Judge Fleenor urged to change mind in protecting Gov. Lee despotism

Comes now, David Jonathan Tulis, of 10520 Brickhill Lane, Soddy-Daisy, Hamilton County, Tenn., being of sound mind and body, of capacity, declaring the following facts true and correct to the best of my firsthand knowledge, as follows:

Relator on behalf of state of Tennessee is aggrieved at his treatment in the orders filed Jan. 21, 201, in this “Petition in equity and for writ of mandamus.” Dismissal violates relator’s due process rights to notice, opportunity and time to respond to two motions to dismiss, despite the promise from the court that the relator would be fully heard.

Affidavit & motion to alter Lee dismissal order in interest of equity, justice 

[This affidavit and motion filed in Hamilton County chancery court — effectively a demand for reconsideration — prompted Judge Pamela Fleenor to order a hearing March 30, 2021. As this analysis of one of her two dismissal order runs 19,000 words, it’s not clear what more the judge needs to hear from the relator in the case. And it’s not clear what she needs to hear from admitted lawbreakers, scofflaws and brigands in the case, the governor and Becky Barnes, the local health administrator. This brief outlines why I have every right to a writ of mandamus today to compel obedience to Tennessee law. — DJT]

The hearing Jan. 11, 2021, was for motions to dismiss, and motion to strike, with relator reserving his right to respond to the motion to dismiss after the court foundationally disposed such matters as respondent’s failure to answer to his frauds and particularize what appears to be a boiler-plate motion, or as relator more fully required in his motion to strike an improper document in the record. 

The court denied these material and important procedural rights of relator, rendering an order of dismissal without a foundation for such an adverse deprivation of procedural rights, denying his motion of response, or petition amendment, or as to how the opinion is consistent with equity principles. This also withheld or obstructed crucial knowledge required to prosecuting the cause of the state on relation. 

The court purportedly asserts the action commenced by the state on relation is unworkable, unreachable and ultimately not justiciable. The court’s order appears to have, and not limited to, violated due process, or failed to properly apply equity principles, misinterpreted the petition, or is improperly influenced by respondent, as well, passed over and did not disclose relator’s exhibits establishing specific injury to him privately, nor find any material inadequacy of the petition for relief of respondent(s)’ frauds, causing irreparable harm.

Chancery enjoys plenary equity power to enforce the trust pursuant to the constitution of Tennessee, and broad discretion to form any relief which is bound by the duty to do justice, not limited by relator’s proposed demand, but requiring the court to seek relator’s intentions (“In Tennessee, a liberal interpretation is given to all writings, the purpose of the Court being to ascertain, and give effect to, the intention of the makers of the instrument. The intention is the substance, the words are but the shadow; and so the intention is the only infallible touchstone for the interpretation” of a contract. Gibson, § 72, Maxims Applicable to Pleadings, 1955 ed.), and not to be influenced by respondent’s uninformed or conjectural speculation or schemes — of a petition, severally, for equity and mandamus invoking chancery to stop fraud causing irreparable harm — equity principles require this court to provide remedy to the fraud alleged in the petition now admitted to, not give equity to any party having none. “The Court of Chancery is the arch enemy of fraud; and to that court those who are the victims of bad faith generally apply for redress, not only because the Chancery Court can grant more perfect relief, but, also, because it will often grant that relief upon weaker presumptive evidence than will a Court of Law” Gibson, § 456. Fraud Proved by Circumstances. “Fraud, in the sight of a Court of Equity, vitiates every contract or transaction into which it enters, at the election of the injured party” Gibson, § 57, Equity Will Undo What Fraud Has Done. 

This action does not suffer from a final judgment currently or prior, or a prevailing statute of limitation precluding the claim of fraud in this court. No matter how broad, there is no discretion in chancery to ignore fraud in demand for relief of the state on relation.

How an admitted fraud causing irreparable harm before chancery is not actionable is not explained in the order; nor is how the public interest can be materially prejudiced, thrown under the bus of a statewide general injury, or not deemed extraordinary; nor offer what foundational principle is used to extend to a party without equity the court’s largesse hearing respondent-in-fraud in chancery, or to deny relator the opportunity to respond or amend the petition after notice of a particularized motion worthy of equity. 

Despite the obligation and duty which the respondent(s) do have to avoid the frauds immediately, which the order prejudicially fails to disclose, the order of dismissal, despite the action challenge, does not find any evidence that respondent’s claim to police power is compelled by necessity or lawful exigency. Despite the court’s insistence that it is the burden of relator to prove, he cannot prove a negative and settled equity principles require the burden is upon the respondent(s) to avoid their fraud, of which they did not. 

The court states properly the principle that: 

A court will not substitute its judgment for that of an official vested with discretion unless the official has clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty in the exercise of that discretion. Lee order, Page 3 [emphasis added]. 

The court, despite claiming to accept the petition being true, failed to find or notice fraud does not vest any official with power or authority. No respondent in this action is vested in any legitimate power, in particular police power by or through fraud; fraud and right never go together; and similarly, fraud and justice never agree together; it is fraud to conceal fraud; fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments; he who acts fraudulently acts in vain; everything the respondent does without demonstrating a valid exigency to support police power is not merely arbitrary and without regard to duty, but absolutely wrongful. The respondent, contrary to clearly established equity principles, failed to bring any evidence avoiding his fraud to chancery with the first motion and the court agrees, notwithstanding its purported dismissal, despite failing to identify any avoidance for respondent’s fraud in the order. 

No official admitting to fraud is “vested with discretion,” and no official can operate upon and against the people in state of Tennessee, or contrary to their oath of office, or where in open admitted violations of law or its protections, or by omission of avoidance of fraud, including the obligation to demonstrate the lawful exigency causing an emergency when purporting to wield police power. 

This action and cause are extraordinary, unique and not subject to cases setting inapplicable precedent cited as there is no final judgment, which fact is controlling in Sw. Williamson Cty. Cmty. Ass’n v. Saltsman, 66 S.W.3d 872, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), and because other precedents involving mandamus and officials’ conduct deal with policy disputes, not admitted fraud.

The citation above relied on by the court requiring “an official vested ” is not relevant to this action for fraud under color of office causing irreparable harm, and the court has plenary power in equity, as petitioned, being in the public interest, to stop respondent’s frauds under color of authority. Because of the actionable fraud, there is no authority in chancery to dismiss this action, the effect of which, contrary to the public interest and principles of equity, will be to aid and abet the frauds and continue the irreparable harm admitted by respondents and the court to exist. 

Breached duty of governor, right of relator

The court says relator does not have a right to a writ of mandamus to compel respondent Gov. Lee to obey Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-5-104, that respondent Lee says he is not under “any duty” (respondent’s brief, P. 8, italics in original) to obey, which law says he must make a determination as to the agent of contagion of a condition such as SARS-CoV2 or Covid-19 based “on receipt of a report of a case, or suspected case, of disease declared to be communicable, contagious, or one which has been declared by the commission of health to be subject to isolation or quarantine, to confirm or establish the diagnosis, to determine the source or cause of the disease and to take such steps as may be necessary to isolate or quarantine the case ***.” 

The court discusses the rules of statutory construction that are helpful to making the case for mandamus in this action because the statute requiring a determination to be made about the agent of contagion in any sickness or epidemic is directed at the executive branch of government stewarded by respondent Lee subject to the general settled obligation and duty, as a matter of law, to demonstrate a non-fraudulent exigency, whether or not choosing the safe harbor offered, if it is an offer and not a requirement, of the legislature’s communicable disease determination procedures limiting the force and effect of an emergency, on a case-by-case basis, upon only those shown to be a principle of contagion and reluctant to reasonably avoid becoming a vector of communicable disease.

Our primary objective is to carry out legislative intent without broadening or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn.2002). In construing legislative enactments, we presume that every word in a statute has meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if the obvious intention of the General Assembly is not violated by so doing. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn.2005). When a statute is clear, we apply the plain meaning without complicating the task.

Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tenn. 2011)

Respondent and the court do not find the governor named in the health law. They shouldn’t expect to. 

Respondent Lee is principal who works through agents, in the case of communicable disease determinations, particularly so. Are state or county employees free to ignore a statute that doesn’t name the party administering its provisions? The answer is, “No.” Respondent Lee’s office and name are

watermarked, as it were, on every page of state law. Bill Lee’s duty as governor under the constitution, Article 3, Section 10: “He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed;” also, “All grants and commissions shall be in the name and by the authority of the state of Tennessee, be sealed with the State Seal, and signed by the governor,” section 16 (emphases added). He is not, as he claims, so sovereign nor is there an office of governor of the state of Tennessee without a context and appurtenant duties and obligations which the man Bill Lee freely undertakes by his oath and of which dereliction to those duties and obligation he as a man is privately liable for acts defiling his office. 

“The department of health shall be under the charge and general supervision of the commissioner of health,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-1802, whose duties require him or her to faithfully, honestly, or, in regard to this action, non-fraudulently:

(3) Make such sanitary investigations as may from time to time be deemed necessary for the preservation and improvement of public health;

(4) Make investigations and inquiries with respect to the causes of disease, especially epidemics, investigate the causes of mortality, and the effect of localities and other conditions on the public health, and make such other sanitary investigations as may be deemed necessary for the preservation and improvement of the public health;

(5) Keep informed of the work of the local health officers and agencies throughout the state;

(6) Promote the information of the general public in all matters pertaining to public health;

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-1803 Powers and duties.

The court is aware that commissioners, who are appointed by the governor and serve at his pleasure, are given subordinates who are “under the supervision, direction and control of the commissioners” and these staff directors “shall exercise such powers and perform such duties in regard thereto as are vested therein by law” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-121, (emphases added) and these “shall be subject to all laws applying generally to commissioners” and to the departments — and to the governor himself, the legal head.

Vested with power to administer and fulfill Title 68, respondent Lee’s agents are empowered to name deputies and delegates. “The commissioner is also authorized to delegate any of the powers, duties, responsibilities or authority vested in the commissioner by the laws of the state of Tennessee. This delegation shall be made in writing to any appropriate official of the department.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-1-102.

The general assembly crafted the isolation and quarantine law to impose limits and duties upon the state,

acting through health departments for the benefit of the health, safety and welfare of the general public,

including relator. The fulfillment of those duties, as the petition points out, constitute the due process rights of the people and their protection from arbitrary and capricious actions and from folly and malice or oppression. This is the requirement, an obligation and duty, to demonstrate an exigency.

176. The COVID-19 crisis arises from respondent Lee’s cry, as it were, of “The sky is falling — the sky is falling.” T.C.A. § 68-5-104 requires respondent Barnes and other officials to step outside and check. That checking must be done before issuing orders for every one of the people in Hamilton County and in Tennessee to carry an ACME “sky is falling” umbrella or halt commerce and travel, etc., as pretended mitigation. 

The court says local health authorities and the commissioner may have duty under the epidemic law at Tenn. Code Ann.§ 68-5-104, but not the governor. 

“The background, purpose, and general circumstances under which words are used in a statute must be considered, and it is improper to take a word or a few words from its context and, with them isolated, attempt to determine their meaning.” Eastman Chemical Co. v. Johnson, 151 S. W.3d 503, 507. To find that respondent Lee is not named is isolating a few words (such as “local health authorities” and “commissioner,” Lee order P. 4) in the law and creating a false meaning around them to exclude from liability and duty respondent Gov. Lee as superintendent. 

