I am the relator in the Tennessee lawsuit to end the CV-19 state of disaster — that means I am in court representing the state’s interest on behalf of its 6.8 million citizens. I am doing that as a man, not as a person or individual, and not in any corporate capacity. Gov. Bill Lee et all have persisted in defaming me into the status of a bankrupt corporation, and falsifying my claims and intentions.
One way they’ve done that is to pretend I am in circuit court in an at-law action seeking damages. I’m not. But Judge Pamela Fleenor agrees with the other side, in two Jan. 21 orders dismissing my case on grounds that I am seeking damages. She marshals several reasons for dismissal — that being one.
Another is that I don’t meet standing requirements to sue by showing concrete particularized injuries. I do — but she refuses to see them in the record. Because I am indistinguishable from the general mass of injured and ruined people, she rules, I don’t have standing. Here is part of my answer to her order pertaining to Becky Barnes, the Hamilton County health administrator, a participant in the Green Religion fraud that is the CV-19 “pandemic.”
Mandamus is the best remedy available for Americans for this and future abuses. The other is petition for habeas corpus for false imprisonment (lockdown). The white legal political establishment of Republicans and Democrats seeks further consolidation of search-and-seizure powers via governmental office, the Muslum terror state of 9/11 having served its duty, but no longer galvanizing of public obedience.
Not a peep from either party as state actors, in pretended panic, overthrow our rights and bring economic ruin into every one of the state’s 95 counties. Read closely — learn how the law works. This research is intended to help you when your time comes.
The court follows respondent(s)’ custom of mischaracterizing the petition and relator’s intent, converting it from an action for mandamus and (or) equity into a case at law seeking “damages as compensation for an injury,” or damages under Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 29, chapter 20, the governmental tort liability act. The court says “Relator fails to state a claim for damages in this mandamus action,” order P. 9.
That’s true, because he states no claim, makes no demand, for damages.
Unless this court has secretly and wrongly transferred this action to the circuit court, it applies the wrong expectations to the action filed by the relator intending equity relief.
State of Tennessee on relation is in chancery because relator seeks equity against respondent Lee the officeholder and the man personally. Relator invokes, against either capacity, the court’s discretion to do equity:
202. The relator via this petition and verified complaint demands the court —
209. ➤ Order equitable compensation, to the extent available to chancery, to persuade and impress the conscience of each respondent from repeating wrongs cited in this complaint, sending a message to others so inclined;
210. ➤ Make other redress within the power of this court to the ends justice requires, not limited to, further compensation, reimbursement, indemnification or reparation for benefits derived from, or for loss or injury caused to the relator, fellow Tennesseans or the state of Tennessee. [emphases added]
This demand for equitable compensation “to the extent available to chancery” seeks to “impress the conscience of each respondent from repeating wrongs cited in this complaint,” sending a deterrent message to other office holders and men and women acting outside authority of office. The demand is within the court’s inherent jurisdiction, and relator objects to this demand being cited as cause of dismissal.
If there is a lawful and equitable contract, the court can equitably
Enforce the contract, or (2) award compensation for its breach, or (3) to require the party in default to do such act relative thereto as he, in good reason and good conscience ought to have done without suit. (Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, 1956 ed. § 28)
If there is no contract and a dispute arises,
[A]ll the court can do is *** (2) where injury has been done, to make the defendant atone therefor. [emphasis added]
Chancery is the jurisdiction for “the determination of the equitable rights, estates, and interests of the parties to such causes, or the granting of equitable remedies,” Gibson’s § 30. “Equity Acts Specifically, and Not by Way of Compensation” is a maxim of chancery § 43.
