CHATTANOOGA, Tenn., Feb. 22, 2021 — I have been in court 4 1/2 months in a bid to compel obedience to state law, and so end the pretended epidemic / pandemic that is the worst thing to happen to the people of Tennessee since the breach of 1861 between North and South over slavery and states’ rights. The epidemic, so-called, of coronavirus is the new phase of American and global elite totalitarianism, coming just as the elites’ giant debt bubble of greed and malivestment-based private enrichment is starting to pop.
They have in mind for us our conversion into subjects and animals, to free themselves from the constraints of constitution and black-letter law, and to manage the people administratively by directive, fiat, order and decree (for our safety, no doubt). The medico-terror state is their next 20-year project (having worn out the rationale of their Muslum terror state since 9/11).
Judge Pamela Fleenor is wholly taking the side of the malefactors, shooting down EVERY SINGLE ONE of my motions without the other side — Gov. Bill Lee, administrator Becky Barnes — having to lift a pinky. The work by this elected Republican attorney — wearing not a black robe of old English canon law chancellor, but a batman cape of seeming private justice — is wholly serviceable to those whom I call “the good people.” She serves arbitary fiat government by state and county elites who, as yet, face no personal liability for their deeds apart from black-letter law.
Here is Part 3 of my detailed analysis of her work as judge. She says I have no standing because I do not show any personal injury from the law violations of Gov. Lee and, here, Mrs. Barnes.
Specific harms, wrongs & subject matter jurisdiction
Relator turns now to subject matter jurisdiction and the court’s dismissal based on its findings of a lack thereof. The court on P. 2 says subject matter jurisdiction is “a threshold inquiry,” meaning it comes before anything else.
The court says respondent, in her facial challenge to relator’s cause, admits “the facts serving as the basis for jurisdiction,” order, P. 2. We can look at the court’s actions first to determine whether it has claimed subject matter jurisdiction up until Jan. 21, 2021, when the court said it didn’t.
The court has had three hearings in State ex rel Tulis and as of Friday, Feb. 19, 2021, will have had the case 4½ months (140 days). Surely — surely, it cannot justly now say it has no subject matter jurisdiction, or if it fulfilled its duty to do justice.
A petition for writ of mandamus is an emergency, peremptory petition.
Mandamus is a personal obligation of the individual to whom it is addressed and is based on the fact that the respondent has neglected or refused to perform a personal duty to which the plaintiff is clearly entitled. *** It affects the defendant personally. *** [emphases added] Mandamus is an unusual and extraordinary remedy, which the courts issue only as a last resort. It is not a common means of obtaining redress and is available only in rare cases when the parties stand to lose their substantial rights. *** Mandamus is a remedy at law whose purpose is to execute, not adjudicate established legal rights in an expeditious manner.
Mandamus, American Jurisprudence §§ 1-5.
Mandamus is a petition for remedy not to be docketed “as quickly as I could” (the court’s words, hearing transcript, Jan. 11, 2021, P. 12, lines 10-13) behind custody cases and contract feuds. The court refused to instantly and summarily dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or transfer to a competent court. Its actions profess the court has subject matter jurisdiction, empowered by the petition evidencing fraud to act to uphold the law and benefit the public in Hamilton County and statewide.
An order which prejudicially fails to disclose relator’s unrebutted affidavit of private irreparable harm, Exhibit No.1, relator’s affidavit with five particulars of irreparable harm (here are three, for example, not abandoning those remaining), cannot be an order relevant to the relief relator intends for his irreparable harm without adequate remedy at law; the affidavit says in part:
➤ Hamilton County deputies’ threatening to commit the crime of violating Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 40-7-103, arrest by officer without warrant, by arresting affiant without a warrant for walking into the courts building as a member of the press to cover a court hearing, and doing so with his jaw, cheeks, mouth and nose visible to other people;
➤ Respondents’ actions and falsehoods about a state emergency have deprived affiant of Christian fellowship and gathering, or freedom of religious worship; the threats and falsehoods of the governor closed North Shore Fellowship, where affiant is a member;
➤ “Affiant is suffering injury buying goods and services in commerce and selling goods and services. These activities have been curtailed — with opportunities for growth and expansion lost — whether from barking store clerks, officers threatening affiant in public buildings or by billboards telling affiant, or by unwarranted ridicule, that if he doesn’t wear a mask he doesn’t care for other people. After Gov. Lee’s placing the people of Tennessee under house arrest, affiant finds people unwilling to meet with him at every part of life in local economy and free markets, to the growth and prosperity of which affiant is committed.”
These are harms in fact, economic and otherwise, that distinguish relator from the otherwise undifferentiated mass of the public. Neither respondent nor the court have offered counter-affidavits, nor attacked or disputed the petition’s facts. Only with the convenient though prejudicial failure to disclose the evidence of irreparable harm can the court find no concrete injuries, particular to him, that, when included, would meet the elements delineated in law, contrary to what is offered in the order.
In his motion to amend the Lee dismissal order, Pp. 12 to 20, relator supports the affidavit in detail as to his harms reaching the lofty standard proposed that they be “extraordinary,” which standard chancery brings upon the cause from a footnote in a federal case. Relator hereby incorporates that analysis in this motion.