The court cannot have it both ways when bringing the rules of statutory construction into the case. one

interpretation and application of law to this case is in error. The order does not explain how respondent Lee is excluded from liability because the office is not named, on the one hand, then allow a “venue of privilege” for suits where not named, applying expressly to commissioners, on the other.

When language within a statute is ambiguous, and the parties legitimately derive different interpretations from identical language, we must look to the entire statutory framework to determine legislative intent. Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678–79 (Tenn. 2002). The court should take judicial notice of the nature of Tennessee law, especially when it is not ambiguous, as in this case, in particular to conduct under color of prerogative police power, and not force relator to have to make such extensive argument, in its defense, for its relevance, applicability and claim upon respondent Lee, over the course of 140 days (as of Oct. 19, 2021) since his emergency filing, that respondent Lee is charged with administering the law.

In the instant case, no one disputes the language or has different interpretations within the statute. The statute vests respondent Lee with authority and duty to administer Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 68-5-104, through the communicable disease delegee, plain and simple, which he denies. The court has a duty at equity, given the private harm of relator, without adequate remedy and the found public interest or benefit, reports of irreparable harm across the state against millions of people, to order parties liable to fulfill their duty via writ of mandamus or other power at equity and to stop continuing irreparable harm to relator, evidenced in his affidavit of irreparable harm of record.

Public servants’ obedience to law provides many health and welfare benefits to the public. Via this law, the state channels its resources to protect the public welfare on arrival of an unproven, purported novel virus in one county or another. This mechanism of protection is being ignored in flagrante delicto. As noted in the unrebutted affidavit of complaint: 

35. Each respondent is in violation of the public duties imposed through T.C.A. § 68-5-104. 

36. Respondent(s) did not receive “a report of a [Hamilton County] case, or suspected case, of disease declared to be communicable, contagious, or one which has been declared by the commissioner of health to be subject to isolation or quarantine,” pursuant to and required by T.C.A. § 68-5-104.

37. Respondent(s) did not “confirm or establish the diagnosis”, pursuant to and required by T.C.A. § 68-5-104.

38. Respondent(s) did not “determine the source or cause of the disease” pursuant to T.C.A. § 68-5-104.

39. Respondent(s) did not use any testing method[s] which could identify the cause of the disease. 

40. Respondent(s) did not have a required communication or report of the initial case, in anticipation of compliance with TCA § 68-1-202, the cause, or “contagious principle” or transmission mode to the commissioner, or governor, or any other government official.

41. Respondent(s) or department did not “take such steps as may be necessary to isolate or quarantine the case or premise upon which the case, cause or source may be found, as may be required by the rules and regulations of the state department of health,” and of the “contagious principle” or transmission mode and did not send its findings to the Commissioner or governor or any other government official, pursuant to either T.C.A. § 68-5-104 or T.C.A. § 68-1-202.

Since respondent Barnes was derelict to make the lawfully required showing, and respondent Lee could not rely upon a non-existent record demonstrating a communicable disease exigency, and without “any duty” did not while also failing to demonstrate a non-fraudulent exigency, then, as the petition proves, the public notices are fraudulent, the police power is not vest. Respondent Lee’s motion for dismissal is a fraud upon the court, misrepresenting the structure of Tennessee government, and relator objects to the court’s whole agreement with it, and the various trust and other breaches thereby.

Respondent Lee is subject to the law, and executes it in service to state of Tennessee and the people of Tennessee, and being so subject he is barred from legislating anything upon or against the men, women and children in the state who are private citizens not his subjects, which legislating he has done starting March 12 with Executive Order No. 14 and orders following by which he has minutely regulated by proxy the lives of the relator, of record, evidenced in the appurtenant affidavit of irreparable harm, as well as, other people, statewide, in abrogation of their constitutionally guaranteed rights to due process, thereby irreparably harming relator by his interactions or potentially so, of hundreds of thousands of other people in myriad ways.

Respondent Lee is a man with private, personal and manly capacities who occupies the office of governor. He is brought from his personal estate into the office by an oath before God to fulfill it. He swears, “I will support the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and the Constitution of the United States, and that I will perform with fidelity and faithfully execute the duties of the office of Governor to which I have been elected” (emphasis added).

State of Tennessee on relation sues respondent Lee personally to bring his extracurricular governmental adventurism to an end — with respondent Lee the man obeying his valued and true calling as governor of the free state of Tennessee, not as potentate or monarch, not as tyrant following arbitrary and capricious whim, not as an individual perpetrating a fraud upon the people, to their irreparable harm — but as a lawful governor obeying once again the express contract, with its implied interstices thereof, with the people of Tennessee. 

It is frivolous for the court and respondent Lee to say he has no duty in his office to execute, implement, administer and obey Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 68-5-104, or where not providing an alternate non-fraudulent exigency to vest the police power executed.

As stated in the petition, state of Tennessee on relation demands mandamus lie to push respondent Lee the man entirely within the scope of his office — to pop him back into his lawful job — so that no part of him operates outside of that office to the injury of the people, that he submit himself obediently to his oath and their will via their Tennessee code annotated.

Respondent’s motion, on the point of equity relief, such as mandamus, is not just frivolous, but scandalous. Fraud vitiates every act, including respondent’s defense that has convinced this honorable chancery court. Equity principles require respondent(s), without equity, can have no defense until avoiding the fraud evidenced in the petition.

At behest of respondent, the court has deconstructed Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 68-5-104, and vaporized it, suggesting that while Lee may be excluded, Barnes is included as she is identified as a “local health authority” specifically. The court renders irrelevant —  null and void — the people’s legislative protective enactment; relator avers he is irreparably harmed by it and objects to the order of dismissal, and demands alteration of the erroneous order to faithfully reflect relator’s action, not the one fabricated by respondent(s) having no equity.

Demonstrating a non-fraudulent exigency

Given the respondent Lee denies “any duty” to the legislature’s safe harbor communicable disease determination procedures, given he chose to invoke police power, he is left with and not free from the concomitant obligation and duty of the office to demonstrate the lawful cause therefore. 

The legislature has spoken in T.C.A. 68-5-105 as to the process for what constitutes an epidemic. If any one, or body, asserts there is no duty in the governor to use that method and process, there is still the problem, then, as to what is the demonstrated exigency if not by the process the legislature enacted. Respondent Gov. Lee has failed to say. And he was required to if he intended to answer to the allegation of fraud fabricating a health emergency without warrant or upon foreign suggestion. 

Demonstrating an exigency requiring police power is not a consequent discretionary condition but a prerequisite. And one attempting to invoke the police power prerogative is required to establish a non-fraudulent exigency before any discretion can attach, and then subject to review for abuse of discretion, the existence of the frauds from which respondents shall not act are subject to equity relief or mandamus action.

The consequence then is Bill Lee, in any capacity, has committed at least two frauds:

➤ One purporting there is an emergency without demonstrating any lawful exigency. 

➤ The other is saying the exigency is a communicable disease without identification of the infectious agent by some method other than that determined by the legislature, because he denies using that method because he says he has no duty to use that method. 

Respondent Lee still has the duty and obligation to demonstrate the exigency giving warrant to the police power he claims to have invoked, and before any prerogative power attaches.

In this action, state of Tennessee on relation seeks mandamus or other equitable relief for facially fraudulent public orders or directives purportedly declaring a statewide health crisis wrongfully, fraudulently, invoking and executing state police power, and mandamus may be employed “to determine the constitutional validity of a statute, ordinance or other legal directive that on its face requires that the defendant official shall not perform the act sought to be required.” The frauds committed deprive the respondents of all power or consequent discretion to act.

“[I]f a contract is affected with fraud, or has a fraudulent purpose, none of the parties to such fraud can have the assistance of the Court either to compel the execution of such contract, or to have it cancelled, or to have the property or interests, transferred thereunder, restored. Equity will leave such parties where they have placed themselves, and will refuse all affirmative aid to either of the fraudulent participants. It is on this principle that the door of a Court of Equity is always shut against a debtor when he seeks to recover back property he has conveyed to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. (No right of action arises out of a fraud).” § 42 Gibson’s, 1907 ed. (italics added)

Relative to establishing extraordinary need, nothing in the record has been suggested or shows “another remedy is “equally as convenient, complete, beneficial, and effective as mandamus,” and is “sufficiently speedy to prevent material injury” cite omitted; “Sufficiently speedy” to prevent harm, applied to this action evidences injustice to the state on relation, contrary to equity principles, or as we’ll see following, “forthwith.” 

Mandamus is appropriate where, as here, the fundamental rights and property of relator, despite the court’s failure to disclose this evidence on its order, being clearly established in Exhibit No. 1, his affidavit with five particulars of irreparable harm, (here are three, for example, not abandoning those remaining:

The affidavit is uncontested and shows relator is irreparably harmed. Respondents-in-fraud claim nothing can stop them, that respondent is the sovereign, and working apart or in concert, can be a wanton, rogue, dictatorial destroyer. By definition, respondents-in-fraud, by their own statements, of record, agree with the petition and believe there is no other remedy adequate against them (Petition ¶ 24; Exhibit No. 4, Dr. Paul Hendricks letter; petition ¶ 41, “Respondent(s) or department did not ‘take such steps as may be necessary to isolate or quarantine the case or premise upon which the case, cause or source may be found, as may be required by the rules and regulations of the state department of health,’ and of the ‘contagious principle’ or transmission mode and did not send its findings to the Commissioner or governor or any other government official, pursuant to either T.C.A. § 68-5-104 or T.C.A. § 68-1-202”).

Chancery and equity principles uphold a trust established by the organic constitution of the people (the state on relation, the people, the true sovereigns and beneficiary), and declare and ordain differently than the court’s order finds or lawful due process could allow. Opinion and acts to the contrary are evidence of breach of trust and corruption. 

The third referenced irreparable harm above, “Affiant is suffering injury buying goods and services in commerce and selling goods and services. . . ” speaks directly to the mistreatment by the court in its order misinterpreting the “harms to commerce, travel and constitutionally guaranteed rights” as a generalized allegation. Lee order, P. 11 ¶ 1. To highlight such a reference and view it as an admission of having no private concrete injury is part of the court’s policy of failing to disclose the particularization of the irreparable harm specific to relator, as intended in the petition showing the uncrossable bright red line of state law, and prior notice constraining, limiting, the respondents-in-fraud actions.

Equity principles require, the petition is evidence, as well the facts in the affidavit proving irreparable harm, working together as one, when properly interpreted, not as part and parceled as the court has done.

What the court inexplicably believes is a generalized allegation is the fact of the limit of action breached, the bright red line, specifically perfected in the evidence of record in the appurtenant affidavit of irreparable harm caused by the breach of that law by the respondents-in-fraud.

Relator suffers respondent-caused particularized harm, has standing

The court says relator lacks standing and “failed to meet the first element of the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” in that he “failed to allege that he suffered a particularized concrete injury in fact *** a personal, concrete injury,” leaving respondent Lee nothing to challenge and the court an injury to address, Order P. 12. “Relator failed to allege how the Governor’s actions injured Relator in a concrete and personal way. Nor has Relator alleged some extraordinary damage to him privately, beyond that of the rest of the community. However, standing may not be predicated upon an injury to an interest that the Relator shares in common with all other citizens. Darnell, 195 S. W.3d at 620.” He “only alleges generalized grievances,” the court says.

The court finds relator’s grievances are generalized on two grounds. One is by identification with the people of Tennessee. The other is by the court’s violation of its public trust by refusing to disclose Exhibit No. 1. Both are improprieties and appearances of impropriety, materially and adversely affecting justice, or that justice be done, to which relator objects.