Equity aims at putting the parties exactly in the position they ought to occupy, giving them in specie what they are entitled to enjoy and putting a stop to injuries which are being inflicted. Thus, Equity decrees the specific performance of a contract, instead of giving damages for its breach. So, Equity restrains the commission of a trespass, instead of compensating the aggrieved party by damages. Gibson’s § 43 [emphasis added]
Relator in petition ¶ 209 invokes chancery’s inherent equitable powers (reference is “to the extent available to chancery”), and is content whether the specie from respondent Barnes the woman and the officeholder is silver coin or, better yet, “performance according to exact terms,” which phrase defines specie in Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed., and pursuant to the court’s discretion. Specie of equity — the health administrator’s obedience to law — is relator’s demand, not cash damages assessed upon relator’s report of his checkbook shortfalls, plunging sales commissions and overdue bills in respondent-caused material economic and other harm.
Relator treads not upon the state’s sovereign immunity to not be sued for damages reaching the treasury. The court’s interpretation to the contrary is prejudicially erroneous.
Relator in equity insists the court avoid a misreading of his intentions to give cause to dismissal of his petition, and he reserves the right to amend it, and requires the order of dismissal be altered to reflect the facts of the petition as relator intended, as equity principles require, and if not to summary disposal as demanded in the court’s discretion, then as due process requires the right of the relator to respond or amend, as equity would appear to require it where the court can bring a foundation for ignoring fraud in chancery, or disclosure that the evidence the court promised existed outside of the knowledge of relator, that the matter is not in default.
Public interest nature of cause
The court denies relator has standing, saying he has no distinctive, concretely presented and redressable particularized injuries that the court can see, preventing the court from having subject matter jurisdiction. By second means, in a flank attack, the court devotes Pp 10-14 to help it draw the same conclusion based on findings about relator’s efforts to establish a public interest in his cause.
The court knows, or should know, one of the required elements to invoke the extraordinary remedy relator seeks is that it has public benefit and a clear public interest. The court forces one part of relator’s paperwork to cannibalize the other part, leaving him no wherewithal for standing.
The court marshals the relator’s references to the people at large, to his hurt, as follows.
Relator sues so that dignity be “restored to the people” ( P. 21), not to Relator. Relator alleges harms to “commerce, travel and constitutionally guaranteed rights” ( P. 21). This Court determines that Relator only alleges generalized grievances. As Justice Kavanaugh explained, generalized grievances are not justiciable.
Order, P. 13
Further Relator asks this Court to “deal with him as one of the people of Tennessee, not as a person or an individual” ( P. 14); demands “remedy for the extraordinary irreparable harm done to him and the state of Tennessee” ( P. 14); and alleges ” that he and the state of Tennessee are being irreparably injured by respondents” ( P. 21). In fact the entire injury is to the state of Tennessee” ( P. 23), and “ jeopardizes everyone in the state of
Tennessee” ( P. 52), so Relator sues so that dignity be restored to the people ( P. 21), and
demanded a peremptory writ to benefit the public at large. (P. 8).
The above allegations demonstrate that Relator seeks relief that no more benefits the Relator than it does the public at large. Relator failed to allege how the Administrator’s actions injured Relator in a concrete and personal way. Nor has Relator alleged some extraordinary damage to him personally, beyond that of the rest of the community.
Order, P. 14
First of all, the standard of relative benefit among the citizenry from a writ of mandamus’ bringing relief is made impossible to meet.
The relator “seeks relief that no more benefits the Relator than it does the public at large,” the court says. This statement holds that relator can control whether other people get more benefit from a writ of mandamus as a relief than he might, can control relative blessings of the people’s liberties and rights being restored to them by the court’s power of equity and of mandamus to halt the state of disaster by respondent(s) since March 12, 2020. Relator cannot be made to claim he will benefit more (financially, spiritually, psychologically or severally), then faulted for showing no evidence that he can obtain more benefit than other people. Such test would be impossible to score.
Secondarily, the references to the people and the public give the petition the essential element of being in the public interest, serving more than just a private interest.
Relator’s references to the people serve two purposes.
