CHATTANOOGA, Tenn., Sept. 30, 2022 — High court justices deny my demand that disqualify themselves from hearing my petition for a hearing in their court on grounds of partiality, bias and their role in joining Gov. Bill Lee in overthrowing constitutional government in March 2020.
By David Tulis / NoogaRadio 96.9 FM
They say I should have sued them when I sued Gov. Lee; and since I didn’t sue them for violating T.C.A. § 68-5-104, as did Lee, that they are fit to hear my petition against him demanding he obey the law or show cause as to his actions leading up to his March 12, 2020, executive order for emergency, first in many in the so-called pandemic. They claim they can be fair to me, though they have been Gov. Lee’s ally in rejecting black-letter statute and violating the constitution with a state of martial law.
I mailed Sept. 26 a second recusal demand, making an argument even less likely to succeed. And that is that all five justices — Sharon Lee, Sarah Campbell, Holly Kirby, chief justice Roger Page and the former chief justice Jeff Bivins — should recuse because they are members of the Tennessee Bar Association, united in polity with the American Bar Association. This latter gang, drawing delegates from Tennessee, pursues World Economic Forum and United Nations goals for “environmental sustainability.” Covid-19 is key in the “Great Reset” toward depopulation and globalist totalitarianism for which CV-19 is a huge boost.
Motion for recusal & disqualification No. 2
Comes now state of Tennessee, on relation, swearing the contents of this motion to be true to the best of his knowledge, to object to the order denying his motion for recusal and disqualification. He demands recusal of the whole court, on further grounds, its members in league with parties outside the case, connection to whom suggests they are ally with respondents and the lower courts, under private interest, rather than fixed on justice, equity and the job to “uphold and apply the law,” Rule 2.2, as the oath to judicial office before God requires.
Justice Roger Page arrest of relator grounds. Relator objects to the order insisting Justice Page can be impartial in having ordained relator’s arrest in the pendency of this cause, though on grounds unrelated to the conflict in view in the litigation. The court says, “We disagree that this requires recusal.
Nothing in this appeal relates to Mr. Tulis’s arrest, and a judge is not required to recuse himself simply because he has had previous interactions with a party. See, e.g., Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
It is true that “nothing in this appeal relates” to relator’s arrest covering the Tennessee judicial conference as radio news reporter Nov. 6, 2021, by right at the Embassy Suites at Cool Springs hotel in Franklin, Tenn. The question is not whether the appeal relates to an arrest ordained by the chief justice, but whether the chief justice relates to this case fairly and impartially while under cloud of acts by his agents that are arguably criminal, subject to fact witness testimony to a grand jury or a tort action either in Williamson County circuit court or U.S. district court.
True, “simply because he has had previous interactions” with a party is not ground for recusal. The court cites the Kinard case, which is off point. (1) It cites a judge’s and a lawyer’s past business relationship eight years prior and two years prior. This case is not about a “previous interaction.” It is about an existing unsettled conflict between two people, one a justice with a first blow, the other a petitioner with a right of redress. Does the court not see the terrible optics of its position, wherein the judge may actually unjustly favor relator in this cause on account of relator’s pursuit of redress in a different one? “[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13, 99 L. Ed. 11 (1954), as cited in Kinard at 228.
Failure to sue grounds. The state, on relation, objects to denial of its motion for disqualification. The justices “respectfully disagree” with its recusal demand on grounds that “Mr. Tulis’s petition did not name the Justices of this Court as defendants” and that the “the issues on appeal *** are unrelated to the actions this Court took in response to the COVID-19 pandemic,” those issues on appeal, the court notes, being “among other things, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a lack of standing.”
In other words, relator didn’t sue the participating justices for their actions “in response to the Covid-19 pandemic,” so now he must accept them as his judges in a suit claiming their “response to the *** pandemic,” like the “responses” of respondents, is fraud and breach. The court’s words are an admission of the court’s role in harms of which the relator complains — all the more ground for recusal. The prospect of recusal does not control litigation and selection of defendants; the facts do. The “issues on appeal” are not merely procedural, as the court alludes. The issues in the appeal are mass fraud, harm to the relator as a man, harm to law and breach, which altogether enstink the record, which frauds commenced with acts of respondents to violate clearly established law T.C.A. § 68-5-104, which acts the court endorsed. The court’s denial of recusal, as it were, “pretermits” the justices’ role and their “personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute,” quoting Rule 2.11, causing a whole line of constitutional violations. Relator details these harms and a pattern of judicial bias, due process violations and prejudice in “Notice of judicial department mass fraud,” TR p. 339, and other pleadings.
