!!
LUIS EWING HAS FINALLY DESTROYED THE PIGS FALSE CLAIMS THAT DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE IS A PRIVILEGE AS BEING A TOTAL SCAM!!!
Article XIII, section 3 OF THE JANUARY 28, 1889 WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION AS APPROVED BY THE 50th CONGRESS 2nd Session – SENATE – MIS. DOC. No. 55 GRANTS ALL WASHINGTON CITIZENS A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL
YES, THE ORIGINAL 1878 WALLA WALLA CONSTITUTION WHICH IS THE ONE (1) AND ONLY WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION TO EVER BE REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY CONGRESS PROVIDES THAT ALL WASHINGTON STATE CITIZENS HAVE . . . “A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL.”
THIS IS WHY THEY DID NOT PUT . . . “A RIGHT TO TRAVEL CLAUSE” . . . IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION!!!
EVERYONE NEEDS TO GO TO THEIR STATE ARCHIVES AND PURCHASE A COPY OF YOUR FIRST ORIGINAL DEJURE HAND WRITTEN STATE CONSTITUTION!!!
DID YOU KNOW THAT ALL OF YOU ARE USING THE WRONG STATE CONSTITUTION?
DID YOU KNOW THAT WHAT YOU BELIEVE IS YOUR STATE CONSTITUTION ON YOUR STATE’S GOVERNMENT WEBSITE IS A FAKE STATUTORY CONSTITUTION?
DID YOU KNOW THAT EVERY STATE HAS TWO (2) OR THREE (3) OR MORE STATE CONSTITUTIONS???
YES, THERE IS PROBABLY . . . “A RIGHT TO TRAVEL CLAUSE” . . . IN ALL FIFTY (50) STATES FIRST ORIGINAL DEJURE HAND WRITTEN STATE CONSTITUTION!!!
It is undisputed that the Congressional Records clearly show that the 1878 Walla Walla Constitution was approved by the 50TH CONGRESS 2d Session.– SENATE – MIS. DOC. No. 55. on January 28, 1889, which grants all Washington Citizens the State Constitutional Right to Travel without a Title 49 CFR § 383.153 (a) Commercial Drivers License at article XIII, section 3 which reads:
“SEC. 3. ALL RAILROADS IN THIS STATE SHALL BE DEEMED PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, AND SHALL BE FREE TO ALL PERSONS FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF THEIR PERSONS AND PROPERTY, . . .”
See also RCW 47.04.050 & RCW 47.42.290.
Article II, section 1 of the January 28, 1889 valid Washington State Constitution reads:
“THE COLUMBIA RIVER AND THE NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE STATE SHALL BE . . . COMMON HIGHWAYS AND FOREVER FREE, . . . AS WELL TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE STATE, AS TO THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT ANY TAX, DUTY OR IMPOST THEREFORE.” See also RCW 79.01.340.
The Northwest Ordinance is a Treaty and is the Supreme Law of the Land states in part:
“…THE WATERWAYS SHALL FOREVER BE FREE THE SAME AS THE HIGHWAYS.” Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan et al., 44 U.S. (3 How) 212, 220 and 229 (1845).
THE TERRITORIAL CODE OF 1881 CHAPTER CCXXII. LAW OF TRAVEL ON PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, SECTION 3030 clearly says that I have to keep to the right side of the road:
“SECTION 3030. LAW OF THE ROAD: GO TO THE RIGHT.
WHENEVER ANY PERSONS DRIVING ANY VEHICLE SHALL MEET ON ANY PUBLIC HIGHWAY IN THIS TERRITORY whether owned or kept by a corporation or private person, THE PERSONS SO MEETING SHALL SEASONABLY TURN THEIR VEHICLES TO THE RIGHT OF THE CENTER OF THE ROAD, so as to permit each vehicle to pass without interfering with or interrupting the other.” Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wn.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 [No. 65059-4. En Banc.]
In 1915, Washington’s “Business Law for Business Men” stated:
“SECTION 1351.–BABBIT’S BOOK – “SECTION 1364.– THE LAW OF THE ROAD.– HIGHWAYS ARE PUBLIC ROADS . . . WHICH EVERY CITIZEN HAS A RIGHT TO USE . . . THE USE OF THE HIGHWAYS . . . IS NOT A PRIVILEGE . . . BUT A RIGHT, . . .”
RCW 47.04.010, RCW 46.09.020, RCW 36.75.010 (11), WAC 296-32-210 (46), WAC 296-45-035 and Pierce County Code 11.02.030 defines . . . “PUBLIC HIGHWAY” . . . as:
“[E]very way, lane, road, street, boulevard, and every way or place in the state of Washington OPEN AS A MATTER OF RIGHT TO PUBLIC VEHICULAR TRAVEL both inside and outside the limits of incorporated cities and towns. (Emphasis added.) R.C.W. 36.75. 010 (6) defines “county road” as : [E]very highway or part thereof, outside the limits of incorporated cities and towns and which has not been designated as a state highway.” See also AGO 59-60 No. 88 (December 10, 1959); AGO 63-64 No. 25 (May 23, 1963); AGO 65-66 No. 121 (November 29, 1966); AGO 1996 No. 17 (September 26, 1996). See State ex rel. Telegraph Co. v. Spokane., 24 Wash. 53-62 (February 1901); State ex rel. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co. v. Walla Walla Cy., 5 Wn.2d 95, 104 P.2d 764 (1940); Roediger v. Cullen, 26 Wn. (2d) 690, 175 P. 2d 669 (1946); State ex rel. York v. Board of County Commissioners, 28 Wn.2d 891, 184 P.2d 577 (1947); Hall v. McDowell, 6 Wn. App. 941, 945, 497 P.2d 596 (May 11, 1972); Allemeier v. University, 42 Wn. App. 465, 469, 470, 712 P.2d 306 (December 30, 1985).
