When I travel in my van, I always carry my “safety letter” issued by Tennessee revenue commissioner David Gerregano as we are in a fight over my right to the driving and operating privilege in commerce (aka, registration tag or license plate). (Photo David Tulis)

CHATTANOOGA, Tenn, Wednesday, Dec. 4, 2024 — In our attack on behalf of 7 million people in Tennessee, I am suing in two courts and in administrative venue in department of revenue to shut the Eye of Sauron surveillance of the motoring public. It generates 40,800 criminal convictions a year in a systemic oppression apart from law and in breach of the  Tennessee constitution. Apparently only you and I care about this — not the ACLU, NAACP, GOP, PCA, USDOT, DOJ, TDOT, TNAG, DOSHS, DOR, HCSO nor other entity.

This report contains portions of a hearing Nov. 22, 2024, in the case Tulis v. DOR, administered within DOR by hearing officer Brad Buchanan. The hearing was held by phone call and lasted about 40 minutes.

If case void, do you wish to proceed?

BRAD BUCHANAN As I was reviewing the papers this week that the parties have filed, I noted a statement, this is from petitioner’s response to the department’s motion for summary judgment. And I will quote this from the conclusion on page 22. Mr. Tulis, you write “The hearing officer may opt to punt this case by finding he has no subject matter jurisdiction since hearings in TFRL are heard in Department of Safety and proceedings are void if not authorized by law.” You quote from statute, TCA 55-12-103, then you go on to say, “No provision in Atwood would allow for hearings and revenue. UAPA specifically declaims that applies revenue rulings.” *** You refer to this as a point of subject matter jurisdiction.

Setting aside the merits of those contentions – and I recognize the department has responded to those – I wanted to ask you because this is something that you raise in the early days of this contested case, Mr Tulis. Is it your view that I do not have — or rather the department does not have — subject matter jurisdiction to convene this contested case?

DAVID TULIS Is that a trap question, sir? [laughter] My consent does not cure any defects about which I complain and which if there is a subject matter jurisdiction defect in these proceedings, Mr Buchanan, that could be raised sua sponte by a judge anywhere along the road, even at the supreme court. So, it could

BRAD BUCHANAN — To what end because if I don’t have jurisdiction to hear this, if the department doesn’t have jurisdiction to convene this contested case, then you’re back where you started with a suspended registration. 

TULIS So I— well, the program does not give me an option for appeal. And that’s because you’re not, your agency is not, allowed to have hearings because they’re held — all held — in safety under 103. And so my position stands on bringing it to the attention of the court. I’m here in good faith, I’m here in the forum that we’ve all agreed to. In one of the Tennessee cases I cited, consent of the party doesn’t cure the problem [of no subject matter jurisdiction,absent authority to hold hearings under TFRL]. Ok? I’m not baptizing it and approving it by being here. 

I’m saying that that is, and that is the point, the judges on appeal will look at first: Was the hearing properly held there. *** The record is going to go up whatever happens, you know, whether it’s lawful because the issues are laid out in full on both sides in the record. So the record is going to need to be considered by somebody — even if the hearing officer didn’t have subject matter jurisdiction. 

Brad Buchanan, chief hearing officer Tennessee department of revenue

BUCHANAN Well, I will tell you that if somebody decides that I the hering officer or the department did not have jurisdiction to convene this contested case [within department of revenue], then there will be no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from it. 

TULIS That’s right. That’s correct.

BUCHANAN So, we got — we’ve done an awful lot of work if we’re not supposed to have convened this contested case. But I take it that you are not going to move to have your petition dismissed at this point?

TULIS  Oh, no, sir. No.

BUCHANAN AlL right, then. We’ll proceed. ***

It’s certified: Small stone hits Goliath

TULIS Yes, sir, Mr Buchanan. Thank you very much. And Mrs. Cline, thank you.  This case is about legal fundamentals, I would say starting with statutory construction and specifically the meaning of “certificate,” the noun and the verb, “to certify.” Not just any insurance policy proof in a billfold or a policy folder in someone’s glove compartment can be POFR [proof of financial responsibility].

To certify, Mr Buchanan, means to guarantee as proof. It comes from the word “certainty,” which refers to absence of doubt. Black’s [Dictionary] fourth edition says certificate is a ticket, it’s a warrant, “by form constituting quote evidence of truth of the facts stated therein,” and a certified —

BUCHANAN What statute does the word or the phrase to certify appear in? Where is it operative?

TULIS Certify is throughout TFRL, and the word certificate and certify and certification are throughout the statute. 