➤ Relator one of the people. The court cites relator’s references to the people of Tennessee indicating his affinity with them, Order P. 11, and uses these references to uphold respondent Lee’s (and respondent Barnes’) claim that he is indistinguishable from them, thereby making him invisible to the court, and thus a relator not privately and concretely injured, and a man aggrieved, unable to invoke the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, yet doing so without respect given the the record evidence or the requirement attending equity relief.

Relator objects that the court takes references to the people in common harm, instead of the fact required for equity relief as to public interest or benefit, all of whom will benefit from a writ of mandamus or other command at equity, and use them to deflate the public interest in relator’s case representatively and drain away his standing, established elsewhere (in affidavit Exhibit No. 1).

The court calls these references to “state of Tennessee” and “the people of Tennessee” as allegations and says they “demonstrate that Relator seeks relief that no more benefits the Relator than it does the public at large; That relator failed to allege how the Governor’s actions injured Relator in a concrete and personal way; Nor has Relator alleged some extraordinary damage to him personally, beyond that of the rest of the community. *** [S]tanding may not be predicated upon an injury to an interest that the Relator shares in common with all other citizens,” Lee order, Pp 11, 12. 

The standing rule is about injury, not whether equitable relief benefits the relator MORE than other people. But the court misinterprets what that clause phrase in the petition is used for and mistreats it, not asking the relator his intention, required by equity principles, previous stated herein. There are Tennesseans impoverished and ruined by respondents’ actions of mass detention, shuttering of businesses and abuse of free exercise of religion and travel. It appears this standard of who gets more benefit from the court’s upholding the law (pursuant to the rule that “A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct”) is a prejudice against state of Tennessee on relation, and untoward in many ways, or as only partially delineated herein.

The supreme court, in rebuffing a petition for writ of mandamus in Harris v. State, 96 Tenn. 496, 34 S.W. 1017, 1022 (1896), says mandamus cannot lie in service of a single person. “It is not in every case of clear legal right, and the absence of sufficient legal remedy, and where, therefore, mandamus is an appropriate remedy, that it will be issued. It is well settled by numerous decisions that a sound judicial discretion is to be used, and, where the circumstances make it unwise and inexpedient to allow this writ, to refuse it, when sought to enforce merely private right.” 

“Inasmuch as the people themselves are the plaintiffs in a proceeding by mandamus, it is not of vital importance who the relator should be, so long as he does not officiously intermeddle in a matter with which he has no concern. The office which a relator performs is merely the instituting a proceeding in the name of the people, and for the general benefit.” Certainly, it cannot be affirmed that these relators are “officious intermeddlers,” or have in view any other than the public good.

Harris v. State, 96 Tenn. 496, 34 S.W. 1017, 1019 (1896)

Relator’s references to the people serve two purposes.

— Inform the court of the broad public interest in his petition. Yet the court converts relator’s references to the people as acts by which he is made to deny his own standing. The petition seeks to enforce the duty of the health law at Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 68, or of lawful police power, and also the protections of the people under the emergency law as noted in the petition:

184. Even were the respondents to identify the exigent circumstance supporting their claim to power, emergency law requires executive action to protect against collateral damage, injury, or harm within state operations in time of crisis and to enhance the service of government to protect the people and their property. In the emergency law, respondent(s) are required to reduce dangers, “all of which —

➤ “threaten the life, health, and safety of [the state’s] people

➤ “damage and destroy property; 

➤ “disrupt services and everyday business and recreational activities; and 

➤ “impede economic growth and development.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 58-2-102

185. This “vulnerability is exacerbated by the growth in the state’s population, in the elderly population, in the number of seasonal vacationers, and in the number of persons with special needs” Tenn. Code Ann. § 58-2-102.

The case is styled State of Tennessee ex rel David Jonathan Tulis for a reason. The relator represents the state itself and the people who comprise the compact creating it, and to deny and misinterpret it appears not in keeping with the judicial ethic of impartiality, competence, diligence, or otherwise. Using the very purpose of the remedy against itself, cannot do any justice. Nor can it comport to the constitutional trust responsibility to provide remedy for harm done. 

“Inasmuch as the people themselves are the plaintiffs in a proceeding by mandamus, it is not of vital importance who the relator should be, so long as he does not officiously intermeddle in a matter with which he has no concern. The office which a relator performs is merely the instituting a proceeding in the name of the people, and for the general benefit.” Certainly, it cannot be affirmed that these relators are “officious intermeddlers,” or have in view any other than the public good. [emphasis added]

Harris v. State, 96 Tenn. 496, 34 S.W. 1017, 1019 (1896)

— Relator’s references to the people at large intend to establish his constitutional status, that of a man, among the “free people” of Tennessee (state constitution, Article 1, section 24). Repetition of the point anticipated abuse of it in these proceedings. Respondents and the court have acted to diminish and reduce relator’s legal status, to defame him and to reduce him to a subject, a legal person or entity, to a bankrupt corporation (see Motion to object to the proposed Dec. 2, 2020, hearing orders, filed Dec. 4, 2020). Relator objected to this treatment in the Jan. 11 hearing, Transcript, P 46 ¶ 15 to P 50 ¶ 2; None of which has been rebutted in the record, and cannot be.

The court’s words at the Jan. 11 hearing that it would respect relator’s status and the styling of his name have made no difference in the styling of her orders as identifying relator as DAVID JONATHAN TULIS, despite unrebutted proof of his true name as David Jonathan Tulis (Exhibit, birth certificate, with motion to object to the proposed December 2, 2020, hearing orders, filed Dec. 4, 2020), or his private or constitutional status of other than an individual, person, or bankrupt under statute.

➤ Particularized affidavit. The court cites Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2007) on standing, saying “injury must be particularized — which the Court has also described as personal, individual, distinct, and differentiated — not generalized or undifferentiated.” This showing is done in evidence Exhibit No. 1 filed Oct. 2, 2020. 

The affidavit has suffered the indignity, insult, and prejudice of being ignored, not attacked. Respondents did not challenge it on sufficiency, accuracy or veracity. Thus, it stands, with five instances of distinct and differentiated irreparable harms. It is a material injustice for the court to convert respondent’s acquiescence in the exhibit to nonexistence of the exhibit. On the other hand, equity principles required the respondent(s) bring lawful title, and the court to decide upon the strength of that evidence, not upon any form or infirmity of the other party.

The court takes issue with the stand-alone phrase, “commerce, travel and constitutionally guaranteed rights.” (Lee order P. 11 ¶ 1). This would be a generalized grievance had relator gone no farther; but it is particularized to relator in the appurtenant affidavit of irreparable harms specifically identifying unwarranted infringement of his private commerce and travel, themselves constitutionally guaranteed rights, prejudicially not disclosed in the order of the judge.

The supreme court says mass wrongs can also, with any one victim, give that victim standing.

For example, a mass tort inflicts “widely shared” injury, and each victim “suffers a particularized and differentiated harm. One tort victim suffers a burnt leg, another a burnt arm—or even if both suffer burnt arms they are different arms…. With the generalized grievance, on the other hand, the injury or deprivation is not only widely shared but it is undifferentiated.” Akins, 524 U.S. at 35, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (Scalia, J., opinion for the Court) (no generalized grievance when “concrete injury has been suffered by many persons, as in mass fraud or mass tort situations”)

Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

Relator cited Spokeo as giving a reminder as to particularity and affinity with other people. “The fact that an injury may be suffered by a large number of people does not of itself make that injury a nonjusticiable generalized grievance. The victims’ injuries from a mass tort, for example, are widely shared, to be sure, but each individual suffers a particularized harm.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). 

The court reads Spokeo and concludes it “does not support Relator’s claim of standing.” But relator’s claim of standing, is not decided by Spokeo, but through his affidavit of injury appurtenant, which the court prejudicially fails to disclose in the order, the other affidavit of evidence of the facts causing that injury, the petition. 

The court cites Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion. He quotes Blackstone’s commentaries and cites an 1828 ruling from the general court of Virginia. 

Even in limited cases where private plaintiffs could bring a claim for the violation of public rights, they had to allege that the violation caused them “some extraordinary damage, beyond the rest of the [community].” 3 Blackstone *220 (discussing nuisance); see also Commonwealth v. Webb, 27 Va. 726, 729 (Gen.Ct.1828). [Emphasis added]

 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1551, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016).

Relator is held to the high standard for standing, as he is a private man, aggrieved, seeking equity to vindicate not just a private irreparable harms, but one the relief sought requires also be of public interest or benefit as well. The court imposes on relator the standard test of concreteness and particularity, but also that of “extraordinary,” as well.

Relator, a member of the press under protection of Tennessee constitution bill of rights Section 19, is involved in this protected category of citizen activity, having suffered threatened criminal act, arrest by officer violative of the exceptions list for arrest by officer without warrant at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-103, Exhibit No. 1, P. 1, as attested, makes that single experience extraordinary in the record, and sufficient to reject respondent’s motion to dismiss. No other radio reporter in the state has had like experience of which relator is aware.

EXTRAORDINARY. Out of the ordinary; exceeding the usual, average, or normal measure or degree; beyond or out of the common order or rule; not usual, regular, or of a customary kind; remarkable; uncommon; rare. *** The word is both comprehensive and flexible in meaning. *** Beyond or out of the common order or method; exceeding the ordinary degree; not ordinary; unusual; employed for an exceptional purpose or on a special occasion; as a noun it is defined as, something extraordinary; especially, an extraordinary expense or allowance; specifically (Eng.) any allowance made to troops beyond the customary gross paid. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition) [Citations omitted] 

Under the headings of concrete, particular, actual and uncontested, relator avers his private harms are extraordinary, insofar as the test imposed upon him is valid and his unrebutted affidavit acknowledged and read by the court.

Respondent argues for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted that “challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the strength of the plaintiff’s proof or evidence” Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc. 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011). Respondent Lee alleges that there are insufficient factual allegations to articulate a claim of relief. Respondents have not attacked specifically and particularly relator’s affidavit of irreparable harms, rather the affidavit is never disclosed allowing them to wrongly get their contrived outcome. Then, and again, the court wrongfully, prejudicially, allows a respondent without equity for the unavoided frauds to have a defense, anticipating the appearance of predetermination, in concert.

Respondents’ attack on the petition, their unavoided fraud aside for the moment, falls short ignoring the affidavit of injury, Exhibit No. 1, and thus fails to undermine the quantity, quality or sufficiency of its concrete detail. The affidavit of irreparable harm is not of an abstract and indefinite nature. If respondents have not attacked the affidavit’s sufficiency, on what foundation does the court make its unparticularized nonspecific attack upon it? The court hasn’t even done that. It merely, conveniently, fails to disclose the affidavit of irreparable harm, or properly interpreted, under color that it did.

Ignoring a main body of material evidencing standing is improper, violating at least the rules of evidence, equity principles and state of Tennessee’s due process rights on relation, and relator objects.

After finding irreparable harm, accepted by the court by not disclosing it nor evidences successful rebuttal, taking the petition and affidavit of irreparable harm true, there appears to be a facial absurdity in the dismissal order, the claim that irreparable harm — injury so severe that there are no known ways to fix the problem or restore the conditions that existed before the harm — is not an extraordinary injury where claiming relator failed to evidence “extraordinary injury” while the court materially and prejudicially failed also to disclose the existence of the uncontested affidavit of certain and great, actual, ongoing, unending, egregious and accepted irreparable harm within the affidavit of the petition and as equity principles require it to be interpreted, if the court intended to do justice.