“It is well settled that the United States Constitution protects an individual’s right to travel, although it is not always clear which constitutional provision affords the protection. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 175, 58 L.Ed. 2d 435, 99 S. Ct. 471 (1978); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 16 L. Ed. 2d 239, 86 S. Ct. 1170 (1966); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204, 78 S. Ct. 1113 (1958). . . . Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177, 86 L. Ed. 119, 62 S. Ct. 164 (1941); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, 53 L. Ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908); William v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274, 45 L. Ed. 186, 21 S. Ct. 128 (1900); Crandal v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 18 L. Ed. 744 (1867). This fundamental constitutional right applies to both interstate and intrastate travel. Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed. 2d 600, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969) (interstate travel) with Macias v. Department of Labor & Indus., 100 Wn.2d 263, 272, 668 P.2d 1278 (1983) and Eggert v. Seattle, 81 Wn.2d 840, 505 P.2d 801 (1973) (intrastate travel). Freedom of movement is at the heart of our scheme of values, for it may be as keen as an interest of the individual as the choice of what he reads, says, eats or wears.” Spokane v. Port, 43 Wn.App. 273 (March 27, 1986); Carter v. University, 85 Wn.2d 391, 536 P.2d 618 (June 5, 1975). “The right to travel is a fundamental right protected by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 31 L.Ed. 2d 274, 92 S.Ct. 995 (1972); Eggert v. Seattle, 81 Wn.2d 840, 505 P.2d 801 (1973).” Halsted v. Sallee, 31 Wn.App. 193, 639 P.2d 877 (January 21, 1982). “Although judicial recognition of the right to travel as being a constitutionally protected fundamental right is of recent development, its existence can no longer be questioned. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 31 L.Ed. 2d 274, 92 S. Ct. 995 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed. 2d 600, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969).” Seattle v. Larkin, 10 Wn.App. 205, 516 P.2d 1083 (December 1973); Zobel vs. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). See also Moen v. Erlandson, 80 Wn.2d 775, 498 P.2d 849 (June 22nd, 1972).
“The public has a paramount right to the use of the streets in all its parts. That right is the right of all persons to pass over it freely and without impediment whenever they have occasion to do so.” James v. Burchett, 15 Wn.(2d) 119 (October 14th, 1942); Bellingham v. Cisna, 44 Wash. 397 (November 1906); Roberton vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash. 133 (Dec. 21, 1934); Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 168 P. 516 (1917); State ex rel. Schafer v. Spokane., 109 Wash. 360-365, 186 P. 864, 865 (January 1920); Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 416 P.2d 46 (1966); 25 Am. Jur. 339, section 2.
Both RCW 46.25.050 (1)(c) & WAC 308-100-210 provide that if I declare my family car to be a . . . “RECREATIONAL VEHICLE” . . . used solely for non-commercial purpose, that I am exempt from having to have a drivers license.
See also Washington State TAX CODE 95 – “RECREATIONAL USE.”
For help with beating your traffic tickets, contact Tribal Lawyer Luis Ewing at Home Office Phone: 1 – (360) 335-1322 or send me a text message to my Cellular Phone at: 1 – (253) 226-3741 or write to me at: or or
PLEASE SEND ALL $$$ 18 U.S.C. § 8 GREEN (FRN) FEDERAL RESERVE NOTE CASH DOLLARS $$$ MONEY ONLY DONATIONS WHICH ARE NOT TAXABLE BY THE STATE PURSUANT TO 31 U.S.C. § 3124, BY FEDERAL EXPRESS ONLY TO:
Luis Ewing
c/o 4731 State Route 109,
(City of) Moclips,
The State of Washington [98562]
Note: The Postman does NOT deliver mail to the houses in Moclips.
YOU CAN CALL ME ANYTIME FROM 1:00 PM THROUGH 12:00 AM MIDNIGHT MONDAY THROUGH SATURDAY!
Luis Ewing home office phone: 1 – (360) 335-1322
Luis Ewing cellular phone: 1 – (253) 226-3741
Luis Ewing SKYPE ID:
https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/legacy/1878Constitution.pdf
FACEBOOK PROFILE:
https://www.facebook.com/luis.ewing.77
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TRIBAL LAWYER APACHE INDIAN LUIS EWING EXPOSES THE SCAM THAT THE DRIVERS LICENSE IS INTENDED TO ONLY APPLY TO FOR HIRE VEHICLES!!!
IT’S ALL OVER FOR YOU PIGS!!!
LUIS EWING PROVES THAT THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL IS A VALID LEGAL ARGUMENT!
LUIS EWING PROVES THAT THE SO CALLED REQUIREMENT FOR A DRIVERS LICENSE IS INTENDED TO ONLY TO APPLY TO . . . “FOR HIRE VEHICLES.”
THE ALLEGED REQUIREMENT FOR A DRIVERS LICENSE UNDER RCW 46.20.001 (1) FORMERLY RCW 46.20.020 ONLY APPLIES TO . . . “FOR HIRE VEHICLES” . . . PURSUANT TO RRS 6313, Sec. 103.