BUCHANAN OK. Very good. 

TULIS A certified document like a certified insurance policy — motor vehicle insurance policy — is more secure than your other kind, is more binding, it’s more sure than other documents. It has a higher validity. It’s more meriting of trust of the person receiving it or counting on it or relying on it. 

And it’s as if it were sworn or notarized, even though a certificate may not have anybody’s sworn statement or affirmation on it. 

This case turns on whether, Mr. Buchanan, TFRL and Atwood require 100 percent of registered motor vehicle owners to have an operator or owner’s policy or whether it requires them to have — or certain ones to have — a certified motor vehicle liability policy. 

And that’s defined in 102. 

I don’t have $65,000, being a very poor person, to buy use of the road from the commissioner. Respondent says that my only option is to buy from Grange or State Farm or some other approved insurance company an owner’s or an operator’s — or maybe in a comprehensive — policy.

And then, secondarily, I’m supposed to have in my billfold or the policy declarations printout in the glovebox at all times. 

The respondent is relying on EIVS to surveil all auto policy business and then target people who are noncustomers. Of those who are the customers, it’s satisfied that their policies are POFR. It’s satisfied that these policies are acceptable and these policies meet its requirements. The question is, sir, are noncertified policies sufficient, legally sufficient, to be POFR? 

This is an insurance card for a Tulis family auto, a Toyota RAV4 currently a motor vehicle, that is destined Jan. 29 to have its registration revoked. Revocation means I may use the auto solely for private purposes, and not in commerce hauling goods and people for hire as an instrumentaity of commerce, which I have a right to do. More than 1 million motorists in TN are targeted for tag revocation even though they are not subject the requirements of the law. (Photo David Tulis)

DOR says yes. 

In its program, in so saying, abrogates 27 provisions of Parts 1 and 2 as I have very clearly demonstrated.

The petitioner says no. 

The law supervises only certified policies and given that that’s my argument, I would ask approval of my motion for summary judgment.

And the proofs of this analysis, sir, are in the statute.

Only certified insurance will do

View 102, in definitions. A motor vehicle liability policy “means an owner’s policy or operator’s policy of liability insurance, certified — underline that — certified as provided in 55-12-120 or 55-12-121 as proof of financial responsibility.” 

So, the certification makes it proof. It becomes proof on certification.

119 mentions manner of proof, and there, “POFR when required under this chapter may be given by filing, (1) a certificate of insurance as provided by 55-12-120.”

If you are subject to TFRL in Tennessee, you are likely to have SR-22 high risk insurance. Only an owner’s policy with an SR-22 certificate is legally sufficient for “proof of financial responsibility” under the TFRL, the Tennessee financial responsibility law of 1977, under the color of which two state departments run a program of oppression and fraud.

At 120, and the title of that is certificates and certification, and it’s a reference to the SR-22 IICMVA standard for insurance, it says “proof of financial responsibility may be furnished by filing with the commissioner — that’s of safety — of the written certificate of any insurance carrier certifying that there is in effect a motor vehicle liability policy for the benefit of the person required to furnish proof of FR.” And then that provision goes on to state that the certification includes the start date of the policy. 

If you go down a little further to 121, Mr. Buchanan, it’s on nonresidents’ requirements and it’s also called “certificates and certification.” This non-resident can show POFR by filing with safety “a written *** certificate or certificates, plural, of an insurance carrier licensed to conduct business” in the foreign state.

Go further to 123. And that’s on cancellation and termination. And when a carrier “has certified a motor vehicle liability policy” — notice what’s happening here — “under 55-12-120, insurance so certified shall not be canceled.” And that’s can’t be canceled without a 10-day notice by the insurance company to safety. That didn’t happen in my case.

In 125 on cancellation and certificates of insurance, it says that in specific situations, Mr. Buchanan, the safety commissioner “shall consent to the immediate cancellation of a bond or certificate of insurance.” Also, he may waive the requirement for filing proof of, of financial responsibility. 125 also says that a certificate “is maintained during the period of revocation.” And that’s important to notice, on the side there, that these periods of certification that people have under a policy under the certification has a terminus. Now these periods of probation have an end. The statute used to say “up to five years” and the new edition of that provision changes it to say until the suspension is ended.

The Tennessee supreme court meets in this building, and has refused two of my appeals, one for arguably the most important case in the state’s history, that of the Covid-19 coup March 12 and 13, 2020. How will it treat Tulis v. DOR when the time comes?

