Judge Pam Fleenor, in a lawsuit ignored by the establishment press in Tennessee, says there is nothing justiciable in my claim representing the state and its 6.8 million people. She rules that the governor has no duty to obey the health law, that I have not been harmed by any of his acts on the Covid-19 scam, that nothing in my suit allows there to be a redress of my grievance, that my alleged injuries are unspecific and speculative, that the governor has to be sued in Davidson County (even though fraud and crime are alleged), and that mandamus — a most powerful common law writ — cannot be used against the governor.
Here is part of my analysis on the unjust judge Pam Fleenor’s claim that my Oct. 2, 2020, filing is of no substance, no merit, and not “justiciable.” — DJT
Justiciability — can court give remedy?
SUMMARY A case is not justiciable if it does not involve a genuine, existing controversy requiring the adjudication of presently existing, real rights. It must be a real question rather than a theoretical one. A legally protectable interest must be at stake, a real interest involving past and present events (not in the future, not contingent). The orders of the lower court assert the relator’s claims are “alleged nonjusticiable generalized grievances” (p. 233, Lee dismissal order). In Tennessee, justiciability doctrines assist the courts in determining whether a particular case presents a legal controversy.
The justiciability doctrines recognized by Tennessee courts mirror the justiciability doctrines of the federal courts. These doctrines include: (1) the prohibition against advisory opinions, (2) standing, (3) ripeness, (4) mootness, (5) the political question doctrine, and (6) exhaustion of administrative remedies. The petition and supporting affidavit evidence continuing, direct, specific, irreparable harms, a real and substantial controversy involving a genuine conflict of tangible interests and not merely a theoretical dispute. Together with the standing evidenced, no assertion has been made that any of the five justiciability doctrines control, the multiple court orders asserting the suit is not justiciable in chancery are incorrect. The petition commencing this lawsuit is “proper to be examined in courts of justice” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed.).
ARGUMENT The constitution in Article 1, sect. 17, says relator has a remedy for wrong done to him in the courts. “That all courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay.”
The justiciability standard in Tennessee includes “exceptional circumstances that make it appropriate to address the merits of an issue notwithstanding its ostensible mootness,” or lack of justiciability. These exceptions to the doctrine “include: (1) when the issue is of great public importance or affects the administration of justice; (2) when the challenged conduct is capable of repetition and evades judicial review; (3) when the primary dispute is moot but collateral consequences persist; and (4) when a litigant has voluntarily ceased the challenged conduct” Witt v. Witt, No. E201700884COAR3CV, 2018 WL 1505485, at *4–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2018).
A moot case is not justiciable. If, arguendo, the present case is seen as moot, having been inexpertly submitted that it fails to reach justiciability, its great public import gives it the substance it otherwise lacks — to make it justiciable. The state’s lawsuit on relation empowers the court on matters of “great public importance” that “[affect] the administration of justice” (p. 9 ¶ 8). The “challenged conduct” of respondents-in-fraud “is capable of repetition” and thus far, 544 days into the “emergency,” has “[evaded] judicial review” with a train of evil “collateral consequences” upon every man and woman in the state of Tennessee, starting with the relator.
The petition establishes the legally cognizable interests of relator, a wrong done relator by respondents (p 8 ¶ 2) extending communicable disease law preventative measures wrongly, without due process, without the first required medical report to invoke any jurisdiction in them. Both parties have a legally cognizable interest in the issues, liability being that of respondents, for which no adequate remedy exists for relator except the open court under the “due course of law,” demanding that justice be “administered without sale, denial or delay” by a chancery court with subject matter jurisdiction.
The dispute is legal in nature, with relator violated by respondents’ rejection of duty and trust obligation by respondents who oppress relator (p. 11, ¶ 21) and all the people in the state of Tennessee by defying the legislative constraints put on them pursuant to T.C.A. § 68-5-104 and, harming relator’s rights, violating article 11, sect. 16, of the constitution. “The declaration of rights *** shall never be violated on any pretense whatever. And to guard against transgression of the high powers we have delegated, we declare that everything in the bill of rights contained, is excepted out of the general powers of the government, and shall forever remain inviolate.”
The court alone has authority to direct respondents as to law and duty, to halt “wrongful acts” and to empty their acts of “all force and effect” and to declare them void ab initio (p. 9, ¶ 5). Relator demands relief from respondents-in-fraud, and that the court not agree with chancery that the arrival of this case at its bar gives it nothing to do, as if relator had filed blank sheets of paper.