➤ Inform the court of the broad public interest in his petition. Yet the court converts relator’s references to the people as speech acts by which he is made to deny his own standing. The petition seeks to enforce the duty of the health law at Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 68, or of lawful police power, and also the protections of the people under the emergency law as noted in the petition:
184. Even were the respondents to identify the exigent circumstance supporting their claim to power, emergency law requires executive action to protect against collateral damage, injury, or harm within state operations in time of crisis and to enhance the service of government to protect the people and their property. In the emergency law, respondent(s) are required to reduce dangers, “all of which —
➤ “threaten the life, health, and safety of [the state’s] people
➤ “damage and destroy property;
➤ “disrupt services and everyday business and recreational activities; and
➤ “impede economic growth and development.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 58-2-102
185. This “vulnerability is exacerbated by the growth in the state’s population, in the elderly population, in the number of seasonal vacationers, and in the number of persons with special needs” Tenn. Code Ann. § 58-2-102.
The case is styled State of Tennessee ex rel David Jonathan Tulis for a reason. The relator represents the state itself and the people who comprise the compact creating it. Using the very purpose of the remedy against itself, cannot do justice. Nor can it comport to the constitutional trust responsibility to provide remedy for harm done.
“Inasmuch as the people themselves are the plaintiffs in a proceeding by mandamus, it is not of vital importance who the relator should be, so long as he does not officiously intermeddle in a matter with which he has no concern. The office which a relator performs is merely the instituting a proceeding in the name of the people, and for the general benefit.” Certainly, it cannot be affirmed that these relators are “officious intermeddlers,” or have in view any other than the public good. [emphasis added]
Harris v. State, 96 Tenn. 496, 34 S.W. 1017, 1019 (1896)
➤ Relator’s references to the people at large intend to establish his constitutional status, that of a man, among the “free people” of Tennessee (state constitution, Article 1, section 24). Repetition of the point anticipated abuse of it in these proceedings. Respondents and the court have acted to diminish and reduce relator’s legal status, to defame him and to reduce him to a subject, a legal person or entity, to a bankrupt corporation (see Motion to object to the proposed Dec. 2, 2020, hearing orders, filed Dec. 4, 2020). Relator objected to this treatment in the Jan. 11 hearing, Transcript, P 46 ¶ 15 to P 50 ¶ 2; None of which has been rebutted in the record, and cannot be.
Thirdly, the petition shows scofflaws’ wrongs falling upon the larger public. Respondents-in-fraud have brought state of Tennessee and its people a disaster second only, perhaps, to the Civil War split in Tennessee in 1861. But the court intends to controvert that fact, and magnify the references to affinity to so shrink down to a pin dot, if it only could, the petition’s Exhibit 1, the unrebutted affidavit of personal injury and its five harms traceable to respondent Barnes.
46. Respondent(s)’ silence on these facts is admission that they have no way to investigate, or identify the virus, diagnose it or deal confidently with those who are its presumed victims, called cases by rule definition. The pretense of respondent(s) jeopardizes everyone in state of Tennessee.
The court takes the references to the comprehensive nature of the respondent-in-fraud man-made disaster that “jeopardizes everyone,” petition ¶ 46, to contort this required element into something not intended nor stated by relator.
As anticipated several times in the petition, the court engages in tactics unworthy of chancery’s high calling for equity and justice.
48. The state of Tennessee, on relation, is in this honorable court seeking remedy because respondents are acting without benefit of the duty imposed upon them by the legislature to protect the public.
49. Instead of obeying the law, evading constitutionally required due process and to confine their actions within a lawful delegation to protect relator and state of Tennessee, the respondents rely upon such tactics as subterfuge, confusion, and deceit. [emphasis added]
Respondents have not attacked the affidavit’s sufficiency as to substance or facts; relator asks on what foundation does the court make its unparticularized nonspecific parallel attack upon it in the ignoring and not disclosing of it in the record. The court merely, conveniently, fails to disclose the affidavit of irreparable harm, or properly interpreted, under color that it did.
Ignoring a main body of material evidencing standing is improper, violating the rules of evidence, equity principles and state of Tennessee’s due process rights on relation, and relator objects.
Time to fight