Common law rightsEmergencyFree people vs. police stateInterpositionPanic 2020

Lawbreaking Barnes demands relator pay F$10,000 in legal fees

Becky Barnes, Hamilton County, Tennessee health administrator, is overseeing a mass inoculation program of experimental jabs and worries about so-called “vaccine hesitancy,” though many members of the public are fooled by her acts in fraud. (Photo hamilton county health department on YouTube)
Sharon Milling, behind the plexiglass window at the county attorney’s office, opens her copy of a grievance against judge Pam Fleenor in Hamilton County chancery, one filed with the state supreme court. Mrs. Milling represents Becky Barnes, the county health administrator who is ignoring state law because she has “discretion,” according to Mrs. Milling. (Photo David Tulis)

Affidavit & Motion to Object to Billing by Party in Fraud

Comes now, David Jonathan Tulis, of 10520 Brickhill Lane, Soddy-Daisy, Hamilton County, Tenn., being of sound mind and body, declaring the following facts true and correct to the best of my firsthand knowledge, reserving for a later date those injuries the expression for which escapes the affiant today or as may develop to describe, as follows:

  1. State of Tennessee on relation who objects to a $10,150-plus proposed bill from Hamilton County attorney’s office and from respondent-in-fraud Rebecca Barnes in a case involving admitted mass fraud, admitted violation of Tennessee Code Ann. § 68-5-104 and admission of committing fraud with the court’s acquiescence, consent and promotion (Petition, ¶¶ 85-88), of deeds prohibited by Tenn. Code Ann. 39-16-402, official misconduct.
  1. State of Tennessee objects to the record supplied by attorney Sharon Millings and the total she says is owed by state of Tennessee on relation. 
  1. The state of Tennessee on relation further asserts it is an unlawful takings of relator’s private funds not paid for by the people of Tennessee, given the state is speaking on relation, not the relator, who is not benefited but attacked by the state’s own attorney general, or state officers of the court, using the treasury against the will and contrary to the rights of the people. This case is not one at law. The suit is an equity relief matter of fraud, the petition of record incorporated by this reference, causing irreparable harms, relator’s unrebutted  affidavit of irreparable harms of record incorporated by this reference, not lawfully subject to the injustice allowed by the court, and sufficiently so to chill the future exercise of the constitutional rights of the people against government or official wrongdoing, such as breach of trust.
  2. This chill-causing breach of trust evidences that the administration of justice in Tennessee is broken, as a matter of law, chancellor Gibson might have said, shown in the mistreatment of those suitors intending equity remedy to stop admitted official fraud but instead experiencing time-wasting monetary punishment contrary to constitutional guarantees or securities by the very officials entrusted to keep the law protecting the state on relation, and in peace. The relator claims that being charged is a wrongful constructive seizure of his private property for exercising a constitutional right to stop a public health fraud, which public fraud is not a legitimate public interest,  purpose, or use, or whatever the legislature may be deemed to have said to the contrary of an official sued in their personal capacity. Chancellor Gibson’s fine work indicates this legislative entitlement, if constitutional, couldn’t extend to fraud, whether or not embraced by the court.
  1. The unrebutted or lawfully disposed grounds for objecting are admitted and continuing fraud, unreasonableness, the court’s role in delay, and maladministration of the equity court in piling on expenses, losses and harm resulting from delay, or as the respondents-in-fraud concertedly piggy-back the wrongful advantage provided by the court to them. 
  1. Respondent Barnes is bold to claim “discretion” to commit fraud while disobeying black-letter law imposing known legal duty upon her that she evades extravagantly, knowingly, willfully and negligently. So also is she arrogant in her disregard enough to flout the appearance of impropriety before the court of equity and demand that she, a party in negative equity, be compensated for a taxpayer-funded crusade to evade justice of relator’s claims against her infidelity to her known legal duty to have yet more days to defy the claims of state of Tennessee and its people, and through fraud to continue their irreparable harms. Submission of the Barnes attorney affidavit of costs fails to recognize that the court’s order for a hearing on relator’s two motions to alter effectively rescinds the court’s double dismissal orders, and proceeds in prejudice.
  1. The court’s ruling to discuss her bill prior to a final order in this lawsuit gives signal that the court prejudicially intends to rule against state of Tennessee on relation contrary to equity principles, for instance, aiding and abetting fraud, as if a final order of dismissal or issuance of a writ of mandamus is in any way delayed by the matter of expenses coming up after final disposition. 
  1. The respondents-in-fraud know or should know any affidavit to this court is a perjurious attempt to fulfill fraud and get paid for it. At the hearing of March 30, 2021, despite a criminal denial by omission, a representative of the respondents-in-fraud finally acknowledged equity principles have something to do with relator’s suit.
  1. Barnes attorney Milling referred to § 510 in Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, without objection by the court. By this reference, the respondents-in-fraud shall now also acknowledge, notwithstanding any omission prior, that Sections § 57, Equity Will Undo What Fraud Has Done,  § 456, Fraud Proved by Circumstances, § 457, When Fraud Will Be Presumed and others prevail against  their use of any section referenced outside of the sections on fraud, and each their commission of fraud upon the court. 
  1. That to the extent § 510 in Gibson’s could have any bearing, the force and effect of a more complete and proper application of the equity principles acknowledged appurtenant to the suit intended by relator prevails, destroying any pretense or pretext of any defense or expectation of compensation for want of equity, unless this court intends to aid and abet fraud and deny under color of state authority remedy the constitution of Tennessee guarantees to relator. In doing so, aiding and abetting fraud of record, this court would also breach the trust established and it undertook to be faithful to or securing the confidence of the state on relation. 
  1. Says Gibson, “Fraud, in the sight of a Court of Equity, vitiates every contract or transaction into which it enters, at the election of the injured party and the court will not only undo what fraud has done, but will treat acts as done which fraud prevented from being done,” Gibson, 1955 ed. § 57, P. 71.