In its order, the court gives a long discussion of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016), and says,
Turning to the Relator’ s petition, Relator sues so that dignity be “restored to the people” (P. 21), not to Relator. Relator alleges harms to “commerce, travel and constitutionally guaranteed rights” ( P. 21). This Court determines that Relator only alleges generalized grievances. As Justice Kavanaugh explained, generalized grievances are not justiciable.
The court reaches the conclusion from a concurring opinion indicating a relator’s harms be not just injury in fact, concrete, personal, particularized and de facto, but also “extraordinary, beyond the rest of the community.”
The court cites Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion. He quotes Blackstone’s commentaries and cites an 1828 ruling from the general court of Virginia.
Even in limited cases where private plaintiffs could bring a claim for the violation of public rights, they had to allege that the violation caused them “some extraordinary damage, beyond the rest of the [community].” 3 Blackstone *220 (discussing nuisance); see also Commonwealth v. Webb, 27 Va. 726, 729 (Gen.Ct.1828). [Emphasis added]
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1551, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016).
The two standards in play cut in alternate angles. One insists on deep personal harm. The other insists on a public interest. “([C]ommoner must establish not only injuria [legal injury] but also damnum [damage] to challenge another’s overgrazing on the commons).” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1552, citing Commonwealth v. Webb, 27 Va. 726, 729 (Gen.Ct.1828). Relator is vindicating his private rights under damnum (“damage”), but also the public’s rights under injuria (“legal injury,” a wrong enabled amid abuse of rights embedded in statute and constitution — aka, due process) in exhibit No. 1.
The affidavit recounts threats against him of false arrest for entering a courts building with jaw, chin, nose and cheeks visible to the public, or in violation of a so-called mask mandate. The public is injured when respondents bar access to public buildings and subject a citizen to false arrest. The affiant is irreparably harmed by a breach of several laws, which are forbidden their proper operation across the board, with other people harmed.
Relator’s press activity is under protection of Tennessee constitution bill of rights Section 19. His is a protected category of citizen activity. An officer enforcing respondent’s directive threatened to violate the exceptions list for arrest by officer without warrant at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-103, as attested, making the experience extraordinary in the record, and sufficient to reject respondent’s motion to dismiss. No other radio reporter in the state has had like experience of which relator is aware.
EXTRAORDINARY. Out of the ordinary; exceeding the usual, average, or normal measure or degree; beyond or out of the common order or rule; not usual, regular, or of a customary kind; remarkable; uncommon; rare. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition) [Citations omitted]
Under the headings of concrete, particular, actual and uncontested, relator avers his private harms are extraordinary, presuming the test is valid and his unrebutted affidavit disclosed by the court.
Relator is held to the high standard for standing, as he is a private man, aggrieved, seeking equity to vindicate not just a private irreparable harms, but one the relief sought requires also be of public interest or benefit as well. The court imposes on relator the standard test of concreteness and particularity, but also that of “extraordinary.” And then the court prejudicially disregards evidence in the record which would meet the test.
No other radio reporter in the state has had like experience of which relator is aware. But that commonality would not defeat the same infringement of the next reporter, despite the court’s assertion to the contrary. It is extraordinary whenever people are harmed by officials without warrant of law under color of authority. Doing so is by law felony conduct and not, at least until the court’s order, ordinary.
Under the headings of concrete, particular, actual and uncontested, relator avers his private harms are extraordinary, insofar as the extraordinary test imposed upon him is valid and his unrebutted affidavit acknowledged and read by the court.
Petition phrases such as “commerce, travel and constitutionally guaranteed rights” (order P. 13) might allow the court to see a mere generalized grievance had relator gone no farther; but his grievance is particularized to relator in the appurtenant affidavit of irreparable harms specifically identifying unwarranted infringement of his private commerce and travel, themselves constitutionally guaranteed rights, prejudicially not disclosed in the order of the judge.
The supreme court says mass wrongs can also, with any one victim, give that victim standing.
For example, a mass tort inflicts “widely shared” injury, and each victim “suffers a particularized and differentiated harm. One tort victim suffers a burnt leg, another a burnt arm—or even if both suffer burnt arms they are different arms…. With the generalized grievance, on the other hand, the injury or deprivation is not only widely shared but it is undifferentiated.” Akins, 524 U.S. at 35, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (Scalia, J., opinion for the Court) (no generalized grievance when “concrete injury has been suffered by many persons, as in mass fraud or mass tort situations”)
Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
Respondent Barnes alleges that there are insufficient factual allegations to articulate a claim of relief. Respondents have not attacked specifically and particularly relator’s affidavit of irreparable harms. Rather, the affidavit is never disclosed — allowing them, and of which non-disclosure technique the court adopts, to wrongly get a contrived outcome. Then, and again, the court wrongfully, prejudicially, allows a respondent without equity for the unavoided frauds to have a defense, anticipating the appearance of predetermination, in concert.
Alternative writ required? Form over substance?