We have the same type of evidence of the certification necessity on these policies. And that’s, that one, that provision, sir, is about the maintenance of proof and also suspensions. And it says, “If a person elects to use a policy of insurance and financial responsibility insurance certificate” — certificate — “as proof of financial responsibility under this section, then the effective date on the financial responsibility certificate” — which I never had — “is the date upon which financial responsibility was proven and financial responsibility must be maintained for the period of the suspension or revocation.” That’s, again, 126.

At 133, safety shall consent to cancellation of any certificate of insurance if there is an alternative POFR. So, notice, the certificates are canceled if the policyholder says, Well, “I’m dropping that, I’m doing something else.” That would be, you know, driving without insurance or paying the commissioner $65,000 or, or trying to buy a surety bond (which I was not able to do.)

136 — going on — says, and that’s about the corporate certifications, the companies that provide insurance — there’re certificates involved with them, and they have to have a certificate of authority to be in the program. If they don’t have that certificate of authority, they can’t be in the program. So, you know, what good is it to have an insurance company that can’t have that certificate? The certificate makes the man.

139 — highly disputed — says that officers can run, I would say, only certified policies. And here’s the quote. 139(b)(1) “The officer shall request evidence — shall request evidence — of financial responsibility as required in this section.”

And 139 also refers to certificates of title for cars. Well, you know, you, you can have a title for a car. But if it’s not certified, well, then you’re not sure that it’s really yours. I mean, the state provides the service showing, recognizing you, the owner of your car, Mr Buchanan. You have a certificate to prove it, not just a piece of paper. But it’s a certificate proving it. The certificate is the evidence. 

Support princely combat v. principalities & powers

And, so, 210, quickly, refers to “insurer of record.” The insurer of record is the one who has the certificate of insurance and who gave it to safety. 210 also refers to the IICMVA model, the SR-22 standard. And if a person under POFR probation lets a policy lapse, well, at that point he becomes “eligible for notification” under 210.

We know that insurers are certified, but so is the program itself — the whole EIVS program. And it says this: “Until such certification occurs, no law enforcement action shall be based upon the program.” That’s the 212 — EIVS certified by someone saying, “it’s good.” And in light of that comment in the statute, I’d say that I would request the hearing officer to decertify the program — decertify the program instantly as a breach of law.

One more reference. In chapter 10 of title 55 in 108 — chapter 10, 108 — and that’s about accident reports. There are three sentences that talk about insurance. Two of them deal with regular insurance. And then the last sentence makes a clear distinction between regular insurance that people may report to each other and maybe even make — end up in the [police] report. If a person has a certificate of compliance with the TFRL, notice that — again, that’s 55-10-108. If a person has a certificate of compliance with the TFRL issued by the commissioner of safety, “a copy of the certificate shall be included in the report.” 

And quickly, the case to take a look at is McManus v. State Farm, 1971, Mr. Buchanan. And it says that a liability policy on file with commissioner of insurance and banking does not make a certified policy under TFRL. So, a record of insurance with insurance doesn’t satisfy the certification requirements under TFRL. 

The supreme court has a great quote in a case called Barnhart vs. Sigmund Coal Company. And this is on the apparent necessity by the respondents who dig into the legislative history. And this is 534 U.S. 438. That’s 534 U.S. 438. 534 U.S. 438. And it says, “As in all statutory construction cases” — and this is the easy stuff here, “we begin with the language of the statute. The first step is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” Now, here’s the good part. “The inquiry ceases, Mrs. Cline’s inquiry ceases — ’ 

BUCHANAN — You need to, you need to finish your, finish up your suggestion. One thing 

TULIS One sentence — “The inquiry ceases if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” Thank you.

Risky drivers must get SR-22 ‘certifieds’

Camille Cline, department attorney representing Mr. Gerregano, takes 15 minutes to defend the EIVS program.

***

What follows is rebuttal.

TULIS Yessir, thank you, Mrs. Cline, for that presentation. Mr. Buchanan, the [insurance] policies demanded by the respondent in this case are legally insufficient. The policies that the department’s extorting the public to obtain are not capable of proving financial responsibility. They are defective proofs. They are not — these are policies are not certified — and thus they are defective to, for anyone, to prove financial responsibility. 

Why, one might ask, do certifieds, these certified motor vehicle policies, have to have to be certified in the first place? What’s the reason? 

Well, because they allow — and think of the large picture here that the legislators may or may not be thinking about — because these certifieds allow careless, irresponsible persons on the road. These are high-risk people. They may be dangerous. They elevate risks for other travelers in the traveling and shipping public. And so, they’re on the road only under a probationary provision under suspension. 