What is not an extraordinary injury about irreparable harm caused through fraud of government officials not obeying the laws of the state of Tennessee, or natural law that the relator did not prove through uncontested affidavit is not explained by the court, with foundation. 

Relator objects to an order that piles up obstacles against relator’s Exhibit No. 1 and his clear evidence for standing evidencing private, concrete irreparable harm by the frauds of malefactor and wrongdoer respondent Gov. Lee. Relator objects, is harmed by it, and demands the court alter its order to reflect the action in chancery filed by relator upon the record evidence, not as appearance to be unduly influenced by respondents-in-fraud.

A case cited as against relator’s interests are not dispositive against state of Tennessee on relation. In Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612 (Tenn. 2006), the plaintiffs seeking to overturn the proposed marriage amendment to the constitution could not show that untimely publication of the language didn’t concretely harm them or injure their organizing and political activity for gay marriage. 

Despite the evidence of record for standing, the court cannot seem to find relator’s standing. No one disputes standing consists of three elements: (1) The plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Relator used these elements to write the petition. That the court or respondents-in-fraud cannot find them in the affidavits or petition is shocking, unless working in concert with an intention to not see them.

The court lists the required minimum elements for determining standing, then does everything to contort the petition to find none. Further, the court, in its order, goes so far as to fraudulently fail to disclose relator’s unrebutted affidavit of five (5) particularized irreparable harms, all fundamental or actionable. 

Respondent attorneys and the court eliminate standing element No. 1 on injury in fact by ignoring relator’s affidavit. They eliminate element No. 2 on traceability by saying respondent Lee has no duty to obey Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-5-104 and that his ignoring the law did not impose harm upon relator, as consistent with his alleged failure to show concrete injury and a pretense that his life was unaffected in the subject matter of the petition but for respondent-in-fraud’s challenged conduct.. They eliminate element No. 3 on redressability by ignoring the fact that ordering respondent governor to obey the law ends the state of emergency and requires him and his department to establish, in each and every county, a first case of the contagion and a determination and diagnosis of the infectious agent, and focus any police power upon the sick only, not upon the healthy generally.

Petition avers, ¶ 118, that respondent rejected unavoidable obligation and duty, and the record contains no contradiction to it.

Nevertheless, an actual epidemic brings the condition beyond preparedness the response to which falls not upon non-binding foreign aspiration or recommendation, but to local determination of an infectious agent of which vital protective purpose the Tennessee legislature intended through T.C.A. § 68-5-104, requiring a demonstrable exigency, not reflected in the respondents’ orders, explained prior. 

Not only is respondent guilty of illicit acts of commission, but of omission avoid the legislature’s communicable disease determination process. At petition ¶ 121, 

While it claims no such power by separation of powers evasion, the judicial branch of this state, on its own motion, failed in its inherent power and duty to check that a co-equal branch of the government had followed the law, the conduct or omission of which created the disaster and irreparable harms to the state of Tennessee and its people, wrought by respondents under color of a pandemic without warrant.

Any lawfully acting respondent similarly situated is required to demonstrate a non-fraudulent exigency for an exercise of police power. Respondent Lee has a statutory delegation enacted by the legislature regarding communicable disease, and because respondent denied the safe harbor it provided; respondent professed distancing himself from his ministerial duty to invoke that statute, asserting he is subject to no law not having “any duty,” which wrong is identified in petition at ¶ 3, 

It is commonly known there is no test for the presumptive contagion or infectious agent of COVID-19 despite official misrepresentations or assurances to the contrary. Respondents act without bona fide demonstrable exigence or jurisdiction and by their unwarranted and unconstitutional premature actions or arbitrary and capricious, even deadly, purported mitigation measures are causing irreparable harm and injustice, wreaking havoc on the relator, fellow Tennesseans and the state of Tennessee. 

The entitlement of relief to relator is firmly established in the petition as the one framed, of many, if not obvious, and if need be, mindful of the liberal construction requirement. And if not continually gagged or denied of due process opportunity, the relator can expose more pathways to standing. But given the reasonably perceived predilection of the court, relator reasonably believes and having been denied multiple times is an expectation in futility, there is certainly no aspiration to justice being done; the above fulfilling all three irreducible minimum elements for standing, the court’s order is erroneous as to finding the lack of standing. And the relator is wrongfully disadvantaged in having to tell the court in this way, denied proper due process, denied the opportunity after notice of a non-fraudulent particularized motion to dismiss, which is required to avoid this sort of deprivation and injustice. 

This order appears so absurd, even to the point of looking criminal through complicity with fraud, relator must speak in frank terms in light of the irreparable harms, even unwarranted death, being allowed to stalk the relator by this court. And further, apparently fraud cannot be asserted enough to get a hearing or remedy in a Tennessee court, because it continues and is allowed to continue, even flourish.

The court asserts extraordinary burdens upon relator not allowed by equity principles. The only obligations of a petition for extraordinary relief against fraud causing irreparable harm are pursuant to principles of equity for a given remedy, the rules to aid — not obstruct — that relief. The petition is adequate for any relief in equity, mandamus being only the preferred relief sought together with the demand. Once fraud is alleged and facially shown as it is in the unrebutted petition taken true, in this equity action, the burden does not stay upon the relator, but shifts to any respondent to avoid. Given the irreparable harms in evidence by affidavit, undisclosed, even denied, by this court in its order, respondent’s avoidance should have been immediately — Equity principles require forthwith — returned, within days of delivery of the summons and complaint; in this action, the respondents have the duty in law to have had validation, the demonstrated exigency, of their executed power in-hand, before taking action. 

We require as much for all white-collar criminals, once caught.

Respondents loyally indulged by the court make great noise over the obligations upon the relator, looking right past the fraud admitted by the respondents and not avoiding it 140 days later, and never actually look to find whether those standards for extraordinary equity relief have been met in the petition. 

Instead of showing how the facts and evidences fulfilling the standard have not been met, by avoiding the frauds claimed to be occurring, as is available to any one not committing fraud, the respondents and court say, because we choose to wear cloth blinders, “We cannot see, nor do we understand.” That’s the excuse of criminal psychopathology. 

Relator’s motion to strike sought to cure this problem. Respondent’s cherry-picked out-of-context boiler-plate motion to dismiss evades the fraud and relator objects to sufficiency of respondent’s procedural defenses and the court’s acceptance of them. Instead, if respondent Lee were honorable and keeping his oath, he would have avoided the fraud alleged, showed obedience to the law, or submitted a particularized objection to the petition so that relator could respond or amend and perfect his petition or withdraw his case entirely if he were shown to be in error about the claims of Tennessee law upon respondent.

Instead of hearing the motion to strike an improper document in the record, the court at the Jan. 11, 2021, motion hearing gagged the relator under the pretense he was interruptive, prejudicially interfering with the adequate prosecution of the action by the state on relation.

The relator objects that the court is hearing the respondents-in-fraud at all for the reason they have not met equity principles requiring they avoid the frauds facially shown in the petitioner, nor, for want of equity, earning the right to object to the relief demanded. Transcript, Pp 16, line 13 to P 17, line 5. 

THE COURT: All right. The objection is overruled.

Ms. Kleinfelter, you may argue the motion to dismiss.

MR. TULIS: On what grounds?

THE COURT: That I’ve already ruled on — you’re relitigating the same issues. We’re getting to the merits of your case now.

MR. TULIS: Well, we’re getting to procedure. Their, their motions —

THE COURT: Mr. Tulis —

MR. TULIS: — are —

THE COURT: Mr. Tulis —

MR. TULIS: — (unreportable crosstalk) Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Tulis, do not interrupt again. Ms. Kleinfelter, you may argue the motion.

The court never actually overrules relator’s rightful objections but merely, through theatrical, impatient, insensitive, discourteous exasperation in apparent non-commitment to equal justice that the objections would derail the locomotive, the engineer ignoring them, apparently thinking to placate relator into believing the merits of his case would be heard during a pre-trial procedural hearing or that this could overcome the prior due process violations in the hearing to that point, and continuing; The admission for predestination of the matter, that “We’re getting to the merits of your case now.”

Despite relator’s right to object to procedural prejudices and failures of equity principles, which evasion the court has not provided foundation for and of which are continuing undisposed record objections, or that a claim for relitigating is not possible, the court injuriously gagged the relator, under the pretense he was interruptive. Apparently, because those continuing objections, such as the unaddressed fraud and unmet obligations of respondent-in-fraud, the court in the moment had no other way to obstruct due process but through this pretense and pretext.

The court has never provided evidence of the things it claimed it ruled on. And it cannot. This is why none exist in its order. 

In the phone hearing (Jan. 11, 2021, transcript, P. 16, lines 19, 20), the court says “we’re getting to the merits of your case now” prior to respondent’s oral argument for dismissal. If that comment on merits was intended by the court as true, then the pretrial motion to dismiss — written and argued orally starting transcript, P. 17 — should have converted a demurrer into an answer on the merits recorded in the affidavit of petition. 

That answer on the merits, clearly, fails to avoid the frauds alleged, as equity principles require, even if overlooked by the court before-hand and despite numerous notices to the court of its existence. In the hearing relator’s motion to strike an improper motion was only partially indulged AFTERWARDS, a due process violation that materially damages state of Tennessee’s prosecution on relation. Relator had reserved (in his motion to strike) his right to amend his petition to cure any inadequacies after notice and particularization from respondent (these did not come). After the hearing relator was denied an opportunity to respond in writing to a proper motion to dismiss, a due process right he had reserved.

 These troubling procedural features, such as and not limited to, lack of adequate notice and opportunity to respond, under the court’s control give the Jan. 11, 2021, hearing more than hint of being legalist premeditated prestidigitatory predestination, not justice done as equity principles require.

The problem for the judge is, and it comes at no pleasure to say, with biding grief really, in fact, fraud is being allowed in chancery. 

That has never been “litigated.” The court wrongfully ignores fraud. Nor has any other thing been disposed with any foundation or a valid uncontested proposed order, nor has the due process issue of whether a respondent without equity can ever be heard in chancery, clearly condemned by equity principles, neither that the merits have or are supposed to be heard during a procedural motion to dismiss pre-trial, the consequence of which should have been to convert the motion to an answer without answering to the fraud taken true in the petition, but for judicial negligence, or otherwise improper, no mention in the order as to this consequence as a matter of law or to its exoneration. 

Astonishingly, as to a due process objection prejudicing relator’s prosecution, the judge relies not on principles of equity, but that relator can appeal! (Jan. 11, 2021, hearing transcript, P 6, line 24, to P. 7, line 7). 

THE COURT: All right. And again, I’ve already ordered that she was — he was not in default. You can take that up on appeal, but you’re relitigating the same issue. And the record is open. Whatever the record says is what the record says. That —

MR. TULIS: Well —

THE COURT: You don’t have to — sir, don’t interrupt me. It’s difficult. Don’t interrupt me. I’m ruling.

The issue is the court hasn’t heard and lawfully responded to the motions objecting to the proposed orders to issue a final order being questioned for want of any foundation, and for the inclusion of false statements claiming to be based on the proceeding purportedly determining the non-existence of a default contrary to record evidence, or principles of equity, to issue a final order to appeal from. 