The Court of Chancery [and by implication, the court] is the arch enemy of fraud; and to that court those who are the victims of bad faith generally apply for redress, not only because the Chancery Court can grant more perfect relief, but, also, because it will often grant that relief upon weaker presumptive evidence than will a Court of Law. 

Gibson, § 456. Fraud Proved by Circumstances (emphasis added) 

  1. Fraud, in the sight of a Court of Equity, vitiates every contract or transaction into which it enters, at the election of the injured party, Gibson says.

Whatever fraud touched was declared to be vitiated, wherever fraud trod was declared unholy ground, and whatever fraud did was pronounced null and void. All the haunts of fraud were laid bare, all of its paths, however crooked, were sign-boarded, all of its subterfuges pointed out, all of its false coins branded, and all of its allies detected and marked with badges. Fraud has been so crippled and hedged about by the Chancery Court that its power to deceive and do evil has been much weakened, and the remedies for its rascalities much increased, but it has not yet gone out of business.

 Gibson, § 57, Equity Will Undo What Fraud Has Done (emphasis added)

  1. Indeed, in State ex rel Tulis, fraud keeps on in business as respondents refuse to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-5-104, requiring respondent Barnes must make a determination as to the viral agent of contagion in the erstwhile flu season of Covid-19 or SARS-CoV2.
  1. Fraud poisons respondent Barnes’ actions, according to the petition for writ of mandamus. Fraud vitiates the court’s actions discussing her legal expenses before a final order. 

[I]f a contract is affected with fraud, or has a fraudulent purpose, none of the parties to such fraud can have the assistance of the Court either to compel the execution of such contract, or to have it cancelled, or to have the property or interests, transferred thereunder, restored. Equity will leave such parties where they have placed themselves, and will refuse all affirmative aid to either of the fraudulent participants. It is on this principle that the door of a Court of Equity is always shut against a debtor when he seeks to recover back property he has conveyed to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. (No right of action arises out of a fraud)

§ 42 Gibson, 1907 ed. (emphasis added)

  1. And even if by the admitted untrue public order, directive, etc., “he” is chargeable, not the office; “Hence it is a settled rule in Equity that where a person makes a statement of fact which is actually untrue, and he has at the time no knowledge of the matter, he is chargeable with fraud; and his claim that he believed in the truth of his statement is wholly immaterial.” 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 887. § 932. — The Rationale of the Law as to Fraud, Accident and Mistake, holds that despite the legislature’s provision for costs the law is, HEREBY, challenged as being unlawful, against equity principles and justice done, as applied to this suit of admitted fraud that chancery refused to remedy, that further, to the extent the legislature could make such a law it did not have lawful jurisdiction to embrace fraud or reward what “he” is chargeable for.
  1. All courts require “good faith in dealings between men, and reprobate bad faith” § 48, Gibson’s 1907 edition. As respondent Barnes is in negative equity and pursuing fraud, deceit and irreparable harm even today, there is nothing she has said worth compensating. 
  1. “Where one of two persons must suffer loss by the acts or fraud of a third party, he who enabled that third party to occasion the loss, or to commit the fraud, ought to be the sufferer.” Gibson’s § 61, 1955 ed. Where One of Two Persons Must Suffer Loss He Should Suffer Whose Act or Neglect Occasioned the Loss. 
  1. Given, as a matter of law, that no right of action arises from fraud, neither does an invoice.