It is undisputed that the so called “REGULAR DRIVERS LICENSE” at RCW 46.20.001 (1) formerly RCW 46.20.020, is in fact and law a “COMMERCIAL DRIVERS LICENSE” that has been endorsed with the requirements of chapter 46.25.010 (3), and is only intended to apply to “FOR HIRE VEHICLES” as provided in former RRS 6313, Sec. 103 which reads:
“Sec. 103 It shall be unlawful for any person to drive an automobile or other motor vehicle carrying passengers for hire, within the city of Seattle, without having a valid and subsisting license so to do, to be known as a ‘drivers license’ …”Driver’s license, ‘first class’ shall entitle the holder thereof to drive any kind or class of motor vehicles for hire within the city of Seattle. “Drivers license, second class’ shall be limited to stages, sight-seeing cars, or other motor vehicles operating over a specified route and having a fixed terminal. “Drivers license, ‘third class’ shall be limited to drivers of taxicabs, for hire cars, or other automobiles not operating on fixed routes, and having a passenger capacity of less than seven (7) persons, not including the driver. …It is intended to apply to “for hire vehicles” as provided in section 6313, Rem. Comp. Stats., are defined to mean all motor vehicles other than auto-mobile stages used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration of any kind is received, either directly or indirectly.” INTERNATIONAL MOTOR TRANSIT CO. et al. v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al. , (No. 19992) 141 Wash. 194, 251 PACIFIC REPORTER 120-123 (Dec. 6, 1926.) And;
RRS 6313, SECTION 103 CLEARLY PROVIDES THAT . . . “IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON TO DRIVE AN AUTOMOBILE OR OTHER MOTOR VEHICLE CARRYING PASSENGERS FOR HIRE, WITHIN THE CITY OF SEATTLE, WITHOUT HAVING A VALID AND SUBSISTING LICENSE SO TO DO, TO BE KNOWN AS A DRIVERS LICENSE.”
“THE REMUNERATION, THE PAYING OF WHICH DETERMINES THE STATUS OF THE VEHICLE, is for the “TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS” as is clearly indicated by the words “which transportation,” NOT FOR THE USE OF THE CAR.” STATE v. HERTZ DRIV-UR-SELF STATIONS, 149 Wash. 479-482 (October 1928). See also State v. Bee Hive Auto Service Co., 137 Wash. 372-374 ( January 1926). And;
“It is clearly the express intention of the legislature to include with the prohibition (against operating motor vehicles on the public highways without proper licensing) of the act every person operating a vehicle of the nature described . . . “FOR HIRE AND AS A REGULAR BUSINESS, ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS” . . . and to exclude from its operation those residing in rural communities who may occasionally carry either passengers or freight, with or without compensation, but not on a commercial basis, and not as a regular business. . . .” Hadfield v. Lundin, 116 P. 516, 98 Wash. 657 (1917). See also Pacific Inland Tariff Bureau v. Schaaf, 1 Wash. (2d) 210-216 (November 1939) and Allen v. Bellingham., 95 Wash. 12-41 (Feb 1891). And;
“1. Carriers–1–State has power to regulate use by common carriers. The state has full power to regulate or prohibit the use of public highways as a place of business by common carriers for hire. . . .” INTERSTATE MOTOR TRANSIT CO. v. KUYKENDALL, State Director of Public Works of Washington, (District Court, W.D. Washington, N. D. November 21, 1922.) No. 309. 284 FEDERAL REPORTER 882-885. And;
“THE RIGHT OF A CITIZEN TO TRAVEL UPON THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS AND TO TRANSPORT HIS PROPERTY THEREON IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LIFE AND BUSINESS IS A COMMON RIGHT, AND NOT A PRIVILEGE, and differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for private gain, such as the running of a stage coach or omnibus which is a privilege. THE FORMER IS A THE USUAL AND ORDINARY RIGHT OF A CITIZEN, A COMMON RIGHT, A RIGHT COMMON TO ALL, while the latter is special, unusual and extraordinary, and is a privilege. As to the former , the extent of legislative power is that of regulation, and the state cannot arbitrarily or unreasonably restrict or prohibit the right; but, as to the latter, its power is broader; the privilege may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and denied to others, because of its extraordinary nature. THIS DISTINCTION, ELEMENTARY AND FUNDAMENTAL IN CHARACTER, IS RECOGNIZED BY ALL THE AUTHORITIES, Indeed, the Allen case, supra, answers every contention made by the appellant and is absolutely controlling here, BUT THE USE TO WHICH THE APPELLANT PURPOSES PUTTING THE STREETS IS NOT THEIR ORDINARY AND CUSTOMARY USE, BUT A SPECIAL ONE. HE PURPOSES USING THEM FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF PASSENGERS FOR HIRE . . .” State Ex Rel. Schafer v. Spokane., 109 Wash. 360-365, 186 P. 864, 865 (January 1920). And;
“Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see THE MOST SACRED OF THEIR LIBERTIES taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment, . . . THE BUSINESS OF OPERATING AS A MOTOR CARRIER OF PROPERTY FOR HIRE ALONG THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE IS DECLARED TO BE A BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST., . . . and that the USE of the highways FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF PROPERTY FOR HIRE may be restricted to the extent required by the necessity of the general public. . . . SUCH A SCHEME OF REGULATION OF THE BUSINESS OF A PRIVATE CARRIER, SUCH AS THE APPELlANT, IS MANIFESTLY BEYOND THE POWER OF THE STATE. . . . MUCH OF OUR TRAFFIC IS FOR PLEASURE ONLY, AND IT IS NOT FOR THE STATE TO SAY WHAT IS PLEASURE AND WHAT IS FOR PROFIT. . . . I am not particularly interested about the rights of haulers by contract, or otherwise, BUT I AM DEEPLY INTERESTED IN THE RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC TO USE THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS FREELY FOR ALL LAWFUL PURPOSES.” We know of no inherent right in one to use the highways FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES. The highways are primarily for the use of the public, and in the interest of the public, THE STATE MAY PROHIBIT OR REGULATE . . . THE USE OF THE HIGHWAYS “FOR GAIN.” Roberton vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash. 133- 147 (Dec. 21, 1934). See also McGlothern v. Seattle., 116 Wash. 331-338 (July 1921). And;
“The local authorities shall have no power to pass or enforce any ordinance, rule or regulation REQUIRING of the owner or operator of any MOTOR VEHICLE, ANY LICENSE OTHER THAN AN OCCUPATION LICENSE OR TAX.” Washington State Session Laws 1915, Chapter 142, pages 396-397, Sec. 34. And;
“THE STATUTE MERELY PROHIBITS THE ENACTMENT OF ANY ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY LICENSE OR PERMIT TO USE THE PUBLIC STREETS. The ordinance in question does not provide for any such license or permit, NOR DOES IT EXCLUDE THE APPELLANT FROM THE FREE USE OF THE STREETS OF THE CITY OF BELLINGHAM.” Bellingham v. Cisna, 44 Wash. 397-403 (November 1906). See also State Ex Rel. Webster v. Superior Court., 67 Wash. 3764 (January 1912); State Ex Rel. S. & R. Co. v. Superior Ct., 123 Wash. 116-123 (January 1923); Big Bend Auto Freight v. Ogers. 148 Wash. 521-525 (August. 1923); State v. Collins., 94 Wash. 310-313 (JANUARY 15, 1917).
