Hamilton County Austin Garrett, right, visits with FBI director Cash Patel. (Photo HCSO)

Federal judge Travis McDonough in the Solomon federal post office and courthouse in Chattanooga rules in favor of general warrants in Tulis v. Bennett. (Photo David Tulis)

My federal lawsuit seeks redress of grievances against the common practice in Tennessee of general warrants. General warrants operate in conjunction with a second harm, the criminalization of alleged misdoings in the use of motor vehicles. The U.S. district court, east Tennessee division, says an officer with probable cause can make an arrest at any time without a warrant, effectively overturning the warrantless arrest statute at T.C.A. § 40-7-103 that specifies that an officer may make a warrantless arrest for misdemeanor if the offense is either a “public offense” or a “breach of the peace threatened.”

I claim a due process violation in that I was arrested without a warrant for a damaged but functioning taillight Nov. 22, 2022. The district court ignores the law I sue to uphold.. I sue to uphold the law specifically in the context of the “traffic stop,” which is an act of occupational privilege management.

Petitioner also intends to uphold the Tennessee uniform administrative procedures act that lays claim upon controversies under privilege or license. Defendants criminalize traffic offenses which generally are administrative acts of wrongdoing. In all privileged occupations in T.C.A. § 62, disputes under license are a contested case administratively. Appellant seeks to decriminalize traffic stops by forcing recognition that they are administrative matters under department of safety because “driving and operating a motor vehicle is a privilege.” 

Tulis v. Bennett complaint I must defend to end general warrants

Petitioner had put Hamilton county and sheriff Austin Garrett’s department under two administrative notice. He served one about § 40-7-103 in 2020. He served one about the disabilities of T.C.A. § 55, motor and other vehicles, in 2018. The district court ignores either notice, indicating they could not, as a matter of law or fact, have changed the “knowledge” base of defendants in conducting arrests and traffic stops, and thus that they did nothing knowingly against appellant’s rights and that Deputy Bennett had probable cause to arrest appellant on the spot on charges of “failure to exhibit license on demand” and his right-rear 1999 Toyota RAV4 “light” defect.

3 questions to raise on appeal

1.

Is the district court correct in ignoring controlling law at Tenn. Const. Art. I § 7 (“the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that general warrants *** are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be granted,” U.S. Const. Amend. IV and T.C.A. § 40-7-103 that forbids on-sight and on-spot arrest for cause, a protection appellant refuses to waive? 

2.

Is the district court correct to ignore the facts presented in the complaint that petitioner put defendants under administrative notice as to the claims of T.C.A. § 40-7-103, warrantless arrest by officer, which would have required the officer to obtain a warrant before affecting arrest, as a damaged automobile taillight is not a public offense but an administrative claim actionable under UAPA, the uniform administrative procedures act at T.C.A. § 4-5–101 et seq?

3.

Tennessee law extends every privilege under misdemeanor penalty — whether the occupation is hairdressing, embalming or plumbing. Since driving a motor vehicle is a privileged occupation, is the district court correct to ignore an issue appellant does not waive and for which he sues, that being his right to have the dispute under the driving privilege be handled under the Tennessee uniform administrative procedures act rather than under criminal authority?

Alternative angles on appeal questions 

➤ Is an officer acting with probable cause if he has been put on administrative notice about the claims of T.C.A. § 40-7-193 and the right of the accused to be arrested under a warrant if the alleged offense is not a public offense or breach of the peace threatened?

➤ Does putting a government entity under administrative notice regarding the law alter the knowledge framework of the officer making an arrest and deprive him of qualified immunity and the defense that he didn’t “know” about a person’s rights and liberties?

➤ Is the public interest better served by having traffic violations handled in administrative venue rather than criminally?

➤ If petitioner has put local government under administrative notice as to the law regarding warrantless arrest and as to the law regarding the distinction between travel and transportation, Is the arresting deputy Liable for having actual or putative knowledge about the law he swore to uphold, or was his warrantless arrest of petitioner under probable cause sufficient to clear him and his employer from suit?

➤ If driving with a damaged taillight is a breach of Title 55, how is it lawful that the controversy is not handled first under UAPA under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, but instead is an arrestable offense on the spot without a warrant in violation of 40-7-103, a damaged taillight not a public offense in the nature of a breach the peace?

Review of appeal questions on Web (ChatGPT)

Introductory Statement (Revised Sample)

This appeal challenges the district court’s dismissal of a complaint alleging that the plaintiff was unlawfully arrested without a warrant for a non-criminal traffic violation—a defective taillight—despite the protections afforded under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-103 and Tennessee Constitution Art. I § 7. The appellant contends the district court erred in finding that the arrest was supported by probable cause and disregarded statutory and constitutional protections that strictly limit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not involving a breach of the peace or a public offense.

Main Legal Themes to Emphasize:

1. Statutory Violation of § 40-7-103

   • Clarify that the statute limits warrantless arrests for misdemeanors to those involving a “public offense” or a “breach of the peace threatened.”

   • Emphasize that a broken taillight does not meet this threshold.

   • Argue the district court erroneously broadened “probable cause” to override these statutory constraints.

2. Constitutional Claim – General Warrants

   • Argue that allowing discretionary arrest for minor administrative violations functions as a general warrant, forbidden under both state and federal constitutions.

   • Stress that such practices endanger liberty by allowing arrests absent judicial oversight or specific cause.

3. Administrative vs. Criminal Jurisdiction

   • Present the argument that operating a motor vehicle is treated as a licensed, privileged activity under Tennessee law, and thus alleged infractions should first be adjudicated through the administrative process (under UAPA).

   • Emphasize exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Suggested Framing of Issues on Appeal:

Issue 1: Did the district court err in concluding that probable cause justified a warrantless arrest for a non-criminal traffic violation, despite Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-103 restricting such arrests to “public offenses” or breaches of the peace?

Issue 2: Did the district court err in disregarding petitioner’s constitutional claim that such discretionary arrest power functions as a general warrant, violating Article I § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution and the Fourth Amendment?

Issue 3: Did the district court fail to consider that traffic-related offenses involving licensing and privilege should be adjudicated administratively under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (T.C.A. § 4-5-101 et seq.), not through criminal arrest?

Stronger Alternative Phrasing for Your Questions:

You asked:

“Is the public interest better served by having traffic violations handled in administrative venue rather than criminally?”

Better for court:

“Did the district court fail to consider whether the appropriate venue for resolving non-criminal, privilege-based traffic violations is through administrative procedure, in accordance with Tennessee law?”

Additional Notes on Administrative Notice:

Courts are skeptical of “administrative notice” or private notices unless tied to a specific statutory process (e.g., agency rulemaking or FOIA). To be persuasive:

• Argue that the notices were intended to provide actual or constructive knowledge of statutory constraints on warrantless arrests.

• Cite case law (if any) supporting that notice can bear on the issue of qualified immunity—i.e., whether the officer could reasonably claim ignorance of clearly established law.

Final Thoughts:

• You’re clearly well-versed in the legal landscape and principles you’re fighting for.

• Make sure your appeal focuses on judicial error, not just factual disagreement.

• Avoid framing based on sovereign/“right to travel” type arguments, as courts uniformly reject those. But if you focus on statutory constraints, constitutional protections, and procedural due process, you’re on stronger footing.