The false statement of the judge in the above hearing is that there is no order to appeal from, only contested proposed orders that are not appealable. Despite these gaping holes in the boiler, the freight train continues on its downhill predetermined terminus. In the ruling, the judge misrepresents the authority and the record, and in complete disregard of the due process being violated by two outstanding motions she has refused to allow (relator’s answers to two respondents’ briefs) yet which includes the continuing unanswered fraud. 

The court allowed an unworthy respondent-in-fraud to ramble away in the hearing. The court did not stop her at any point to ask relator his intentions, even when there was a question (Jan. 21, 2021, hearing transcript P. 21, lines 19-21, KLEINFELTER, “Now, the petition also appears, Your Honor, it’s not clear but it appears to also be seeking some sort of declaratory and/or injunctive relief ***”); the court did not ask the gagged relator what relief relator sought or what may have been required. 

Of the nineteen, 19, times the respondent’s state attorney was “clear” upon all the duties and law against the relator, the only thing not clear was relator’s demand for equity relief against respondent-in-fraud. The court followed those errant suggestions without further independent review, inquiry or consideration or caring to inquire what the relator intended, which equity principles require.

The court, in seeking the intention of the relator, also did not use its power to disregard any superfluous or impertinent material in the petition, if there actually is any, to get to justice. For instance, great noise is made trying to expand beyond relator’s private irreparable harms as being some sort of unextraordinary generalized event and therefore not actionable. The respondents-in-fraud and their loyal court cherry-pick a part of a repeating clause of the form (Court order for Lee, P. 11, “and the state of Tennessee” [italics in original]). If the only thing standing between justice and relief to stop fraud causing irreparable harm is the last part of the sentence stating this, the court has every power to disregard the part and rely upon the undisclosed affidavit or irreparable harm particular to the relator. 

But that clause inclusion is, contrary to the court’s intended mistreatment, if for no more reason than the court didn’t ask the relator his intention, is a statement fact of continuing relation to the status and the remedy required of chancery, pursuant to Tennessee constitution, to the posterity, such as the relator, secured thereby, the trust established of which the relator is entitled. 

Then more yet, the court’s mistreatment of the clause, “not as a person or an individual,” court Lee order, P. 11. That usage is directed not to the whole of the people or each man or woman reserving to themselves remedy for harm done, but to the creatures of the state identified as “person” or “individual,” for example, business, or corporation, which lesser status the court and respondents-in-fraud repeatedly defaming or fraudulently, whether factually or procedurally, to negative the character of relator, notwithstanding acknowledgment of the contrary fact at the hearing (see Jan. 11, 2021, motion hearing transcript, Pp. 47-50), and the continuing derogatory character evidenced in the order caption styling without warrant; of statutory creations, not of the constitutional posterity, such as relator, of the men identified in the constitution at Article 1, section 24, as among “the free people” in whom inheres “all power,” the “free government” of Tennessee “founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness,” Article 1, section 1.

The court improperly construes the phrase “to benefit the public at large,” Petition ¶ 8, to mean that relator cares not to redress his private irreparable harms caused by respondents-in-fraud, such readings by the court hinting partiality for a predetermined outcome. 

The court knows, or should know, one of the required elements to invoke the extraordinary remedy relator seeks is that it has public benefit. The court, without warrant, materially prejudices that required showing and unrebutted statement of fact as some sort of intention or indicating the scope of the public benefit, “injury is to the state of Tennessee” and that the comprehensive nature of the respondent-in-fraud man-made disaster “jeopardizes everyone” to contort this required element into something not intended nor stated by relator. In fact, the court so distorts things, that no one could ever comply with the requirement to show the need for an extraordinary remedy, because no relator could seek “relief that no more benefits the Relator than it does the public at large” (Court’s Lee order, P. 11), despite the public interest being a required element for the remedy. 

Then, with this impossibility imposed by the court, the order abusively states the relator did not allege something the court wouldn’t allow anyway, because there is no way to show a public benefit without it being no greater relief than the public at large, not specific to relator. 

In the court’s demand for relator to show “some extraordinary damage,” the court is incorrect again. This is a suit in equity, not at law for money damages. The petition filed and relief demanded facially proves something far worse than extraordinary damages for money, the purpose of chancery: Irreparable harm without remedy, which no amount of money can bring relief. 

The petition, when properly interpreted, proves the need requiring extraordinary remedy in equity for irreparable harm due to fraud under color of governmental authority, not as the court mistreats it, the due process violations aside. The court, given that this record will be relied upon by the parties and others on any appeal, fraudulently fails to disclose relator’s particularized affidavit of irreparable harm which disproves the unwarranted assertions in the order (Lee dismissal order, P. 12). The order evidences no record demand for money damages for injury. Therefore the next assertion in the order that, “Relator failed to allege that he suffered a particularized concrete injury in fact” is, at least, erroneous when applied to the action relator filed for equity relief, but not as misapplied to case at law for money damages. Unless this court has secretly and wrongly transferred this action to the circuit court, it applies the wrong expectations to the action filed by the relator intending equity relief.

But with the specter of the predetermined outcome, respondents-in-fraud or the officers of the court are not going to see what they intend or conspire for others to overlook. And if the relator is incorrect, there is the problem that any misperception would have likely been answered with a proper and lawful hearing of the motion to strike the motion to dismiss, providing an opportunity for response if not struck to respond to a particularized motion, followed by an unbiased hearing, rather than the prejudicial deprivation of due process imposed upon relator and also denying possible amendment of the petition. But the court chose, instead, to deny due process, while the fraud plays on. 

Relator seeks equity, not money damages

State of Tennessee on relation demands alteration of the court’s order of dismissal because the court mischaracterizes his petition for equity and/or mandamus as a suit at law for damages.

The constitution says, Article 1, section 17, “Suits may be brought against the state in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct,” and the laws include Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102 that says 

No court in the state shall have any power, jurisdiction or authority to entertain any suit against the state, or against any officer of the state acting by authority of the state, with a view to reach the state, its treasury, funds or property, and all such suits shall be dismissed as to the state or such officers,

The court says relator “seeks damages” for respondent Lee’s actions with regard to T.C.A 68-5-104, and, beyond that, “damages for delay in doing the thing that the mandamus petition seeks to command,” Lee order, Page 13. The court cites Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-13-102 to suggest that relator filed suit with confused provisions in his petition violative of the state’s right not to be sued in its own courts for damages and that any suit filed “with a view to reach into the State’s treasury *** shall be dismissed” [emphasis in original].

Nowhere in the petition is relator asking for money damages for injury as fraudulently represented: equitable compensation is not money for injury. 

Contrary to the court’s assertion, if this were an action at law, statute envisions lawsuits in which the state pays compensation. State government is allowed to make settlements and give compensation, according to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-103, which says the attorney general and reporter may

compromise and settle, insofar as the state is concerned, any civil litigation to which the state may be a party, upon such terms as in the attorney general and reporter’s opinion may seem to be in the best interest of the state, and may enter into such agreements in connection with the compromise and settlement as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this section.

The law requires written approval for “any compromise and settlement greater than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-103. And then there is the requirement to pay compensation for takings. 

State of Tennessee on relation in “petition in equity and for mandamus,” filed in chancery court, makes no demand for money damages and does not seek money from the state’s treasury; it is not a case at law, despite repeated efforts of respondents to defame relator and his cause and fictionalize the case into one that would be filed in circuit court at law for damages. Relator makes no claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-103, and whatever the court does in equity is within its sound discretion, not the relator in any regard.

The court implies that no Tennessean can hold a governor or commissioner to account for violation of his duty by implying relator’s equity and mandamus action is “a suit against the state or against any officer of the state acting by authority of the state,” a case “with a view to reach the state, its treasury, funds or property.” This provision cannot be construed as deleting his right to mandamus at Title 29, chapter 28, mandamus. And if it were to be read to do so would come into direct conflict with the constitutional reservation secured to relator to remedy for harm done, or as evidenced in undisclosed affidavit of irreparable harms. The state on relation demands the order be altered to honor relator’s petition seeking equity, not as currently mistreated at law.

State of Tennessee is in chancery because relator seeks equity against respondent Lee the officeholder and the man, a soul wrapped in a body, as C.S. Lewis says. He invokes, against either capacity, the courts discretion to do equity: 

202. The relator via this petition and verified complaint demands the court —

*****

209. ➤ Order equitable compensation, to the extent available to chancery, to persuade and impress the conscience of each respondent from repeating wrongs cited in this complaint, sending a message to others so inclined; 

210. ➤ Make other redress within the power of this court to the ends justice requires, not limited to, further compensation, reimbursement, indemnification or reparation for benefits derived from, or for loss or injury caused to the relator, fellow Tennesseans or the state of Tennessee. [emphases added]

This demand for equitable compensation “to the extent available to chancery” seeks to “impress the conscience of each respondent from repeating wrongs cited in this complaint,” sending a deterrent message to other office holders and men and women acting outside authority of office. The demand is within the court’s inherent jurisdiction, and relator objects to this demand being cause of dismissal. If there is a lawful and equitable contract, the court can equitably

Enforce the contract, or (2) award compensation for its breach, or (3) to require the party in default to do such act relative thereto as he, in good reason and good conscience ought to have done without suit. (Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, 1956 ed. § 28)

If there is no contract and a dispute arises, 

[A]ll the court can do is *** (2) where injury has been done, to make the defendant atone therefor. [emphasis added]

Chancery is the jurisdiction for “the determination of the equitable rights, estates, and interests of the parties to such causes, or the granting of equitable remedies,” Gibson’s § 30. “Equity Acts Specifically, and Not by Way of Compensation” is a dictum of chancery § 43. 

Equity aims at putting the parties exactly in the position they ought to occupy, giving them in specie what they are entitled to enjoy and putting a stop to injuries which are being inflicted. Thus, Equity decrees the specific performance of a contract, instead of giving damages for its breach. So, Equity restrains the commission of a trespass, instead of compensating the aggrieved party by damages. Gibson’s § 43 [emphasis added]

Relator in ¶ 209 invokes chancery’s inherent equitable powers (reference is “to the extent available to chancery”), and is content whether the specie from respondent Lee the man and the officeholder is silver coin or “performance according to exact terms,” which phrase defines specie in Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed, and pursuant to the court’s discretion. Specie of equity — gubernatorial obedience to law — is relator’s demand, not cash damages assessed upon relator’s report of checkbook shortfalls or sales commission data showing cashflow poverty. Relator treads not upon the state’s sovereign immunity to not be sued for damages reaching the treasury. The court’s interpretation to the contrary is prejudicially erroneous.

Relator in equity insists the court avoid a misreading of his intentions to give cause to dismissal of his petition, and he reserves the right to amend it, and requires the order of dismissal be altered to reflect the facts of the petition as relator intended, as equity principles require, and if not to summary disposal as demanded in the court’s discretion, then as due process requires the right of the relator to respond or amend, as equity would appear to require it where the court can bring a foundation for ignoring fraud in chancery, or disclosure that the evidence the court promised existed outside of the knowledge of relator, that the matter is not in default.

Relator demands official obedience to existing law, not judicial legislation 

Another ground of dismissal wrongly asserted and insisted upon by both respondents-in-fraud and the court is that “Relator *** seeks to have this Court usurp the powers of the political branches” and “violate the constitutional separation of powers,” Order, Page 13. Demanding equity or a mandamus from chancery court is hardly a bid to conflate the duties of any of the three branches of government, but is rather an attempt to restore the status quo ante and halt irreparable harm caused through fraud under color of authority.