TRIBAL COURT LAWYER AND APACHE INDIAN LUIS EWING REVEALS THAT ALL INDIANS HAVE . . . “A RIGHT TO TRAVEL” . . . WITHOUT THE WHITE MAN’S BOGUS COMMERCIAL DRIVERS LICENSES!!!
APACHE INDIAN AND TRIBAL COURT LAWYER LUIS EWING EXPOSES THE WHITE MAN’S SCAMMING DRIVERS LICENSE FEES OUT OF INDIANS IS TOTAL BS!!!
ALL INDIANS HAVE A RIGHT TO TRAVEL WITHOUT THE WHITE MAN’S STATE ISSUED DRIVERS LICENSES!
ALL INDIANS HAVE A RIGHT TO TRAVEL WITHOUT THE WHITE MAN’S STATE ISSUED LICENSE PLATES!!!
LUIS EWING IS THE NUMBER ONE (1) RIGHT TO TRAVEL EXPERT IN THE UNITED STATES!
IT’S ALL OVER FOR YOU PIGS!!!
APACHE INDIAN TRIBAL COURT LAWYER LUIS EWING HAS TOTALLY BUSTED OPEN THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL ISSUE AND SLAM DUNKED IT!!!
ALL INDIANS HAVE THE SECURED TREATY RIGHT TO TRAVEL UPON ALL STATE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS WITHOUT BEING REQUIRED TO HAVE STATE ISSUED DRIVERS LICENSES, LICENSE PLATES OR REGISTRATION!!!
It is undisputed that the Washington State Supreme Court held in State v. Stritmatter, 102 Wn.2d 516, 688 P.2d 499 (September 20, 1984), citing the United States Supreme Court Decision in Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, at page 685, 86 L.Ed. 1115, 62 S.Ct. 862 (1942), that . . . “this State can not require members of the Yakima Indian Tribe to buy fishing licenses since it would act “upon the Indians as a charge for exercising the very right their ancestors intended to reserve” . . . and reads:
“In Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 86 L.Ed. 1115, 62 S.Ct. 862 (1942), the Supreme Court held that this State could not require members of the Yakima Indian Tribe to buy fishing licenses since it would act “upon the Indians as a charge for exercising the very right their ancestors intended to reserve.” Tulee, at 685.” State v. Stritmatter, 102 Wn.2d 516, 688 P.2d 499 (September 20, 1984). (Nor can the State require Indians to buy Drivers Licenses to engage in their secured Treaty Right to Travel to any of their usual and accustomed Hunting or Fishing grounds.) And;
Former Governor Isaac Stevens guaranteed that the Yakamas . . . “shall have the same liberties outside the reservation to pasture animals on land not occupied by whites, to kill game, to get berries and to go on the road to market.” P-2 at p. 69.” YAKAMA INDIAN NATION v. FLORES, 955 F.Supp. 1229 (E.D.Wash. February 12, 1997).
“This statement unequivocally secured the Yakamas’ right to travel off-reservation in order to maintain their customs of hunting, gathering, and trade. More importantly, in entering the Treaty, the Yakamas relied on Stevens’ and Palmer’s promises that they would be able to maintain their cultural and subsistence practices which centered on their ability to travel.” YAKAMA INDIAN NATION v. FLORES, 955 F.Supp. 1229, at page 1247 (E.D.Wash. February 12, 1997). And;
Furthermore, the United States District Court, Eastern District of Washington in YAKAMA INDIAN NATION v. FLORES, 955 F.Supp. 1229 (E.D.Wash. February 12, 1997), at page 1260, held that all Yakima Indian Nation Tribal Members have the right to travel on all public highways without being subject to State licensing and State permitting fees, or State registration requirements exacting such fees, related to the exercise of that right while engaged in the transportation of tribal goods and reads:
“Conclusion
Treaties are a country’s contracts. The solemn commitment of great nations, like the given word of good men, should be honored. It should not matter if the erosion of time and the bright glare of hindsight demonstrate that they were extravagant or ill-advised. The promises made at Walla Walla all those years ago were unconditional. They will be so enforced by this court.
Upon review of the trial testimony, admitted exhibits, and briefing of the parties, the court finds that Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty With the Yakimas unambiguously secures to the Yakima Nation and its members the right to travel the public highways without restriction. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment shall be entered in favor of plaintiffs in accordance with the following:
1. Article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty with the Yakimas of 1855 provides the Yakima Indian Nation with the right to travel on all public highways without being subject to licensing and permitting fees, or registration requirements exacting such fees, related to the exercise of that right while engaged in the transportation of tribal goods.
2. This Treaty right to travel, although secured to the Yakima Indian Nation, can be exercised by its individual members, and any Yakima-owned and operated corporation or business which is tribally licensed. . . .” YAKAMA INDIAN NATION v. FLORES, 955 F.Supp. 1229 (E.D.Wash. February 12, 1997). (Equal Protection of the Law under Article 1, Section 12 of the Washington State Constitution requires this State to grant the Same Rights to all Indians). And;
The Aberdeen Municipal Court in Aberdeen v. Cole, 13 Wn.App. 617, 537 P.2d 1073 (June 10, 1975), held that Quinault Indian Gary Cole did NOT have a privilege!