The court says, effectively, “Because you didn’t sue us for what we did responding to Covid-19, following respondent governor,” “you cannot bring up the claim we’re biased in his favor” — a very small square of napkin behind which a court denuded of moral authority and the appearance of impartiality might hide.
Judges have absolute immunity from suit. (2) “Neither the correctness of a judge’s decisions, nor his motives, affect this immunity” Mercer v. HCA Health Servs. of Tennessee, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). To suggest relator have sued them for their administrative and departmental management acts of March 13, 2020, in a terrorism event and mass panic led by respondents Lee and Barnes in rebellion against the law, is a point made without discernible good faith. The justices cite no case allowing such suit.
Code commission grounds. As for two justices settled in their swivel chairs on the code commission, the court says relator “argues this violates article 6 section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Again, we disagree that this requires recusal.” To say that state of Tennessee, on relation, “argues” this point implies the court sees no conflict between statute and constitution, and at the same time that statute wins. Unconstitutional practice at one point of law, the court suggests, doesn’t affect the court’s constitutional integrity in dealing with other parts of clearly established law, namely T.C.A. § 68-5-104. In approving its violation and seeing no harm against relator or equity in its breach, the bar members in lower courts endorse a train of constitutional harms. Relator is expected to believe the justices will obey constitution and law in present cause — just as they do in holding second offices of trust forbidden by Tennessee const. art. 6, sect. 7.
“Nothing in Mr. Tulis’s petition challenged Tennessee Code Annotated section l-1-102,” the court says. To deny relator’s demand for recusal because he hadn’t sued over this point at the start is to retroactively reinterpret the case history, play a hindsight “gotcha” and suppose an original impossibility. Recusal is based upon facts about a judge external to the case that bring an internal harm or appearance of bias. Denial ignores the recusal standards to reach back to the Oct. 2, 2020, filing date and allege a misstep as the ground for refusal to disqualify.
The petition is sufficient and adequate as to the purposes of state of Tennessee, its relator and the 7 million people this petition seeks to protect. With cavils the court favors a statutory duty over a constitutional prohibition. Relator objects. He is being denied due process in this order. Recusal on these grounds is proper and upholds the appearance of impartiality and confidence of the public. The petition for equity and mandamus asks the court to uphold a constitutional and valid law, T.C.A. § 68-5-104, and to secure the law’s claims upon its subjects liable for performance. It asks the court to enforce duties (such as open courts) and prohibitions in the constitution (no martial law), overthrown by respondents in violating the law. It asks that law control over executive policy admitted by respondents as against the law, just as the recusal motion asks that constitution control over statute, as that is the proper order of authority. Relator demands a hearing from uncompromised judges of constitutional integrity, honesty, good faith and forthrightness.
Relief sought on the court’s Sept. 9, 2022, order: Rescission of the order, as argued above,
— The chief justice has not a past relationship with relator but an unknown and potentially perilous future one regarding relator’s false arrest by agents, and on that leading ground must disqualify.
— Justices’ role in adhering to respondents’ illegal actions in a purported pandemic makes a prima facie case for recusal in the mind of any reasonable person or member of the public. If they don’t today state themselves victim of fraud of respondent governor, they are purveyors and collaborators. To say relator should’ve sued them to not now have them hear his petition is to abuse the rules of recusal— ignore them. These rules govern an existing case, not a proposed theoretical one by self-justifying jurists.
— Two justices’ role on the code commission and relator’s objection are a test of their fidelity to their oaths in a case without precedent that goes to the heart of democratically elected republican representative government under a constitution and raises existential questions about government’s upholding its covenant with the people. For the court to say a petitioner should have filed a separate suit over such an issue is to pretend that recusal rules control a case before inception, rather than that a case and the people involved in it — and their eventual encounter over bias or potential bias in a judge — control the operation of these ethical standards.
Next: Bar association ties show bias
1 “The trial judge and the lawyer representing Mr. Kinard had an office sharing arrangement lasting two years that ended eight years before Mr. Kinard sought a divorce from Ms. Kinard. The trial judge had severed all financial ties with Mr. Kinard’s lawyer two years before the divorce suit was filed when he sold the lawyer his interest in the building that housed their offices. There is no suggestion in the record that the trial judge stands to benefit in any way from Mr. Kinard’s lawyer’s practice or that he was ever involved in the present case or any other matter related to the present case. Mr. Kinard’s lawyer did not undertake to represent him in this divorce proceeding until long after his professional relationship with the trial judge had ended.”
Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)
2 The judge performs his duty to the public by doing justice between individuals, or, if he fails to do justice between individuals, he may be called to account by the state in such form and before such tribunal as the law may have provided. But, as the duty neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress, as for a civil injury, is not admissible.
Webb v. Fisher, 109 Tenn. 701, 72 S.W. 110, 112 (1903)
Time to fight