The court says the failure of relator to “to submit either a peremptory or an alternative writ” left the court uncertain about what the petition demands, and “the Court had no writ to issue to Respondent,” P. 8. “It is not the duty of the court to prosecute the case” for relator, nor its duty to guess which ministerial duty Relator seeks for Respondent to perform,” because a court “cannot create claims or defenses for litigants where none exist.”
The court says state of Tennessee’s case on relation is “procedurally deficient” in that relator did not ask for an alternative writ under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-25-102.
The court itself fulfilled the hearing requirement under the alternative mandamus provision, giving respondent two hearings to which respondent was invited and appeared, well beyond the acceptable equity requirement to respond “forthwith,” such as within 5 days or less. The court’s unwarranted indulgence of 140 days being more than enough time to be heard by a respondent to avoid the alleged frauds given notice prior to suit. (Notice was in relator’s demand letter, exhibit No. 3, Aug. 27, 2020, or 36 days before filing suit Oct. 2, 2020.) Relator’s demands in petition ¶ 8 for a peremptory writ of mandamus, together with the case’s public interest and benefit requirement for the equity relief, empowers chancery to use its plenary authority to halt wrongs and bring justice and relief.
The court does not explain how the relator is to divine its will for acts and purposes wholly within the court’s discretion. He will gladly meet with the court or the clerk and master and draft an order pursuant to the court’s direction.
The court cites State v. Grindstaff, 144 Tenn. 554, 234 S.W. 510, 513 (1921) that states,
In a mandamus case under our practice the peremptory writ has not, so far as we know, ever been issued before the return of the alternative writ. This always insures [sic] notice to the adverse party and a hearing before there is any removal from office.
The reference regards precedent inapplicable to this case, and in light of the statute and private process exposing fraud, is not dispositive, particularly in light of chancery’s sweeping powers. This rebuke on relator’s plea under mandamus also abuses and insults the evidence of the notice to respondents in relator’s private process of notice of record. His exhibit No. 3, “evidence demand pursuant to the duty imposed in TCA 68-5-104” of Aug. 27, 2020; exhibit No. 4, the Sept. 2, 2020, letter of Dr. Paul Hendricks, prove failure of respondents to “show cause” as per Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-25-102, with their lawful warrant for the irreparable harm they caused, before the action was instituted.
All the court had to do was read the evidence in support to see the facts taken true, the justice intended. The court itself has fulfilled the requirement for respondent Barnes to show cause as to her dereliction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-5-104, or produce the demonstrable exigency, forthwith.
FORTHWITH. Immediately; without delay, directly, hence within a reasonable time under the circumstances of the case; Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed.
“Forthwith” means not 140 days, but three days or four, equity relief time. On the other hand, a court claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction has bent over backwards to give “a hearing” — two of them to which respondent Barnes made appearance after begging for two months time to answer.
Despite the court’s insistence to the contrary, an alternative writ, the purpose of which is ensuring notice to respondent-in-fraud given notice before and again at the suit, serves no legitimate purpose but to further delay. If the court intended to do justice to stop the irreparable harm, as it now suggests was available, it would have invited the type of writ and extent of its discretion to issue which the relator has been ever-vigilant to receive in aid of the court’s doing justice. But that justice is apparently not to come and the suggestion that the relator is somehow procedurally derelict was never to the relator’s discretion.
Chancery — powerful, glorious court
The court, if it intends to hold to this tack, should explain obedience to the chancery principle, “Equity regards substance rather than form.” In other words, rules are not allowed to subvert a right by imposition of a mere technical form. Another equitable principle is denied control in this case of admitted fraud: “A court of equity in the exercise of a broad discretion should see to it that wrong and oppression are not inflicted under the guise of legal procedure, but that justice be done as the very right of each case may demand” Griffith, § 39, p. 42.
Equity jurisprudence requires chancery to heed intent and not focus on the form or style of pleadings. “Equity heeds not forms but strives to reach the substance of things; and to ascertain, uphold and enforce rights and duties which spring from real relations and the actual transactions of the parties.” Or, “Where there is substance for the Court to act on, the want of form will be disregarded, for Equity regards substance, and not ceremonies. *** Thus if the bill makes out a case for relief, any want of formality, or any misnomer of the bill, or any eccentricity of phraseology, will not defeat the complaint’s right to relief on the facts alleged and proved.” Or, “a meaning should be drawn out of the words and not forced into the words. The intention of the party is the life of the instrument. That interpretation, which is born of the bowels of the case, is, in law, the fittest and most powerful. It is a guess, not an interpretation, which disregards the words of an instrument.” (Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, §§ 43, 64, 1907 ed.) (emphasis added)
The court has not worked to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of this action. Where was this suggestion of procedural deficiency 140-plus days ago, given also this writ but for the purported procedural failure of relator can only be offered by a court of competent jurisdiction, also denied to relator? Relator is aggrieved.
The order is untenable and evasive, hardly instilling confidence and trust, or giving fair treatment, but destroying these. Costs for the hearings should be borne by the court that ordered hearings without subject matter jurisdiction, or to allow maintenance of fraud within chancery under color of jurisdiction.
Time to fight