“Privilege” . . . is synonymous with license . . . . The possession of a . . . license is a prerequisite to violation of this statute. . . . On appeal the Superior court dismissed the charges against Cole on the ground that since he had no . . . license, he had no privilege . . . [2] the statute refers to those whose “privilege” . . . is suspended. Cole never had any type of privilege . . . License is synonymous with privilege, since Cole did not have a license, and that state did not grant Cole a license, THE STATE CANNOT SUSPEND WHAT HE DOES NOT HAVE.” Aberdeen v. Cole, 13 Wn. App. 617, 537 P.2d 1073 (June 10, 1975). And;
I DRIVE WITH NO DRIVERS LICENSE & SMOKE POT AND SO CAN YOU!
For help with beating your traffic tickets, contact Tribal Lawyer Luis Ewing at Home Office Phone: 1 – (360) 335-1322 or send me a text message to my Cellular Phone at: 1 – (253) 226-3741 or write to me at: or or
PLEASE SEND ALL $$$ 18 U.S.C. § 8 GREEN (FRN) FEDERAL RESERVE NOTE CASH DOLLARS $$$ MONEY ONLY DONATIONS WHICH ARE NOT TAXABLE BY THE STATE PURSUANT TO 31 U.S.C. § 3124, BY FEDERAL EXPRESS ONLY TO:
Luis Ewing
c/o 4731 State Route 109,
(City of) Moclips,
The State of Washington [98562]
Note: The Postman does NOT deliver mail to the houses in Moclips.
YOU CAN CALL ME ANYTIME FROM 1:00 PM THROUGH 12:00 AM MIDNIGHT MONDAY THROUGH SATURDAY!
Luis Ewing home office phone: 1 – (360) 335-1322
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APACHE INDIAN TRIBAL LAWYER LUIS EWING AND . . . “QUINAULT INDIAN GARY COLE” . . . PROVES THAT YOU CANNOT BE LAWFULLY OR LEGALLY CHARGED WITH . . . “DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED” . . . IF YOU . . . “NEVER HAD A DRIVERS LICENSE” . . . IN . . . “ABERDEEN v. GARY COLE, 13 Wn. App. 617, 537 P.2d 1073 (1975).
LUIS EWING PROVES THAT YOU CANNOT BE LAWFULLY OR LEGALLY CHARGED WITH . . . “DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED” . . . IF YOUR FORMER DRIVERS LICENSE IS . . . “EXPIRED.”
LUIS EWING PROVES THAT LICENSE IS SYNONYMOUS WITH PRIVILEGE AND THAT IF YOU DON’T HAVE A LICENSE, YOU DON’T HAVE A PRIVILEGE AND THE STATE CANNOT SUSPEND WHAT YOU DO NOT HAVE!!!
LUIS EWING PROVES THAT THE STATE CAN ONLY SUSPEND OR REVOKE A LICENSE IF YOU HAVE ONE!!!
LUIS EWING PROVES THAT THE STATE CANNOT SUSPEND OR REVOKE A DRIVERS LICENSE OR DRIVING PRIVILEGE UNLESS YOU HAVE A CURRENT AND VALID DRIVERS LICENSE THAT HAS NOT LEGALLY EXPIRED!
LUIS EWING PROVES THAT THE MOST THE STATE CAN DO TO THE UNLICENSED DRIVER IS TO DENY THE DRIVER THE PRIVILEGE OF APPLYING FOR THE COMMERCIAL DRIVERS LICENSE, HA, HA, NO THANKS, I DON’T WANT YOUR PRIVILEGE, HA, HA, HA, IT’S ALL OVER FOR YOU PIGS!!!
YOU CANNOT BE CHARGED WITH RCW 46.20.342 DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED IF YOU HAVE NEVER HAD A DRIVERS LICENSE OR IF YOUR FORMER DRIVERS LICENSE IS EXPIRED PURSUANT TO RCW 46.20.181 AND BECAUSE RCW 46.20.001 (2)(a) FORMERLY RCW 46.20.021 CLEARLY SHOW THAT NO STATUTORY LANGUAGE RELATES TO SUSPENSION OF A PRIVILEGE IN THE ABSENCE OF A LICENSE EXISTS AND BECAUSE RCW 46.20.311; RCW 46.04.580 AND RCW 9A.04.080 (j) PROHIBITS ANY SUSPENSION OF A DRIVERS LICENSE FOR A FIXED PERIOD OF NO MORE THAN ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THE SUSPENSION OF A CURRENT AND ACTIVE DRIVERS LICENSE OR FROM THE DATE OF THE EXPIRATION OF THE FORMER DRIVERS LICENSE
It is undisputed that the arresting officer’s illegal warrantless search of the DOL Database Drivers Records check on his Electronic Mobile Data Terminal clearly showed him that my former Drivers License Legally Expired pursuant to RCW 46.20.181, therefore the latest date my former but expired drivers license could have been possibly suspended would be one year later as mandated by RCW 46.20.311, RCW 46.04.585 and the (ONE (1) YEAR) Criminal Statute of Limitation RCW 9A.04.080(j) as held by State v. Klump, 61 Wn. App. 911, 813 P.2d 131 (1991), which stipulates that no license can be suspended for a fixed period of no more than one (1) year. Finally, RCW 46.20.005, clearly states that it is a lessor but included offense of RCW 46.20.342 and further instructs the arresting officer that if the persons former drivers license is expired, see RCW 46.20.015, which clearly shows Driving without a License is a . . . “CIVIL INFRACTION” . . . for which . . . “NO JAIL TIME IS AUTHORIZED” . . . and the . . . “MAXIMUM PENALTY” . . . for . . . “DRIVING WITHOUT A DRIVERS LICENSE” . . . is $250.00.