Court’s role in added improper costs, admitted in delay

  1. Fraud cannot have a hearing in the court, but has had a hearing in Hamilton County chancery court 194 days in a case that chancery had duty to dispose of in 15 days or fewer, as the evidence of violation of law is unrebutted in the record prior to suit being filed. That’s 12 times the length of time allowed by law, and relator objects to the court’s invitation to respondent Barnes to submit her legal expenses for review so they might be sent as invoice to state of Tennessee on relation.
  1. Consideration of respondent-in-fraud’s bill, intending to be sent to relator, is unreasonable because the court has caused these costs. Mandamus should have been handled in chambers because the lawsuit was filed when respondents admitted no evidence of compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 68-5-104. 
  1. The court did not act within days, as required by legislative command, to be forthwith, or pursuant to equity principles to the emergency petition for writ of mandamus, a peremptory writ with respondent-in-fraud admitting prior to filing suit by the affidavit of petition that she irreparably harmed relator without warrant of law when refusing to obey the law, written in black letters and the English language. The court has imposed delay, lost time, imposed additional harm and costs in refusing to issue the writ for obedience to the law and for mishandling this case 194 days.
  1. Mandamus is required to be handled “forthwith” at Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-25-102 as a peremptory, emergency, ministerial act, but the court has improperly opted for delay and prejudice.

To sell justice would be a crime, to deny justice would be an outrage akin to crime, and to delay justice is an intolerable wrong, for delay is equivalent to a denial while the delay continues : the virtue of justice often evaporates during the delay. Denial and delay are man and wife, and injustice and injury are their children. [emphasis added]

Gibson § 535 Applications to Amend, or to Continue, How Considered

  1. It is claimed by the court but unsupported in the record to this day, the respondents-in-fraud made a proper appearance, yet the court inexplicably did not issue the writ forthwith disposing the matter immediately, despite the fraud admitted by respondents on two points of failure of equity principles even if the court were to be correct as to a “proper” appearance: 
  1. ➤ First, where respondents did not avoid the fraud upon appearance, forthwith. 
  1. ➤ The second being the filing a motion to dismiss without avoiding the claim for respondent’s frauds, which equity principles require admits to the facts of both affidavits, the petition and affidavit of irreparable harm of record in evidence for frauds, and not avoiding the fraud alleged therein. 
  1. Yet the court prejudicially asks for a billing, singularly, from respondents-in-fraud that the relator should pay for the transgression of law of respondents-in-fraud and for the court’s transgressions to equity, none of which is lawful, logical nor reasonable by any stretch of the imagination of any chancellor intending to do justice, in good conscience and prior to a decision on relator’s motion unencumbered by judicial abuse, bias or prejudice, or the mere appearance therefrom.
  1. Relator is on record challenging the propriety of the hearings in this case by written motion, arguing no hearing is needed because a hearing adds delay to an emergency action justiciable upon unrebutted evidence entered with the filing of the lawsuit,  and to be disposed forthwith. In fact, hearings in chambers were required immediately if not sooner. Relator has been dragged unwillingly through additional expenses at the court’s insistence, in violation of equity principles long and clearly established to do justice. 
  1. Even as to the last hearing, though for different reasons, neither party agreed the hearing was necessary. And as the state on relation challenged the hearing by motion that this court could not get any additional insight better than the existing evidence of record and summary disposition, the respondents-in-fraud confessed to the court they had nothing to offer as to the court’s failures delineated in the motion directed to the court to alter, in chambers, its order of dismissal for want of disposing the equity suit filed by relator, instead wrongfully in favor of a fabricated fantasy case at law never filed by the respondent-in-fraud. 