 ➤ The court recasts the petition into a process to “maintain oversight of the [Covid] crisis” and says the legislature “established that the Governor is responsible for addressing emergencies, not the courts,” (Order, P. 12), relator is effectively accused of seeking to put legislative, executive, and judicial power into a kitchen blender and pushing the “on” button. 

This suggestion by the court could be, singularly, the best evidence the court has no idea what the relator’s petition is about, or intends, whatsoever. The petition, take true, proves there is no emergency.

A petition for writ of mandamus to compel obedience to a legislative enactment, , or the independent duty to demonstrate a non-fraudulent exigency, to be executed by respondent governor is hardly making a case for the overthrow of constitutional representative government; relator intends to restore constitutional government by his action. 

Petition seeks to end the legislating by the governor, to compel judicial integrity by letting the courts throw off the fraud of executive branch law breach and overreach, and to restore to relator and state of Tennessee and its people their due process rights in the protection of liberty via strict obedience to black-letter law imposing duties on the governor and on the health bureaucracy limiting under law the police power under law applicable upon the sick only, specifically, not upon the public generally and promiscuously, or apart from due process. 

The court mischaracterizes Tenn. Code Ann. 58-2-107(a) to hold that respondent governor can disobey the law when the law the court cites says accurately and specifically what he may do during a declaration of emergency. The general assembly enacted the emergency law in agreement with its other laws, with none defied or overturned by the other and no law misused as against the relator and his liberties, and those of state of Tennessee and the people.

(a)(1) The governor is responsible for addressing the dangers presented to this state and its people by emergencies. In the event of an emergency beyond local control, the governor, or, in the governor’s absence, the governor’s successor as provided by law, may assume direct operational control over all or any part of the emergency management functions within this state, and such person has the power through proper process of law to carry out this chapter. The governor is authorized to delegate such powers as the governor may deem prudent. [emphasis added]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 58-2-107

Nothing here grants respondent Lee permission to disobey, disregard, eschew, bypass, nullify or delete the primary health law administered by the executive branch’s department of health and by the health departments in the state’s 95 counties, or to disregard his obligation and duty to declare a non-fraudulent exigency for any emergency invoking police power. His “direct operational control over all or any part of the emergency management functions” is “through proper process of law.”

His lawful control is not in violation of law. As a matter of law and by admission, his unprecedented historic conduct is not lawful, admitting the need for extraordinary relief.

The rules of statutory construction require that no part of a law, nor any law as a whole, be nullified by misinterpretation of some other statute so as to make Tennessee law self-contradictory, one part voiding another part. The court’s reading does just that.

The court accepts a status quo in which respondent Lee, by his actions in personal capacity outside of law, pretends to be acting in his office and to pit two bodies of law against each other, rendering one of them null and void, in violation of the rules of statutory construction cited by the court.

The court effectively outlaws mandamus as a remedy with the following gloss: “Where an official has discretion to do any act after making evaluations and judgments, a writ of mandamus will not lie,” P. 12, citing Tusant v. City of Memphis, 56 S. W.3d 10, 18 ( Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). 

This quote from Tusant places discretion within operation of a law, not, as relator’s petition avers, outside the law, as if one can use discretion to ignore a law. There is nothing in Tusant operating against relator’s case. Neither is there support for the court’s effort in this case to prohibit use of mandamus in its strained and illogical reading of State v. Frazier, 114 Tenn. 516, 86 S.W. 319, 320 (1905) that says of the governor, “He is not subject to the mandate of any court. No court can coerce him. No court can imprison him for failing to perform any act, or to obey any mandate of any court.” This statement applies to the particular facts of that case and can’t be construed as a ban on mandamus. Indeed, the court under mandamus makes a governor involved in fraud “subject to the mandate of [a] court”; indeed, mandamus does “coerce” him into obedience to all legislative enactments construed as operating harmoniously.

In reference to Tusant, within obedience to Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 68-5-104 there is discretion. When Gov. Lee and his agents enter into the statute to fulfill and administer its provisions in the public health, safety and welfare, there certainly are choices, options, selections, decisions over which no judge controls, then only except to abuse. 

It is the duty of the local health authorities, on receipt of a report of a case, or suspected case, of disease declared to be a communicable, contagious, or one which has been declared by the commission of health to be subject to isolation or quarantine, to confirm or establish the diagnosis, to determine the source or cause of the disease etc.

Discretion in duty lets a local health authority determine if a “case” exists, determine if the case is a real case or a “suspected case.” There is discretion under what epidemiological conditions a “disease is declared to be communicable [or] contagious.” Myriad professional, scientific and expert qualifications come into play in the necessity to “confirm or establish the diagnosis [and] to determine the source or cause of the disease.” Discretion is operative within the law. But there is no discretion, relator insists, to operate apart from the law and to ignore its existence as a corpus and its working parts within. Not a single piece of paper, not even a sticky note, exists among either respondent(s) Lee and Barnes records to indicate a first act compliant with law to demonstrate any thing let alone that required to invoke police power.

The legislature has spoken as to the process for what constitutes an epidemic. If the governor insists he has no duty to obey the method and process at Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-5-104, there remains the problem as to his demonstrated exigency for his “COVID-19 pandemic” if not by the process the legislature enacted. Respondent Lee has failed to say, in public and in this equity action, under the obligation to do so.

In a court of equity, and a chancellor should be fully aware, respondent Lee is required to immediately answer the factual presentation of fraud he has fabricated under color of a health emergency without warrant and upon foreign suggestion, (see petition ¶ 73-75, 80-110, and more).

Respondent has the duty and obligation to demonstrate the exigency giving warrant to the police power emergency he claims to have invoked through Title 58 to displace or overthrow the key statute at Title 68 dealing with epidemics and, alternatively, objectively demonstrate Tennessee’s part in any pandemic.

Respondents are refusing to protect public health, safety and welfare in ignoring the law about contagion and epidemics. Their pretended statewide emergency operates in the area of public health activity subject to this law pertaining to contagion and epidemics, and yet they entirely ignore the law telling them what to do for public health, safety and welfare. 

Respondents refuse to obey the law to the injury and harm of relator and hundreds of thousands of other people who suffer, each in their own way. 

The court says relator is bidding the judiciary to become a parallel or to sidebar the general assembly, dictating the process of the state’s response to a virus. Hardly. State of Tennessee has a health commissioner, a body of law and medical professionals to handle demonstrated non-fraudulent communicable disease. To deny by definition the remedy of writ of mandamus invites the problem from which the court shrinks — legislation by parties in violation of division of powers. Respondent Lee’s actions in an epidemic are not to be devised by him, and he is not to legislate anything upon the people as a whole. His duty is to obey the statute and apply lawfully warranted police power as required — with due process protections continually kept in mind of his agents — upon the sick specifically, not upon the healthy generally.

Alternative writs, phone hearing, other material prejudices

➤ The court says state of Tennessee’s case on relation is “procedurally deficient” in that relator did not ask for an alternative writ under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-25-102. 

The court itself fulfilled the hearing requirement under the alternative mandamus provision, giving respondent two hearings to which respondent was invited and appeared, well beyond the acceptable equity requirement to respond “forthwith,” such as within 5 days or less —  The court’s unwarranted indulgence 140 being more than enough time to be heard by a respondent to avoid the alleged frauds given notice prior to suit. Relator’s demands in petition ¶ 8 for a peremptory writ of mandamus, together with the case’s public interest and benefit requirement for the equity relief, empowers chancery to use its plenary authority to halt wrongs and bring justice and relief. The court does not explain how the relator is to divine its will for acts and purposes wholly within the court’s discretion. He will draft an order pursuant to the court’s direction when it is ready to rule for equity in favor of state of Tennessee and her people on relation. 

The court cites State v. Grindstaff, 144 Tenn. 554, 234 S.W. 510, 513 (1921) that states, 

In a mandamus case under our practice the peremptory writ has not, so far as we know, ever been issued before the return of the alternative writ. This always insures [sic]notice to the adverse party and a hearing before there is any removal from office.

The reference regards precedent inapplicable to this case, and in light of the statute and private process exposing fraud, is not dispositive, particularly in light of chancery’s power. This rebuke on relator’s plea under mandamus also abuses and insults the evidence of the notice to the respondents in relator’s private process of notice of record. His Exhibit No. 2, open records request and letter demands with respondent Lee’s agents, various dates; Exhibit No. 3 is his “evidence demand pursuant to the duty imposed in TCA 68-5-104” of Aug. 27, 2020, upon co-conspirator Rebekah Barnes; and Exhibit No. 4, the Sept. 2, 2020, letter of Dr. Paul Hendricks, prove failure of respondents to “show cause” as per Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-25-102, with their lawful warrant for the irreparable harm they caused, before the action was instituted. 

All the court had to do was read the evidence in support to see the facts taken true, the justice intended. The court itself has fulfilled the requirement for respondent Lee to show cause as to his dereliction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-5-104, or produce the demonstrable exigency, forthwith. 

FORTHWITH. Immediately; without delay, directly, hence within a reasonable time under the circumstances of the case; Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed.

“Forthwith” means not 140 days, but three days, equity relief time. On the other hand, a court claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction has bent over backwards to give “a hearing” — two of them to which respondent Lee was invited and made appearance. 

Respondent was “told” prior, of knowledge, when undertaking the oath in acquiring the office which is subject to chancery, then by the requirement for the demonstration of an non-fraudulent exigency to invoke the police power be declared under color, and prior to, or independent of, or despite not receiving the required report through Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 68-5-104, then by the notice of the mandamus suit to which equity timing attaches which objectively, statutorily in this case, is “forthwith,” notwithstanding the summons time. 

Despite the court’s insistence to the contrary, an alternative writ, the purpose of which is ensuring notice to respondent-in-fraud given notice before and again at the suit, serves no legitimate purpose but to further delay. If the court intended to do justice to stop the irreparable harm, as it now suggests was available, it would have invited the type of writ and extent of its discretion to issue which the relator has been ever-vigilant to receive in aid of the court’s doing justice. But that justice is apparently not to come and the suggestion that the relator is somehow procedurally derelict was never to the relator’s discretion. 

The court, if it intends to hold to this tack, does not explain obedience to the principle, “Equity regards substance rather than form.” In other words, rules are not allowed to subvert a right by imposition of a mere technical form. Another equitable principle is denied control in a case of admitted fraud: “A court of equity in the exercise of a broad discretion should see to it that wrong and oppression are not inflicted under the guise of legal procedure, but that justice be done as the very right of each case may demand” Griffith, § 39, p. 42. The court has not worked to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of this action. Where was this suggestion of procedural deficiency 140-plus days ago, given also this writ but for the purported procedural failure of relator can only be offered by a court of competent jurisdiction, also denied to relator? 

The chancery court’s order is untenable and evasive, hardly instilling, confidence and trust, or giving fair treatment, but destroying these. Costs for the hearings should be borne by the court that ordered hearings without jurisdiction, or to allow maintenance of fraud at chancery under color of jurisdiction.

➤ The “telephonic court hearing” Jan. 11, 2021, was prejudicial to relator in that it was impossible to have the clerk and master to present the record before the court to verify the chancellor’s claims suggesting evidence contrary to the evidence known and created by relator of respondent proper service of process. 

And I’m objecting to a phone hearing, as I, as I made reference in my written notice to the court.