“On appeal the Superior court dismissed the charges against Cole on the ground that since he had no driver’s license, he had no privilege to drive and therefore he could not be charged with driving while such a privilege was suspended. …In State v. Markley, 34 Wn.2d 766, 210 P.2d 139 (1949); it was held that one who did not have a driver’s license could not be charged and convicted under this section. . . . License is synonymous with privilege, since Cole did not have a license, and that state did not grant Cole a license, THE STATE CANNOT SUSPEND WHAT HE DOES NOT HAVE.” Aberdeen v. Cole, 13 Wn. App. 617, 537 P.2d 1073 (1975). And;
“The State has the power to revoke or suspend a license or permit to drive; IT HAS NO POWER TO REVOKE OR SUSPEND A LICENSE IF THE INDIVIDUAL HAS NONE. THE MOST THE STATE CAN DO TO AN UNLICENSED DRIVER IS TO DENY THE UNLICENSED DRIVER THE PRIVILEGE OF APPLYING FOR THE LICENSE.” Crossman v. Department of Licensing, 42 Wn. App. 325-328, 711 P.2d 1053 (1985). And;
“[1] Automobiles – Operator’s License – Reinstatement –Administrative Error – Effect. A driver’s license will be deemed to have been reinstated, thereby precluding a conviction for driving with a suspended license, …The situation is comparable to that of a probationer who is put in jail for 60 days as a condition of probation. At the expiration of that time he is entitled to that freedom, …When that time expired, …he was entitled to his license. He was deprived of his liberty to drive without due process of law; thus the conviction must be reversed..” STATE v. HAAG, 20 Wn.App. 868, 582 P.2d 910 (Aug. 1978). See also State v. Klump, 61 Wn. App. 911, 813 P.2d 131 (1991). And;
“In order to obtain a conviction under Rem Rev. Stat., Vol. 7A, SS 6312-69, of the offense of operating a motor vehicle WHILE the operator’s license was under suspension, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a license had been issued to operate a motor vehicle and that the defendant had operated such vehicle on a public highway WHILE such license was suspended; [1] In order to obtain a conviction of this offense, the state must prove to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a license had been issued to operate a motor vehicle and that appellant had operated such a vehicle WHILE such license was suspended, revoked, or canceled. We are of the opinion that it must be decided as a matter of law that the respondent wholly failed to prove the essential elements of the offense charged, and that the trial court should have withdrawn the case from the jury and dismissed the action. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to enter an order of dismissal.” State v. Markley, 34 Wn.2d 766, 210 P.2d 139 [No. 30968. Department One. September 27, 1949]. And;
“The State charged Campbell with driving WHILE license is suspended or revoked in the first degree. Campbell moved to dismiss the charges. .The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case because the State failed to prove the order of revocation or suspension was still in effect. , . . . other jurisdictions hold that once the period of suspension or revocation has run, the motorist cannot be cited for driving with a suspended or revoked license, See State v. Gasser, 29 Ohio App. 3d 115, 504 N.E. 2d 73 (1985), ..The court held that the State failed to show that Gasser’s license was still suspended on the date in question. Gasser, 504 N.E. 2d at 75; see also State v. Dyson, 518 N.E. 2d 812-813, (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (driver could not be convicted for driving with license suspended after the period of suspension had expired)., …One other jurisdiction has noted the difference between a “suspended” license as opposed to a “revoked” license. See State v. Brude, 222 N.W. 2d 296 (N.D. 1974) The Brude court held that at the end of the period of suspension, the License is automatically restored, whereas with a revoked license, the revocation continues until the license has been restored. Brude, 222 N.W. 2d at 297. THIS ARGUMENT IS PERSUASIVE IN LIGHT OF RCW 46.04.480.” State v. Garrett Lee Danner, 79 Wn. App. 144, 900 P.2d 1126 (1995). And;
“A License, … is no more than ‘a temporary permit to do that which would otherwise be unlawful, . . . .” RAWSON v. DEPT. OF LICENSES, 15 Wn. (2d) 364-372 (Nov. 1942). And;
“The information against appellant fails to allege that appellant had been issued either an operator’s or chauffeur’s license, or that he drove a motor vehicle while such a license was suspended. In Hassell v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 333, 194 S.W. 2d 400, an information alleging that the defendant operated a motor vehicle upon a public highway without a “drivers license” was held insufficient to charge an offense since a drivers license is not known to the law. In Barber v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 18, 191 S.W.2d 879, a complaint charging the operation of an automobile and failure to display operator’s license, on demand of a peace officer, was held insufficient to charge an offense in the absence of an allegation that the accused was on the date of the alleged offense, a licensee. The information being insufficient to charge an offense, the judgement is reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed.” TED HOLLOWAY v. STATE, No. 25192 BLUE BOOK CITATION FORM: 1951.TX.188 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS (March 7, 1951). And;
The Court of Appeals held that evidence was insufficient to support conviction of operating motor vehicle while driver’s license was suspended, as it was not shown that defendant’s driver’s license was suspended on alleged date of the offense.” State v. Ted Jones, 482 N.E.2d 747 (Ind. App. 2 Dist. 1985). And;
“The Court of Appeals, Sullivan, J., held that motorist whose license had been suspended for one year was not guilty of driving with license under suspension where the one year had expired, even though he had not paid reinstatement fee. …When the term of the suspension expired the suspension was no longer in effect. See State v. Martin, (1985)4th Dist. Ind. App., 484 N.E. 2d 1309. …He was not however, driving while his license was under suspension. We adopt the following conclusion stated in Jones v. State, (1985) 3d Dist. Ind. App., 482 N.E. 2d 746-747 n. 7. …In any event, the conclusion reached by the Third District in Jones v. State, supra, was a unanimous conclusion of the panel which included Judge Staton, the author of Baldock v. State (1978) 3d Dist., 177 App. 355, 379 N.E. 2d 539. In Baldock, the majority opinion, joined by Judge Buchanan, correctly observed that the period of defendant’s suspension had expired and that although Baldock “was no longer technically within the suspension period, neither was he legally licensed.” also State v. Douglas A. Dyson, 518 N.E.2d 812 (Ind.App. 2 Dist. 1988). And;