Party’s bills amid § 39-16-402 misconduct

  1. In the bright light of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-402. Official misconduct, respondent and attorney Millings are public servants, the first (a) an “officer, employee, or agent of government” and the second (d) “An attorney at law or notary public when participating in performing a governmental function.” Their deeds exposed in this lawsuit include, at (1), “bodily movement, whether voluntary or involuntary, and includes speech,” and their actions are in violation of state law, defined (2) as “the constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States, a written opinion of a court of record, a municipal ordinance, or a rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute.” Contrary to the court’s assertion to the contrary at the March 30, 2021, hearing, chancery is the jurisdiction to arrest such misconduct as is any official charged with duty to uphold the law and see that it is upheld, such as at 18 U.S.C. 4, or to the Department of Justice, 18 U.S.C. 3, misprison. 
  1. The fees are unreasonable to a party whose actions are as “(a) A public servant [who] commits an offense who, with intent to obtain a benefit or to harm another, intentionally or knowingly” (emphasis added).
  1. Attorney Millings presents to the court an expose´ of her time spent defending respondent from the lawful claims of state of Tennessee on relation and her 6.8 million people, as represented by relator. But she has not spent any time, apparently, advising respondent to come into compliance with the people’s legislative enactments at Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-5-104, or evidence communication of the need to avoid the fraud which equity principles require as a matter of law.
  1. Proposed fees are unreasonable in light of respondent’s and respondent’s attorney’s furthering their misdeeds in violation of a criminal statute. The people are clear in their legislative enactments that they will not tolerate one who —

(1) Commits an act relating to the public servant’s office or employment that constitutes an unauthorized exercise of official power;

(2) Commits an act under color of office or employment that exceeds the public servant’s official power;

(3) Refrains from performing a duty that is imposed by law or that is clearly inherent in the nature of the public servant’s office or employment;

(4) Violates a law relating to the public servant’s office or employment; or

(5) Receives any benefit not otherwise authorized by law.

(b) For purposes of subdivision (a)(2), a public servant commits an act under color of office or employment who acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of the actual or purported capacity. [emphasis added]

Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-16-402. Official misconduct

  1. Respondent, advised by attorney Milling, is “[refraining] from performing a duty that is imposed by law” and is “[committing] an act under color of office or employment that exceeds the public servant’s official power.” 
  1. The sentencing commission has noted that “The defendant must act intentionally or knowingly, so the offense is not completed by reckless or negligent conduct.” [emphasis added]
  1. Indeed, respondent Barnes and attorney Milling do not have the defense that they are acting unintentionally and unknowingly to violate the law. They have been under notice of public law since the day they began their employment or swore to uphold the Tennessee constitution and obey state law. Since petition’s filing Oct. 2, 2020, parties Barnes and Millings have been under notice about respondent Barnes’ illegal acts. 
  1. That’s 194 days. Each hour respondent Barnes and attorney Millings don’t admit their sins and wrongs, each minute they refuse to begin the process of coming into compliance with the law, though making public notices to the contrary, they act knowingly and intentionally in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-5-104. They discard their main defense in a criminal matter and operate in the shadow of criminal guilt by refusing to obey black-letter law at Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 68-5-104 — law published, public and in the English language — under notice of this suit filed in a chancery court, the equity principles applicable to which require the evidentiary facts of the petition and attached affidavit of irreparable harm together with the failure of the obligation to avoid the frauds alleged, are admitted by respondents.
  1. The abuses of the officers of the court have risen to such a degree to adversely, and at this point, irreparably, destroy the trust of the state on relation in these offensive officers the chancellor is duty-bound to arrest, whether or not by this verified complaint. 
  1. Lawbreakers on the public payroll deserve no compensation from state of Tennessee on relation, as such submission to the court is a furtherance of admitted fraud and thus unreasonable, at any amount. The legislature could not have had the power to enact legislation which could intend such and is a breach of the organic establishment under which this suit is filed and entitled to remedy, notwithstanding what the respondent-in-fraud has unduly influenced this court to believe. 
  1. A problem for the officers of the court and this court is chancery is required to not entertain fraud. That this court entertains fraud and would reward it, even by asking for a billing, is self-evident proof the suit is not before a chancery court as intended, consistent with the prior affidavit of facts challenge unrebutted as to this fact. It is also self-evident that though relator by the Tennessee constitution has right to remedy in a chancery court has been deprived of remedy or relief without warrant of law or lawful due process, costs going to someone in fraud, or who has either trespassed the case, and committing fraud on the court to the suit intended by relator, but from one evading law in favor of a proceeding in a court at law cannot be within the chancery court’s jurisdiction to entertain or order. 
  1. Beyond abuse of discretion, such an order is void and is also evidence of deprivation of rights under color of state law. 
  1. Relator objects to any discussion of the affidavits of respondent-in-fraud until a final order issues from a chancery suit, and after the court can produce the evidence of the avoided fraud, or that it lawfully received and treated the affidavits of the relator as intended, and, until relator prosecuting for fraud exhausts all appeals. Relator herein objects, as he did at the March 30, 2021, hearing. State of Tennessee objects, and relator demands the court refuse consideration of respondent’s motion for fees.

Further, at this time, affiant sayeth naught.

The Tulis Report is 1 p.m. weekdays at NoogaRadio 92.7 FM.

Time to fight


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