It’s a, it’s a due process violation that I didn’t get a hearing before this morning to vacate that order filed January 7th. I filed my objection in writing seven days ago and sent copies out. I have material due process harm on the point of objected motion on the Lee default. And on that matter there is something that, that — dealing with the record on the default, Your Honor, that requires being present, because I’m demanding to see the record on which the Court made the order that respondent Lee is not and was not in default as to the time allotted to him by the rules, 30 days plus three with mail service. *** I’m demanding to see, before the court and have the court look over, the material proof of this alleged fact.” P. 4, line 19 to P. 5 lines 1-7, 16, 17

THE COURT: To begin with, Mr. Tulis, you inaccurately stated the filing date. The filing date of your motion is January 4th. This — secondly, you admitted you’ve been up to the court to see the record. The record is not closed. It’s open. *** And thirdly, what you’re arguing has already been argued. So, no, you’re seeking a second bite of the apple, which as the court found, neither respondent was in default. P. 5 line 23 to P. 6 line 3

Relator demanded to see the record on which the court based its claim that respondent is not in default, the case file showing differently than the court’s purported findings, which nevertheless are procedurally only of proposed orders still under timely filed challenge, for false statements and lack of foundation.

Relator demands the court correct its mistreatment of the record, prejudicial to the relator, given the unrebutted evidence finds respondent Lee in default absent evidence of a contrary record, and in contradiction to the existing record.

MR. TULIS Well, I’m doing that now by highlighting the fact that while I have inspected the record, we have an order, Your Honor, that makes reference to another record, that I have not seen and that has not been given to me, about respondent Lee’s receipt of service. And the receipt of service, as the record shows, is October the 6th and not, not, as your order has it, October 26. Where, Your Honor, does October 26 come from? That is a date — there’s material that I have not seen. The record does not show that date. And so somehow the court has excused Governor Lee being in default as to the rule for 30 days to answer, Your Honor. Hearing transcript P. 6, lines 11-23

The court asserts respondent Lee’s service date, with no mention of the record. A phone hearing makes it impossible for state of Tennessee on relation to prosecute the action from the record, or engage the court in any meaningful way to produce the record, and rule upon a defaulted respondent.

The plausible though fraudulent reason for the telephonic hearing is the local court’s “standing order regarding easing of restrictions of in person proceedings,” May 4, 2020, which says on Page 3 (P14 in the PDF online), “Courts to remain open. *** The court will address the need to have in-person proceedings in accordance with the Supreme Court’s Suspension Order and the needs of each individual case.” A case about the fraud of the “COVID-19 pandemic” state of emergency and violation of state law has a judicial good cause need to be heard in person. Such case deserves, given the content and claim, to face as few CV-19 restrictive artifices as possible for good cause, given the judicial nature of the case. 

Rather, no exception was made either for the Dec. 2 or the Jan. 11 hearing, the first one in person — with masks obscuring the faces of all the parties which became a prejudice to the relator and for due process prejudice requiring the filing of an objection to a proposed order for false statements and due process prejudices not understood at the time for purposes of objection by the relator because of the masks and closer proximity between the judge and attorneys and despite the chancellor did not care when the relator stated, “I can’t hear you. I’m so sorry. I cannot hear you. Can you speak in the microphone?” Dec. 20, 2020, hearing, transcript, P. 17, lines 23-25, and, also, 

MR. TULIS: Can’t hear. I’m sorry. I cannot hear you. Speak up.

P. 26, lines, 24, and, also, an objection to a chin diaper covering the judge’s lips and interfering with her being understood, P. 4, lines 15-17, “And, and you will wear a mask as well prejudicing my ability to see your, your expression and your demeanor, ma’am — Your Honor?” Relator’s Americans with Disabilities-based objection is that relator suffers an audiovisual disability, one that might be termed a masked aural disability, indicating his reliance on looking at a person’s moving the lips to speak, as well as hearing vibrations in the air of sound. The consequence of this ongoing fraud, the court of chancery purportedly the beacon of extraordinary justice irreparably harms relator without remedy. 

Subject matter jurisdiction, Davidson County issue

The court claims it has had no subject matter jurisdiction. If so, a single word beyond dismissal of the action is null and void. But because the court for 140 days proves itself negligent to equity, and since the courts of appeal are compromised by executive branch impositions against their independence and willing to play along with chancery, relator drafts this response to every point chancery makes in its dismissal order. He believes chancery has full jurisdiction of this matter, and should rule on it favorably. But he is forced into a futility under the court’s order, arguing against a nullity because of his lack of confidence in judicial honesty and integrity, which, if it were operative, would allow him to stand silent on all null orders and treat the subjects raised in the order at the proper time.

Chancery’s null and void pages of analysis are a trespass on the law itself, also upon relator’s case, a smear and slander, showing the judge’s policy against state of Tennessee she believes will be upheld by compromised superiors who, twice already in petitions to the state supreme court, have turned their back on equity and grievances laid against chancery’s maladministration of this case.

The court’s answer influences jurists, and shows her policy against state of Tennessee and relator, in which she expects consistency in policy from her superiors as they turn their backs on equity, nay, even in chancery with its high and holy origins, as Gibson attests.

The court says it has no subject matter jurisdiction on grounds of the law requiring lawsuits against commissioners to be filed in Davidson County. It says it hasn’t authority to transfer the case to Davidson County, but to dismiss it only.

The court’s order of dismissal is 15 pages. On a single page the court demurs, claims no subject matter jurisdiction. Over 14 pages it witnesses to its belief it indeed has subject matter jurisdiction. The court cannot have it both ways. 

Beyond its commentary on matters said to be not before it, the court has insisted on subject matter jurisdiction in two other ways. 

— Time factor. Chancery’s grip on this case 140 days signals that it believes it has subject matter jurisdiction. 

— Fraud factor. Fraud is not a factor in other cases touching on the statute regarding commissioners’ right to be sued in Davidson County, seat of state government, which separates this case from others. “Allegations in a petition for mandamus, not denied or confessed and avoided, are taken to be true.” Harris v. State, 96 Tenn. 496, 34 S.W. 1017 (1896) Admitted fraud vitiates every privilege, but for the court to acknowledge the fraud and the peremptory nature of relator’s action interferes with the predetermined outcome against state of Tennessee on relation.

Relator insists his petition empowers Hamilton County chancery to act in favor of state law. He filed one lawsuit, not two, for good and equitable reasons. If two judges were to deal with the matter of governor-caused mass fraud under the “COVID-19” pretext, there might be contradictory rulings. That is not to be. Respondents are united in their wrongdoings, one employed in Hamilton County, one in office in Davidson. The court has authority to issue relief today. Equity delights to do complete justice and not by halves, Gibson, § 47, id. “Where a Court of Equity has obtained jurisdiction over some portion or feature of a controversy, it may, and will in general, proceed to decide the whole issues, and to award complete relief, although the rights of the parties are strictly legal, and the final remedy granted is of the kind which might be conferred by a Court of Law,” says Gibson, § 45, citing Pom. Eq. Jur. § 231. Equity court acts upon the person, Gibson § 44, 1955 edition, and respondents are sued in their persons, as their wrongs are pursued outside of their lawful office.

But another due process obstacle for the court in failing to alter its order is, had the motion to strike an improper motion to dismiss been heard timely, prior, the cause may have had to have been transferred, if the court embraced respondent’s fraud on the record, and the court could not have put on the show it did to obtain the record needed to plausibly feign that some sort of adequate hearing was had; this perception speaks to confidence in the court, in the system of justice, trust, that justice will be done.   

The pretense of the court is palpable. The court has failed to maintain this confidence or trust, at least to the relator, who experienced little more than mistreatment by the judicial branch under color of judicial authority. And the sad part of it is, the petition anticipates this mistreatment, with the court breezing the projection into a billowing fact. 

Relator’s claims have been hog-tied in this court 140 days. Knowing the case is in an emergency, that mandamus is ministerial and peremptory, a matter of urgency and great public interest, the respondents-in-fraud, of notice prior to the suit, the court could have immediately transferred the whole or part of the case, allegation of conspiracy aside, in the interest of equity and justice to Davidson County for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; at the very least give notice, if it intended justice.

But it didn’t. Instead the court has violated the rule for mandamus. It has violated equity. It has violated the rules of judicial ethics. It has violated the Tennessee constitution, and its judge has violated her covenant with the voters of Hamilton County by burying this case amid run-of-the-mill probate cases and custody disputes.

The court says “a threshold inquiry” is subject matter jurisdiction under purported gubernatorial privilege and it orders the case dismissed. Relator has had three hearings (one of them with the clerk and master) in this peremptory matter. 

Why hearings if no subject matter jurisdiction? 

Why trouble the state of Tennessee on relation in the court’s calendar — “THE COURT. You will be heard in full,” Jan. 11, 2020, hearing transcript, P. 15, line 15 — if the court has no subject matter jurisdiction and “any order, other than a dismissal, taken by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action, is null and void,” as the court says, Lee order P. 14 (emphasis added)? 

It is futile and void for the court to weigh in on issues not before it; but acting “as quickly as I could” is useful, perhaps, as a make-good and a pretense show of concern in a peremptory and emergency matter involving the entire public in the state of Tennessee due a response “forthwith.”

Relator filed this writ of mandamus on Oct. 2, 2020, and requested an expedited hearing. “I set it as quickly as I could as soon as service was obtained on the defendants and time for them to respond,” the court said, transcript Jan. 11, 2021, hearing, P. 12, lines 10-13. A first hearing was Dec. 2, 2020, two months after filing, way delayed beyond “forthwith.” Exhibit No. 1, transcript Dec. 2, 2020 hearing. Exhibit No. 2, Jan. 11, 2021 hearing.

The court has sat stonily these many months as irreparable harm continues to relator and in trust breach to the people in state of Tennessee as a whole. Equity does not permit irreparable damage and fraud to continue unabated in a matter of extraordinary public interest and personal interest to an aggrieved man living in Hamilton County who is relator. Since equity does not permit such an abuse of authority, the court intends no justice. 

The court’s 14 pages of work, without its subject matter jurisdiction, is so much persiflage. It poisons the well on appeal, erects around relator a briar patch topped with concertina wire to deny him a remedy in the greatest evil the state has faced since its founding June 1, 1796, nearly 82,100 days ago. State of Tennessee in a state of disaster, as respondent Lee admits, is without precedent:

As we approach the one year mark of managing the COVID-19 pandemic in Tennessee and facing the number of other challenges in this state and on the federal level, it’s a common refrain to hear “this is a historic time”, or an “unprecedented time” or “never before have seen a challenge of this magnitude.” 

In many ways, that’s certainly true, and I’ve found there has been no greater place for COVID to cause sweeping disruption than in our K-12 school system.

This disruption has left students to navigate unprecedented challenges without the routine of learning in a classroom, with classmates and a trusted teacher. 

Gov. Bill Lee press release, Oct. 16, 2020. 

Relator’s action is, to meet the oppression, equally unprecedented, empowering chancery court and magnifying its office in an occasion unique in state history, giving means for chancery to provide relief to stop respondents’ historic fraud. 

Relator objects to the court’s toying with his cause, dandling it on its knee, and declares he is harmed by it.

Turning to the court’s reading of the statute regarding lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds relator should have divided up his suit into two parts, in violation of the promise of equity jurisdiction, with respondent Lee’s part to have been originally filed in Davidson County chancery, the court cites a case the facts of which render it an unsuitable prop for its order.

Southwest Williams County Community Association v. Saltsman, 66 S. W.3d 872, 882 ( Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) reviews the right of state commissioners to be sued in Davidson county.