The Court of Appeals, held that suspension of driver’s license pursuant to habitual traffic offender statute terminated automatically upon expiration of specified six-month period, …driver could not be convicted of driving under Financial Responsibility Act suspension without showing that his license was actually under suspension pursuant to Act on date in question. R.C. sections 4507 (K), 4509.76, … We are bound by the holding in State v. Roberts, (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 94, 403 N.E. 2d 971 [16 O.O.3d 102], …The state has simply not proven that Gasser’s license was under suspension on the date in question.” See also State v. Gasser, 504 N.E. 2d 73 (Ohio App. 1985). And;
“On motion to certify record, the Supreme Court, William B. Brown, J., held that suspension of driver’s license for six months terminated by operation of law upon expiration of six-month period.” also State v. Roberts, 403 N.E. 2d 971 (April 23, 1980). And;
“No statutory or inherent authority exists which would cause the original suspension to again rise up, phoenix-like from the ashes of destruction of the original 90 day suspension order. When it ended, it ended. Such argument is without merit.” also State v. Martin, 484 N.E. 2d 1309 (Ind.App. 4 Dist. 1985) (Nov. 14, 1985). And;
“Baldock’s license had been suspended May 15, 1973 and that suspension expired May 15, 1974. Thus, on May 3rd and May 30th, 1975 he simply was not driving while his license was suspended. …Of course, under the facts Baldock was guilty of operating without a license. IC 9-1-4-26. But that is not the offense with which he was charged or convicted. Accordingly the convictions for driving while license suspended should be reversed.” Baldock v. State, 379 N.E. 2d 539 (August 23, 1978). And;
“Under statutes, distinction between suspension and revocation of driver’s license is that a suspension is effective for a specified period while a revocation continues until such time as a new application has been submitted and a license issued. …Suspension means that the driver’s license and privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the public highways are temporarily withdrawn but only during the period of such suspension.” State v. Joseph M. Brude, 222 N.W. 2d 296 (October 10, 1974). And;
“Where chauffeur’s license expired by its own terms prior to trial of case complaining of suspension of such license, question was moot, and life of license was not extended by pendency of appeal to County Court from order suspending license.” See also Hoover v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 305 S.W. 2d 228 (July 31, 1957), and Stogner v. State, 309 S.W. 2d 470 (January 10, 1958).” Boston v. Garrison, 256 S.W. 2d 67 (March 11, 1953). And;
“In Bryant v. Stat, Tex.Cr.App., 294 S.W. 2d 819, we held that a license which had expired could not be suspended. By the same process of reasoning, then a suspension can not keep alive a license that expires of its own terms. A suspension can no more keep alive an expired license than it can restore one that has expired. When a license expires it passes out of existence. Unless and until the applicant secures a new license he has no license, and any driving under those conditions would constitute driving without a license. The instant facts show a driving without a license and not a driving while the license was suspended. It may appear that the difference between driving without a license and driving while the license is suspended is trivial and a matter of little consequence. Such however is not true. There is a vast difference. The difference lies both in the minimum and the maximum punishment allowed to be inflicted. We are laying down a rule that will control in all instances, including those where the heavy penalty for driving while the license is suspended upon facts showing a driving without a license. The evidence being insufficient to show that appellant’s license was suspended at the time he drove the automobile, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded. …The holding of our Supreme Court and two Courts of Civil Appeals hold that the license dies with its expiration date and that any suspension of the license ceases to exist with its expiration. Indeed it is the holding of those civil courts that the pendency of an appeal does not extend the license beyond the term for which it was issued. Under those authorities and the facts of this case, appellant could not have been guilty of operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended. In the interest of harmony between the holdings of this court and the Supreme Court, this court should follow the latter court and the Courts of Civil Appeals, first: because their holding is correct, and second, because they were the first to pass upon and adjudicate the question. In Jennigan v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 313 S.W. 2d 309, we applied that rule and followed the prior holding of the Supreme Court upon the same subject.” Goolsby v. State, 312 S.W. 2d 654 (March 12, 1958). And;
“The proof therefore fails to sustain the allegations of the complaint and information that appellant drove a motor vehicle ‘when the Texas Operator’s License of the said George Gordon Rushing was suspended. …Appellant’s motion for rehearing granted, the affirmance is set aside and the judgment is now reversed and the cause now remanded.” George Gordon Rushing v. State, 277 S.W. 2d 104 ((Jan.26, 1955). And;
“It is necessary, therefore, to determine whether appellant’s driver’s license was suspended at the time he was convicted of driving while his license was suspended, and if so, the period for which it was suspended.” Drake v. Dept of Public Safety, 393 S.W. 2d 320 (Jan. 24, 1965). And;
“The record shows that there was no renewal of appellant’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle, and there is no evidence that he was issued a new license. The state has failed to show that appellant had a license which was suspended on the date of the offense alleged, and the conviction cannot stand. Bryant v. State, 163 Tex. Cr.R. 544 S.W. 2d 819. …It is incumbent upon the state in every cause of action to prove the elements of the offense charged. One of the elements of the offense of driving while license is suspended is that the accused’s privilege to drive a motor vehicle must be suspended at the time of the alleged offense. Under this court’s interpretation of Article 6687b, this means that the state is required to prove that the accused had a license which was suspended at the time of the alleged offense, or that the accused’s privilege to drive was suspended at the time his license expired by its own terms, and that because of an unbroken chain of successive suspensions, that privilege remain suspended from the expiration date to the time of the alleged offense. Preble v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 402 S.W. 2d 