Because they’re suspended for conviction, a civil judgment or finding of a crime or they have a ruling, administrative ruling against them, they are high risk. But they’re able to use the road. They use the road under suspension. 

They’re suspended, they’ve been knocked out. They’ve been revoked. But they can use the road on condition of a certified policy. 

Ordinary policies of ordinary good people, good people who don’t roll through stop signs, like Miss Cline, are not certified and they don’t morally need to be certified. 

They don’t need to be surveilled by EIVS. 

In the moral framework of the law, the law surveils the irresponsible and the negligent and the high risk. In so doing, it recognizes the right of travel and ingress and egress and communication that I’m defending in this case. These people have that right too, even if they have messed up. They have that right and they can exercise their rights and pursue their livings under suspended license that they have is unrevoked, but on condition of financial responsibility.

The certifieds, the certified policies, control the conditional use of these people who are under probation up to five years. At the end of that five year period, they’re not under probation and they can travel as they want, with or without [insurance].

BUCHANAN What happens if, what happens if someone has their driver’s license revoked or their registration revoked and not returned to them. Do they — what happens to their rights of ingress and egress? 

TULIS Well, that’s kind of outside the scope of what I can answer. But they always have a right of travel, they always have a right of ingress-egress regardless of what their commercial harms are. The license is — 

BUCHANAN — I guess what I’m asking you, I guess what I’m asking you, Mr Tulis, is in your conception of that right, which we have brought into this case, if the government, uh, does not, does not grant somebody a driver’s license or revokes a driver’s license and bars them from having a driver’s license, has it violated their right of ingress and egress? 

TULIS No, it has not. It has only violated their right of commercial use under State vs. Harris. People who don’t have licenses cannot use their car, they cannot operate a motor vehicle. Without a tag or without a registration, they’re unable and not free — and are forbidden — to operate their motor vehicle. They can’t use it. They simply can’t. And so —

BUCHANAN — Let me, let me ask you this and I’m gonna give you a minute to finish because I, 

TULIS – I had one more sentence, go ahead, yessir.

BUCHANAN I jumped in on your last, uh, last you will. Uh Sure, sure. I, I do have a question. 

Are you contending in this case that the department’s suspension of your registration for this vehicle violates your rights in a way that is distinct from how it would violate anyone else’s rights. In other words, there is a general problem you’ve articulated with the department doing what it does under 210. Is there a problem specific to you on a constitutional level that is that is not uh necessarily the case with another citizen. 

TULIS *** There are other — I know numerous other citizens who travel the roads without registration without license — rural people, farming people, mechanics.

BUCHANAN I mean, what the department has done to you: Does it violate constitutional rights that you have, but not everyone else has? 

TULIS Well, I don’t have to defend this case on constitutional grounds. I’m defending this case on matters of statute. 

BUCHANAN All right, got that.

TULIS It’s a constitutional statute. It’s the program is facially unconstitutional under color of a constitutionally enacted statute of which there is no problem, which is perfectly coherent and legal. But whether I’m particularly being injured, I am specifically and concretely and particularly being injured by what’s been happening also because I can’t do commerce. I mean, I have a constitutional right under Ogden versus Gibbons to use the means of the day for commerce. I have a protected right. 

And I also have this separate right of travel, which is all I have right now. I have only the one right that I can exercise. Not the right I’m suing for.

BUCHANAN Your injury is the result of what you’ve characterized as a facially unconstitutional program. Is that what you’re telling me?

TULIS Yes. The law is constitutional. There’s nothing wrong with the law. It’s the program —

BUCHANAN — As you construe it, yes. I understand that. Yes.

TULIS And so the program effectively extorts the public and criminalizes the innocent and there are 40,800 annual average annual criminal convictions under the program. Probably very few are genuine POFR-liable people who, who let the policy drop or, you know, who screwed up again. A few of those probably are genuine, proper use of the state’s authority. But the program upon the traveling public is not.

BUCHANAN Right. Very good. 

TULIS Thank you,sir. 

BUCHANAN *** Thank you very much. Thank you both for your arguments. I consider this submission to have been filed and completed as of today in which I will have 60 days to prepare an order on each, on each motion. That will very likely be one order addressing both motions. So, until then, this matter is under advisement and I will get to work on that and I’ll get it out when it’s ready. 

Thank you very much for your time today. I hope you have a good weekend and, uh, if you have any administrative questions, as always, you may contact Mrs. Hill. 

TULIS Mr. Buchanan, it’s a real honor. Thank you so much for your attention. And Mrs. Cline, thank you, ma’am.