The Tennessee Constitution mandates that the State can only be sued as the General Assembly directs by law. Art. I, Section 17, Tennessee Constitution. We believe that the General Assembly has clearly prescribed that a suit against a commissioner in his or her official capacity, i.e., a suit against the State, must be brought in Davidson County.

6 As we have seen, T.C.A. § 4–4–104(a) provides as follows:

Each department shall maintain a central office at the capitol, which shall be the official residence of each commissioner, or head of department.

Sw. Williamson Cty. Cmty. Ass’n v. Saltsman, 66 S.W.3d 872, 881 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)

Saltsman is misapplied. Past cases deal with multiple issues involving policy and commissioners operating within their lawful authority, not fraudulent pretense or pretext. None have adjudicated issues brought up in this case of first impression: Whether the fraud, acts done personally by respondent outside authority and in contravention to oath and duty under Tennessee code annotated (see petition ¶¶ 30, 34-41, 80, 107, 128-133, 159, 160, 165, 168, 174, 181-18), or through conspiracy or by omission, causing irreparable harm, facially proven in the petition, admitted shortly thereafter by respondent’s failure to avoid, vitiates every privilege or immunity, such as the “venue of privilege.” 

To decide otherwise would be to say fraud does not vitiate every equity, notwithstanding Gibson’s authorities.

The nature of chancery to bring equitable relief, the fact it has a local defendant, and the judicial system’s requirement for efficiency and avoiding multiplicity of lawsuits tell chancery that it has full jurisdiction, despite precedent dealing with commissioners. 

The slavish application of the Webb rule would result in forcing plaintiff to sue each governmental entity separately, each in its own county, thereby forcing plaintiff to incur additional expense, to risk inconsistent verdicts, and to further congest court dockets. These results are not desirable. We think the need for judicial efficiency, including the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, outweighs the advantages resulting from the basic policy of localizing actions against a governmental entity. See Rule 22.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and editorial comment thereon. To gain this efficiency and at the same time preserve as much of the efficacy of the Webb rule as possible under the circumstances, we hold that in the absence of statutory authority to the contrary, where two or more governmental entities, or their agents and officials, are material defendants, the plaintiff may bring his action at the situs of either governmental entity.

Baker v. Hughes, 532 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tenn. 1975).

State ex rel Tulis involves fraud on unprecedented scale, or accompaniment with economic ruin, depression, police power abuse in almost every city and county where the COVID-19 “emergency” controls. “And whatever the shapes and disguises fraud has invented in the refinements and diversities of commerce and the progress of civilization, the Courts of Equity have always been able to detect and expose it, to redress the wrong done by it, and to keep it odious, regardless of the rank or wealth of its perpetrator” Gibson’s § 57, Equity Will Undo What Fraud Has Done, 1955 ed.). A fraud by one who is brought to the court in personal capacity (as well as official), which court under maxim of law that “its original authority [acts] on the person of the party” (Gibson’s § 41 Equity Acts Upon the Person, 1955 ed.).

To read or interpret that the general assembly did intend to extend to fraud — or have that much power to provide such a privilege — would be way beyond lawful intent, or suggesting that the legislature could have that power to intend or extend, the statute more properly interpreted as intended by the legislature, to exclude such fraud. 

This is the only thing left to the court to decide when it insisted, until the convenient contrary suggestion irrelevant to this case, that a chancellor, to dismiss and do justice, would have had to make the determination without due process (to the prejudice of relator) that fraud does not, contrary to equity principles, vitiate or deny respondent’s equity; 

— Or, that at the time of filing the action the court knew, precedent shows as to other dissimilar cases, if applicable, or should have known, it had no jurisdiction to take and file the petition for equitable relief; or given, if not immediately at the time of filing, the action at that point being prior to final judgment at the first motion hearing, should have been transferred, the action not heard or decided by a judge; 

— Or, that given the precedent, notwithstanding the question of fraud, knowing Hamilton County chancery had no jurisdiction, the court could feign having jurisdiction to delay, if not thwart, the relief, as the petition anticipated. 

The petition avers the American Bar Association, figurehead of the guild in which the chancellor is a member, favors and promotes the green religion of sustainability, of which “COVID-19 pandemic” is one political weapon and United Nations administration of American life apart from constitutional protections in a state the judicial branch of which has capitulated to “national self-inflicted disaster and embarrassment” and “has taken part in the panic and mass illegality,” the petition taken true. (See petition ¶¶ 85, 86, 120-124.) 

The order of this court supposedly operates “without broadening or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope.” But it evidences no valid reason to interpret the law extending a venue of privilege to lawfully acting state officials, in such a manner as to also embrace fraud; the petition anticipated such corruption of justice and covert usurpation under color of law, and because equity principles do not tolerate fraud. 

If so, chancery itself becomes the causative agent of the irreparable harm without a remedy with such a foundationless interpretation embracing fraud despite equity principles to the contrary. Apart from every other consideration, the delay to this matter is predicted as an obstruction of justice in the petition, sadly, shockingly.

Demand for amended order

The court is fence-sitting on whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, to the injury of state of Tennessee on relation. If gubernatorial fraud deserves the privilege afforded to respondent Lee’s commissioners in routine policy disputes, the peremptory and emergency filing Oct. 2, 2020, deserved to have the Lee portion of State ex rel Tulis transferred to Davidson County chancery court immediately, or prior to forthwith. 

Yes, relator would have objected, as it would put a case of state actors in combination to violate law under two judges, with the prospect of conflicting rulings in a matter that chancery is charged to take up in its entirety, in all possible outlying areas of the dispute. If the court were to deny respondent argument on subject matter jurisdiction at an emergency hearing two or three days after filing (it being an emergency peremptory action), it should have ruled immediately in an order as short as a single sentence as follows: The respondents must obey state law at Tenn. Code Ann. § Title 68-5-104.

Such an order in no way could have harmed either respondent, or imposed on them anything they had not agreed to perform years prior on their taking office or employment. Dismissal causes the reverse of equity and justice. It is not in the public interest. It gives unholy succor to respondents-in-fraud having no equity. It aids and abets fraud, it endorses fraud on the court, it enwraps the court as a participant in the fraud as foreseen in the petition, and it continues the found irreparable harm of the relator, and the state on relation. This is not justice done by any stretch of the imagination, however attorned.

The order dismissing the action is not well taken in law, fact, equity principles, and most importantly in fulfilling the duty of chancery to do justice or by the standard of review for abuse of discretion, if there was any available in a cause of admitted fraud causing irreparable harm by officials under color of authority evidenced by two affidavit witnesses, the uncontested petition and the inseparably appurtenant affidavit of irreparable harm, of record.

The court’s dismissal order is erroneous and needs to be altered to reflect the relief relator sought, and by not adopting the respondents-in-fraud questions of relator’s intention, or unsupportable fabrication on its own, but to properly treat the affidavits of record, the uncontested petition being one and the affidavit of irreparable harm being the other, as intended, and the record, accurately reviewed, together with the prejudicial due process violations depriving relator of his right to respond and be heard, or to petition amendment, and reverse the dismissal doing justice as demanded, whether through mandamus or the other remedies available to every court of chancery.

The court did not have the luxury to do act “as quickly as I could” (hearing transcript, Jan. 11, 2021, P. 12, lines 10-13), with a TWO, 2, MONTH delay to the first hearing, if it did not have jurisdiction upon remedies for irreparable harm caused by fraud requiring action “forthwith,” reflected in the mandamus provision, T.C.A. 29, cited by the court. 

If the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction it should have acted immediately, apart from any response by the respondent, if fulfilling the purpose of chancery to see that justice is done. If this court did not have jurisdiction, it also works an injustice to other litigants delaying their actions, while this case, “as quickly as I could,” took up the court’s valuable time on a matter not lawful before it. 

The court either has subject matter jurisdiction due to fraud, this case being distinguishable from precedent, or it does not because the judiciary of Tennessee embraces fraud and the case should have been transferred immediately to Davidson County, or refused by the court outright with notice.

If the judiciary of Tennessee does not embrace and give succor to fraud, this court has jurisdiction and shall do justice, and not by halves. The court cannot support its contention against standing or that it finds no particularized irreparable harm is in evidence. The unchallenged affidavit evidences irreparable harm, directly caused by the respondents-in-fraud, evidenced in the petition, not disclosed in the order. The court cannot support the contention that the irreparable harm is not directly caused by respondent-in-fraud; but for, we wouldn’t be here — respondents-in-fraud have admitted to being the direct cause, thumbing their conspiratorial noses, the petition taken true, at chancery.

And the court cannot support the contention, as equity requires, that this action of the state on relation has no public interest or benefit due to its extraordinary nature without adequate remedy, secured  constitutionally to relator, a man aggrieved.

To assert to the contrary is frivolous, exceedingly embarrassing, and beyond the mere appearance of impropriety, if not worse. 

As to how this court does salvage this travesty of justice, instead of lamenting all the court cannot do, and blamed, in part, upon the hapless, purportedly remediless, relator, leaves the court with what remains that chancery can do with its broad power, if the court will eschew the respondent-in-fraud and do justice. Even if mandamus is unavailable, for whatever reason, and even if the court still believes, even wrongly, that equity compensation means money judgment, the discretion of the court is not left without a canvas to paint. 

The court in its burning desire to do equity can dip its brush into the palette of justice and find and declare the frauds and nullify the orders of the respondent-in-fraud, which equity principles demand;

The court could further enjoin the enforcement of those orders as demanded in the petition. And it could reform the rule which the respondents-in-fraud used to carry out their scheme and artifice with the help of their foreign co-conspirators of terrorism, all contrary to legislative intent, or scope, or constitutional, or other lawful prohibition, or trust.

Respondents-in-fraud are not the untouchable sovereigns they claim to be, or as the court wrongly accepts, not where law rules. It seems to the relator, chancery can likely find many more shades in its palette of justice, and not requiring a single thing from the “procedurally deficient” relator, if the court intends to do justice. 

The court either never had jurisdiction and is denying justice to the state on relation, and the people of Tennessee, those people that created chancery to secure to them their peace, tranquility, wealth, and health, among others, or it has had jurisdiction and did not act “forthwith,” in lawful due process, denying justice to the state on relation, relator, and the people of Tennessee. 

The order, unless it agrees fraud has no remedy and the respondents thereby are untouchable because they are monarchs subduing the land and oppressing people, fails to provide a foundation for the securing of status quo created illicitly by respondent(s), and further, for agreeing that this dismissal extends to grant and could be without prejudice.

Costs are to be denied to one admitting fraud, whatever the procedural deficiency of the relator. The allowance of costs is fraud and also without jurisdiction.

The order of dismissal needs to be altered to reflect the case intended and filed by relator, not the one fabricated by the court. The court’s original order needs to be stricken from the record as improper for the reasons delineated herein, such as and not limited to, respondent’s unavoided fraud, due process violations, or improper administration of the action, inapplicability to the case before the court, and the want of equity.

The court has authority to end the social engineering project and “government by emergency” under color of a communicable disease crisis and to restore justice today to relator and 6.8 million other people in state of Tennessee. 

The largesse and indulgence of the court extended to respondent-in-fraud Lee has not been afforded the same benefit never extended to the relator prior, his orders for relief all denied. If the court so directs, relator will write the order altering the former, as the court has asked the respondent-in-fraud so many times after instructions in its discretion the court decided as to what to write. 

I do, hereby, declare to the above statement to be true and correct to the best of my firsthand knowledge.