902, opinion delivered February 9, 1966. The state has failed to prove this element of the offense. We overrule the state’s contention that appellant’s stipulation as to his prior conviction estopped him from asserting his defense that he had no license which could be under suspension at the time of the alleged offense. See Lee v. State, 86 Tex.Cr.R 146, 215 S.W. 326. A discussion of the facts is not necessary. Suffice it to say that appellant was shown to have operated a motor vehicle on a public street on February 9, 1965. For proof that appellant’s privilege to drive was suspended on that date, the State relied upon the same chain of suspensions relied upon in the prosecution of this same appellant in Cathy v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 402 S.W. 2d 743, opinion delivered this date. In that case, this Court found that appellant’s license to drive had expired on September 23, 1960, at a time when it was not validly suspended, and appellant had no license–either suspended or unencumbered–on the date of the alleged offense. Conviction in that cause was reversed because the State failed to prove one of the elements of the offense, i.e., that appellant’s privilege to drive was suspended at the time of the alleged offense. Our decision in Cathy, supra, controls our disposition in this case.” Cathy v. State, 402 S.W. 2d 743 (April 13, 1966). And;
“To obtain conviction for driving while license suspended, state must show either that accused had unexpired license which was suspended at the time of the alleged offense or that accused’s privilege to drive was suspended at or before time accused’s license expired by its own terms, and that privilege remained suspended from expiration date to time of alleged offense.” Demorise Smith, Jr., v. State, 895 S.W. 2d 449 (Feb. 23, 1995). And;
“ . . . because defendant’s driver’s license expired prior to subsequent convictions for driving while intoxicated, he could not be convicted of driving with license suspended because he had no license to be suspended by those convictions. …If appellant’s license suspensions lapsed at any time after the license expiration date, but before the date of the alleged offense, then under Preble and Cathy appellant could not have been convicted of DWLS since he had no license which could have been under suspension. See Bryant v. State, 294 S.W. 2d 819. …Therefore, the judgment must be reversed and reformed to show an acquittal. Since we find the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction.” Odis Pippen Allen v. State, 681 S.W. 2d 38 )Tex.Cr.App. 1984). And;
“The trial court concluded that there was no authority to suspend a license for offenses committed after the date on which appellee’s license expired. However, it held that for offenses committed during the life of the license, the license could be suspended for a period or periods that would make the term of suspension extend beyond the expiration date of the license.” Texas Department of Public Safety v. Preble, 398 S.W. 2d 785 (Jan. 27, 1966). And;
“The trial court concluded that there was no authority to suspend a license for offenses committed after the expiration date of that license. …This being true, the license was not suspended when it expired. This distinguishes Boston from the case before us. See Drake v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 393 S.W. 2d 320.” Preble v. State, 402 S.W. 2d 902 (Feb. 9, 1966). And;
“Evidence was insufficient to support conviction for driving an automobile during suspension of operator’s license, in view of evidence that license which had been issued to defendant had expired prior to alleged commission of offense and had not been suspended prior to expiration and absence of evidence that such license had been renewed or another license issued to defendant. …Of necessity, therefore, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense appellant had no operator’s license which might be or was suspended. Because the evidence fails to support the conviction, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.” Brickhouse v. State, 294 S.W. 2d 819 (October 31, 1956). And;
“Where driver’s license had expired by its own terms prior to his arrest for driving while license suspended, State was required to prove that driver’s privilege to drive was suspended at the time his license expired by its own terms and that because of unbroken chain of successive suspensions, that privilege remained suspended from expiration date to date of instant offense, August 9, 1981 Cathy v. State, 402 S.W. 2d 743, 745 (Tex.Cr.App. 1966).” Allen v. State, 659 S.W. 2d 925 (Tex. App.2 Dist. 1983). And;
To the Booking Officer, I want to inform you that the MAXIMUM BAIL AMOUNT UNDER THE LAW for RCW 46.20.342 DWLS IS $500.00 BONDABLE AT $50.00 pursuant to Washington State Supreme Court Rule CrRLJ 3.2 (m)(6), CrRLJ 1.1 & A.R.L.J. No. 7
I DRIVE WITH NO DRIVERS LICENSE & SMOKE POT AND SO CAN YOU!
For help with beating your traffic tickets, contact Tribal Lawyer Luis Ewing at Home Office Phone: 1 – (360) 335-1322 or send me a text message to my Cellular Phone at: 1 – (253) 226-3741 or write to me at: or or
PLEASE SEND ALL $$$ 18 U.S.C. § 8 GREEN (FRN) FEDERAL RESERVE NOTE CASH DOLLARS $$$ MONEY ONLY DONATIONS WHICH ARE NOT TAXABLE BY THE STATE PURSUANT TO 31 U.S.C. § 3124, BY FEDERAL EXPRESS ONLY TO:
Luis Ewing
c/o 4731 State Route 109,
(City of) Moclips,
The State of Washington [98562]
Note: The Postman does NOT deliver mail to the houses in Moclips.
YOU CAN CALL ME ANYTIME FROM 1:00 PM THROUGH 12:00 AM MIDNIGHT MONDAY THROUGH SATURDAY!
Luis Ewing home office phone: 1 – (360) 335-1322
Luis Ewing cellular phone: 1 – (253) 226-3741
Luis Ewing SKYPE ID:
https://www.leagle.com/decision/197563013wnapp6171534
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David,
I agree with Attorney Phil that the Transportation Administrative Notice is based on a strained, activist reading of the statute and that the TAN is worthless if it is starting with an incorrect assumption regarding the intended purpose/scope of the statute.
If you really believe what you are arguing, you should be lobbying the state legislature to adopt legislation which codifies your position.
However, most reasonable citizens would oppose such a change because we don’t want to share the road with uninsured drivers, impaired drivers or scofflaws. Yes, that already happens, but let’s not remove all the penalties for irresponsible behavior.
In every Statute we must include “Maxims of Law” What is written in law is exactly that, no interpretations, no adding of words that the legislators didn put in the “Statute”, as the question was stated “the Statute only referred to commercial activity, we can not interpret that the legislators also meant the “noncommercial” in it’s statute, if it want it in the statute it would have surely put it in their to show intent to cover it also.